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STUDIES IN JEWISH NATIONALISM



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
BY  
LEON SIMON

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
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## PREFATORY NOTE

I AM much indebted to the editors of *Asia*, the *Jewish Forum*, the *Menorah Journal*, the *Round Table*, and *Palestine* for permission to reproduce in this volume essays which have appeared in the periodicals mentioned. The essays are reprinted practically as they appeared: in particular, I have not attempted to bring them up to date by altering the few passages in which the war is referred to, explicitly or by implication, as still in progress. Such changes as have been made are mostly verbal.

The conception of Nationalism, and of Jewish Nationalism in particular, which underlies these essays is derived from Achad ha-Am (Asher Ginzberg), the foremost of living Hebrew writers. Some of his essays have appeared in an English translation by the present writer (*Selected Essays*; Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia, 1912). The German translation (*Am Scheidewege*, 2 vols., Jüdischer Verlag, Berlin, 1913 and 1916) contains a wider selection. Among recent English books dealing with Zionism and the Jewish revival in Palestine the reader may be referred to *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, edited by H. Sacher (John Murray, 2nd edition, 1917); *Palestine* :

*the Rebirth of an Ancient People*, by A. M. Hyamson (Sidgwick and Jackson, 1917); *Palestine of the Jews*, by Norman Bentwich (Kegan Paul, 1917); and the *History of Zionism, 1600-1918*, by Nahum Sokolow (Longmans, 1919).

L. S.

*April 1920.*

## INTRODUCTION

MY old friend Mr. Leon Simon, who has at last sufficiently overcome his modesty to discard the rôle of translator and inspirer, and to issue a book of his own, has asked me to write him a few lines of introduction. He imagines, I fancy, that my chaperonage will in some measure promote the circulation of his book among non-Jewish readers. But the last rôle for which I feel I am cast is that of chaperon, and where Mr. Leon Simon and his master Achad ha-Am (Asher Ginzberg) are concerned I must frankly drop the part of *impresario* and profess myself a grateful disciple.

It is now many years since that I first encountered the ideas of the little group of young English Zionists of whom Leon Simon and Harry Sacher are the most distinguished representatives. My first recollection of Leon Simon goes back to 1902, when, as a Balliol scholar and the most brilliant classic of his year, he carried off the Ireland Scholarship; but it was not till some years later that I made his personal acquaintance. In the previous year, the last of my undergraduate career, Harry Sacher came up to New College, where his more controversial brand of idealism was not

long in making its mark in our College debates and discussions. In 1905, interested in what I had learnt from him and others about the Jewish national movement, I procured journalistic facilities to attend the Zionist Congress held in that summer in Bâle. It was there, at the bookstall of the Congress, that I first fell in with the writings of Achad ha-Am, in a volume of German translations of his essays and in an extremely interesting monograph by Mathias Acher (*Achad ha 'am, ein Denker und Kämpfer der jüdischen Renaissance*, Jüdischer Verlag, Berlin, 1903). It is the plain truth to say that the ideas contained in those two books and developed in the course of years of, unhappily too intermittent, discussion and intercourse with the English interpreters of Achad ha-Am, of whom Leon Simon is the foremost, have influenced me, in steadily increasing measure, ever since. Not only has Achad ha-Am laid his finger on a profound truth—a truth precious and serviceable in any thinking and self-conscious community—but he has a message which is of peculiar interest and value for the present age: for more than half the perplexity and rancour under which the European peoples are labouring to-day would be cleared away as by magic if the simple teaching of Achad ha-Am on nationality and kindred subjects had become, as I believe it is destined to become in the future, the common property of the civilised world.

I have spoken of Achad ha-Am's and his disciple Leon Simon's conception of nationality as simple: and so indeed it seems to me now, and would seem, I think, to anyone, lettered or unlettered, who had not first had his head filled with the shibboleths with which the politicians and the propagandists have made us increasingly familiar during the last hundred years.

But, as my own experience has shown me, it does not seem simple or easily intelligible to the average English-speaking hearer or reader. Words like 'nation,' 'nationalist,' 'liberation,' 'independence,' 'self-determination' call up so many confused and controversial associations that it is very hard to get a fair hearing for anyone who, like the author of these essays, stands back from the political struggles of the moment, and tries to see the problem of his nation, and of all self-conscious nations, steadily, critically and as a whole. I doubt whether the average non-Jewish reader will find these essays easy reading. I almost hope that he will not. But I am sure that if he will read them once, with the care they deserve, he will often find himself inclined to come back to them, and that when he turns to other writers on these and kindred subjects, he will discover how deeply, and with what lasting effect, the ploughshare of the Jewish thinker, with its keen analytical blade, has cut into the subsoil of his mind. Thus encouraged, he will be ready to welcome the good seed which, here as in the order of Nature, follows the ploughing, and to look forward, if not in this distracted generation then in the next, to the plenteous harvest for which sound ideas and faithful thinking sometimes have long to wait, but never wait in vain.

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*March 22, 1920.*



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# STUDIES IN JEWISH NATIONALISM

## RELIGION AND NATIONALITY <sup>1</sup>

THE term 'religion,' as used of a modern man or group of men, normally implies belief in a universal God. It implies, of course, many things besides. The religious man is supposed to stand in a particular emotional relation to God, and to have his life influenced profoundly by that relation. But at any rate the religious man in the modern world—by which we generally mean the Western world—is not thought of as possibly believing in a stock or a stone or a tribal deity. We assume as a matter of course that, though different groups of religious men may worship in different ways, the supernatural power of which religion postulates the existence is a universal God.

When, therefore, we speak of the 'religion' not of a modern man or nation but of a primitive tribe, we are using the word 'religion' loosely, almost metaphorically. For primitive man, generally speaking, has no conception of a universal God. Each tribe has a god of its own, who belongs to the tribe just as much as the tribe belongs to him, and is at war with other

<sup>1</sup> Written in 1913; published in the *Menorah Journal*, June and August 1919.

gods just as his tribe is at war with other tribes. With this tribal god a certain cult is associated, and the individual is born into this cult, and adopts it just as naturally and inevitably as he adopts the language, customs, and habits of his tribe. Thus his 'religion' is simply an element in what we might call—using again a term which strictly does not apply to primitive conditions—his 'nationality.' It is just one of the factors that go to form his group-consciousness, his sense of community of life and interests with the other members of the same tribe; and, like the other factors of that group-consciousness, it is exclusive—it marks him off, no less than his language or his loyalty does, from the members of another tribe. It is quite different from religion in the modern sense, which is essentially inclusive in its aim; for, theoretically at least, a universal God, just because he is universal, claims the adhesion of all, and belief in him takes the individual beyond his exclusive national group into communion with the whole of mankind.

The primitive tribe, then, is at a stage of development in which our modern distinction between religion and nationality is meaningless. But both religion and nationality are implicitly present as elements in its group-consciousness, and in the course of its struggle for existence and growth those elements, at first indistinguishably fused, fall apart, and become separate and even antagonistic things. For the struggle of a group of human beings for existence and growth cannot be carried on successfully unless it advances beyond the primitive stage in knowledge and power over nature. If it is to develop at all, in face of hostile forces both natural and human, it must improve its material equipment and organisation. It must build houses, devise weapons, invent machines, work out a

polity and a system of education, if it is to go ahead in the struggle. It must, in a word, become what we call civilised. But it is not equally constrained to rise from primitive tribal superstition to a conception of the universal God. It can fight nature and other human groups, and become more or less civilised in the process, without necessarily transforming the crude cult into a religion worthy of the name. But the development of the tribe in equipment and organisation cannot be a purely material development. It is bound to react on thought, to produce moral values and standards of conduct; and these spiritual products of the national growth will not square with ideas about the supernatural and the other world which are a mere survival from an earlier stage of development. Unless, therefore, such 'religious' ideas (religious in the sense that they are, as it were, the raw material of what we call religion) are capable of adaptation to the conditions of a more advanced material civilisation, and are in fact adapted to those conditions naturally and insensibly, in that same process of national growth in which all social institutions are adapted to new ideas and demands, they must become anomalies, must cease to stand in any organic relation to the rest of the national life. Religion will thus become a distinct thing, concerned only with one department of human life, and incapable, because it is out of date, of moulding the national growth; there will be a conflict between religion and nationality.

But religion cannot always remain out of date and at odds with nationality. If the mountain will not come to Mahomet, Mahomet must go to the mountain. If outworn religious ideas cannot stay the progress of civilisation, they must give place to others with which civilisation can feel at home. The transition must be

made in some way from the tribal to the universal God, because the more developed outlook of civilised man demands a universal God. We see this process going on in Greek literature, as the result of a philosophic development which had its origin in independent scientific thought. The absurd Zeus of Homer—a Zeus who co-existed with a high degree of civilisation and a well-marked national feeling—is transformed by Æschylus into an omnipotent moral force; but traces of earlier ideas are still abundantly present, and the wider developments of the conception of a universal God do not appear. Plato goes a good deal further: with him the old cosmogony is swept away, *ὁ θεός* (God) is more or less identified with the Idea of Good, and we get an intelligible presentation of the universe as an ordered scheme based on justice—a presentation which, however rationalistic in method, is intensely religious in spirit.

But these developments of Greek religion were the work of individual poets or thinkers, and seem to have had but little effect on the religious life of the people as a whole. The primitive 'religious' ideas did not die out, but survived into a period of highly organised and civilised national life, in which, as it seems to us, they were wholly out of place. We see the clash between the new and the old most clearly in the execution of Socrates for his alleged belief in 'new gods,' which was supposed to be dangerous to the State. What Socrates really believed in was a highly developed morality with a universalistic basis; and his execution was due to the sure instinct of a people in whose group-consciousness the crude 'religious' ideas of a primitive tribe still played a part, so that it was felt that to lay emphasis on the universality of the moral principle was to endanger the national cohesion. Plato, it is true, was able to

work out something like a universalistic religion without falling foul of Greek (or Athenian) national sentiment : but that is because Plato's life fell in the twilight-period of Greek nationalism, and the conflict was no longer keenly felt. So long as the national sentiment of the City-State was strong, there could be no room in Greek life for a universalistic religion, because a universalistic religion, if its development has not proceeded hand-in-hand with that of the other elements of the national life, is bound to be no less discordant and out of place in a well-knit national organisation than is a crude and primitive set of ideas about the supernatural. Just because it is so highly developed, just because it postulates a universal God and implicitly a universal brotherhood of man, it is bound to be in conflict with the essentially exclusive sentiment of nationality.

When, therefore, a universalistic religion is imported from without into a national life which has not developed its own primitive cult into a universal religion, open conflict between the demands of religion and those of nationality can be avoided only in one way. Religion must endeavour to leave this present world alone, and to devote its attention wholly to the next. It must become, so far as possible, identical with ' other-worldliness.' In order to avoid infringing on the domain of nationality, it must strive to make the cure of individual souls its only business, and must avoid having any message for the nation in its corporate capacity. The most highly religious men will then be those who withdraw themselves altogether from this world of materialism, and fit themselves for a better life by prayer and fasting, or else come into this world only to endeavour to save the souls of others by turning them away from the follies and vanities of human life. There will be a rigid distinction between things sacred and things profane,

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between religious and secular, between the things that are God's and the things that are Caesar's. On such terms religion can find for itself a place in life, at the expense of cutting itself off from life as far as possible. It can avoid hampering the development of national civilisation and culture by concerning itself only with the soul of the individual.

But this complete divorce of religion from the national life cannot continue long in practice. The great majority of men will not renounce this life for the sake of the next, and religion cannot, therefore, achieve even its avowed object of saving souls without teaching men a rule of life which will enable them to live in this world without forfeiting the other. Religion, in a word, cannot get on without morality. But, as we have seen, the material development of life also produces moral ideas and standards of conduct. A society of human beings necessarily works out a code of right and wrong in the process of consolidating itself and maintaining itself against its enemies ; it may have a relatively developed morality before it has a religion (that is, of course, a religion postulating a universal God). Morality, then, is involved in nationality no less than in religion. And when the religion has not been developed in harmony with the national life, its morality may be different from, and in conflict with, the national morality. In fact, there is bound to be a conflict between the two : for a purely national morality will judge everything from the point of view of the well-being of the nation, whereas a universalistic religion cares nothing for this nation or that. So the success and progress of the nation will depend in some degree on the extent to which it can force religion, despite its universalistic character, to fit into the national mould and serve national ends. And this Procrustes treatment will not be good for religion.

This conflict between religion and nationality has played its part in the history of modern European nations. It manifests itself not only in open struggles between State and Church, but even more in a war which goes on continually and is not marked by pitched battles—a war between a conception of life derived from Christianity and one which is an expression of the national character and a result of the national history of the nation in question. For the institutions and the morality of European nations have their roots in a period earlier than the advent of Christianity, having been developed in the early struggles of those nations for existence and growth; and the religious change from paganism to Christianity was not brought about as part of the same process. The transition from belief in Odin and Thor to belief in the universal God was not an evolution, but a revolution. The beliefs and practices of Christianity came to the nations of Europe not as a natural and spontaneous growth from within, but as a ready-made scheme of salvation from without; and the national life in which Christianity had first crystallized into being was very different from the national life of the peoples of Europe, reflecting a national character and outlook not only different from theirs, but in many ways fundamentally opposed to it.

Now Christianity, thus brought to the nations of Europe from outside, has no doubt influenced the institutions and the morality of the Englishman, the Frenchman, and the German; but it has not removed the differences of national outlook, or put an end to a most un-Christian rivalry between nations nominally subject to the sway of the same religious idea. There may be individual members of the different nations in whose thought and conduct a conception of life derived from specifically Christian teaching is dominant; but

there are well-marked differences between English morality and French and German, and of none of these nations can it be said that its morality is in any real sense Christian morality. There is little evidence, either in the national life or in international relations, of the influence of that extreme altruism, that insistence on meekness and self-abnegation, which is characteristic of the teaching of Jesus. The levelling and universalising influence of a common creed weighs surprisingly little against the differences of national character and national interests.<sup>1</sup> Moral ideas, among educated men especially, tend to be dominated by the scientific conception of evolution, which has been worked out and applied to the various departments of life in defiance of the Church ; and in so far as there is a tendency towards universal brotherhood, that tendency seems to be fostered more by the march of science and the economic teachings of Socialism than by the preaching of the Church. Indeed, the Church seems at times to be only too ready to meet the claims of nationality when they are at variance with its own principles ; for instance, it will on occasion cheerfully make itself a party to a war of aggression. In other cases there is a visible conflict between national and Christian ideals, and the national demand gradually gains the upper hand. Take, for instance, the question of the way in which Sunday should be observed, or the question of divorce law, in which the sentiment of modern nations turns more and more against Christian teaching, and the Church makes an unavailing effort to stem the tide.

It is no doubt true that the influence of the Church does not necessarily mean the same thing as the influence

<sup>1</sup> This essay was written before the War. I refrain from enforcing what is said above by reference to events of the War period



of Christianity. The Bible was brought by Christianity to the nations of Europe; and the Bible is there once for all, and theoretically it might serve as a source of spiritual and moral influence in the life of the individual, and hence to some extent in the national life, for countless generations, even if the Church should cease to exist. But in practice the Bible has little chance of exerting any influence apart from the Church. Imported into Europe by the Church, it remains the Church's property; it remains a religious as distinct from a national book. Hence in the conflict between religion and nationality the Bible inevitably stands or falls with the Church. The secularist wishes to exclude from schools not only the minister of religion, but also the Bible. Thus the Bible, though translated into every language and read by every people, cannot be in the fullest sense a part of the national literature of any modern European nation. As the struggle between the 'religious' and the 'secular' spirit develops, the Bible becomes more and more the property and the weapon of one section, and it may be of a losing section. This is perhaps the most deplorable result of the fact that the national traditions and the religion of modern European nations spring from two different sources. Nobody who looked at the Bible as a piece of literature, without any prepossession for or against religious dogmas, could dispute its right, or at least the right of some parts of it (for the Bible is not one book), to a place in the educational curriculum of a civilised society. But if the Bible is to be taught only as a part of religion, and if the influence of religion as such tends to be overshadowed by influences arising directly out of the growth of the national life, the Bible cannot have that place in the scheme of national education to which its literary and moral value entitles it.

It is in its relation to the Bible that the Jewish people

differs most obviously from the peoples of modern Europe. The difference may be summed up thus: whereas for the modern European the Bible, being a religious book, is not a national book, for the Jew the Bible is a religious book because it is a national book, or rather because it is *the* national book.

That the Old Testament is for the Jews a religious book goes, of course, without saying. It enshrines for them the truth about God and his relation to the universe; it is the source of the religious dogmas of Judaism. But the Bible and its religion did not come to the Jews ready made, from without; the universal God did not come as a stranger to oust the tribal god from his place. The transition from the more primitive to the more developed form of religion was a natural evolution, forming an organic part of the national growth, and determined by the same conditions which determined the progress of the nation on what would be called in modern phraseology its non-religious side. It was not the abandonment of a lower for a higher form of belief, under the influence of preachers who had attained the higher belief elsewhere, but the gradual adaptation to new national needs of those ideas about the tribal god which the people entertained so soon as it had a collective consciousness at all, while it was still in that early stage of development which lies behind the conceptions of religion and nationality. For this reason the Jews never needed to reach the stage at which religion and nationality can be, or rather have to be, distinguished as two separate and antagonistic forces. And the Bible, which is their religious book, is so not because it set out specifically to give them religious truth, but because it is a record of their national growth, and that national growth is inseparable from their religious growth.

There is evidence enough in the Bible that the God

of Israel was conceived originally as a tribal god, having a specific name of his own, standing in the same relation to Israel as that in which the gods of other tribes stood to them, and fighting for his own particular tribe just as the gods of other tribes fought for theirs. As always in primitive times, god and tribe were indissolubly bound together. Now this close partnership between the god and the tribe involved ordinarily that when the tribe was conquered the god also was conquered, and gave place to the god of the victorious tribe. But with the people of Israel it was different. They were not strong enough materially to secure themselves against the more powerful nations by which they were surrounded. But their God, Jehovah, did not fall with them. They came to regard him as not only their god, but the God of the whole universe; they placed in his hand not only their own destiny, but also that of the very nations which for the moment were triumphant over them. Hence no reverse to the nation could be a reverse to Jehovah; and, on the other hand, the permanence of Jehovah secured the permanence of the nation. The national overthrow could not be more than temporary, because the national god, who was also the universal God, remained unaffected by it, and he must one day restore his own people to their rights. Thus out of the struggle for their national existence the Jews developed a universalistic theism without losing hold of the earlier conception of the tribal deity.

It is only if we regard the development from tribalism to universalism in Jewish history as having come about by some such process as this that we can understand the extraordinary way in which tribal and universalistic conceptions are interwoven in Judaism. The mere retention of a specific name for the deity is of

course a survival from tribal religion. If the universal God of later Judaism were nothing but a universal God, we would expect the name Jehovah to disappear. But it does not disappear, because the God of the world does not cease to be the god of the tribe. The two are made one by the chain of historical development within the national life. 'Hear, O Israel; Jehovah is our God, Jehovah is one'; this is the Jew's assertion of that monotheism which has become the fundamental creed of his religion. But the statement is not at all a statement about God, about a universal God. It is a statement about Jehovah, about *our* God, about the primitive god of a tribe. So again in the Ten Commandments: 'I am Jehovah thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage: thou shalt have no other gods before me.' It is not a universal God who claims acceptance, but simply the tribal god, who emphasises his tribal character by associating the assertion of his god-head with a reference to the history of the tribe.

And yet the Ten Commandments are regarded by the European nations, at least in theory, as a moral code of universal and abiding value; and a religious organisation which used to exhibit biblical texts for the benefit of those who travel about London chose the following text as one means of propagating belief in God: 'I am the Lord thy God: thou shalt have no other gods before me.' This mutilated text, with the reference to the exodus from Egypt carefully omitted, reveals in a flash the whole difference between the Jewish and the Christian attitude to the universal God. The God of Judaism is universal, is the God of everybody, and his special connection with Jewish history is an irrelevance for everybody—except the Jews. But for the Jews there is no God except the one who brought

them out of Egypt, who has been with them and grown up with them, if one may so put it, throughout the course of their national life. The omnipotent ruler of the universe is still the Jehovah who had at one time to compete with Baal and Chemosh. Such a conception will not stand logical analysis: it is a combination of contradictory ideas. But while a religious dogma, if it is to be accepted, must be capable of formulation in a statement free from internal contradictions, one does not expect to sum up the living spirit of a nation in a formula; and Judaism, the attitude of the Jewish nation to its God, is not so much a religious belief in the modern sense as the expression of a national character reacting to the various forces which the nation encounters in its career.

As the national morality of the Jews, like that of any other nation, is the result of this same reaction, it follows that there is no conflict in Jewish history between religious and moral development, because the two are one. Any ethical advance which the developing moral consciousness of the nation demands is accompanied and ratified by an advance in its conception of God. The same God who at one stage of the national history demands the ruthless extermination of the Amalekites is conceived at a later stage as rebuking his angels for exulting over the destruction of his creatures, the Egyptians, in the Red Sea. The God of vengeance becomes also the God of justice and mercy. The demand for moral perfection is expressed in the injunction to the nation to be holy as its God is holy. Moral ideas and religious dogmas do not get out of harmony, because both are produced by the national spirit in a single process of evolution.

It is often said, indeed, that Judaism has no dogmas. This statement is not true as it stands. The unity of

God is a dogma ; the divine origin of the Law is a dogma ; the future coming of the Messiah is a dogma ; and so forth. But there is this peculiarity about the dogmas of Judaism : they are as much statements about the Jewish people as statements about God. The one God, as we have seen, is Jehovah, who brought the descendants of Abraham out of Egypt ; it is his unity, his omnipotence, that is asserted, and not merely the existence of a being with these attributes. The revelation, again, was not the communication of an abstract truth to an individual seer ; it was the appearance of Jehovah before the whole people, and marked the beginning of their national existence. And the Messianic age means for the Jew not merely the establishment of peace on earth and good will to men, but the universal recognition of the Jew and his God. It is another assertion of the eternity of the nation. Dogmas such as these are not simply the articles of faith of a church, to which anybody may gain admittance by accepting them ; they are the beliefs of a nation about its own past and its own future.

It is true that Maimonides in the twelfth century formulated the Jewish creed in thirteen articles, speaking of God throughout as ' the Creator,' and omitting all specific references to Jewish history, and that his articles appear in the Jewish liturgy in a form in which they might serve as the creed of a church with no national attachment.<sup>1</sup> But Maimonides certainly did not intend

<sup>1</sup> Achad ha-Am has pointed out that the inclusion of the last two articles (those relating to the Messiah and resurrection) must have been dictated subconsciously by Maimonides' national feeling. See his essay on Maimonides, *The Supremacy of Reason* (published in English translation as No. 2 of the Second Series of Zionist Pamphlets, 1917), pp. 42 sqq. But it remains true that in the formulation of these articles there is no explicit reference to the Jewish nation.

that acceptance or rejection of his articles should determine whether a man was a Jew or not—the mere idea is an absurdity. And it is significant that his articles were attacked by other Jewish thinkers, not only in detail but also in principle, and that, though they have found their way into the Jewish liturgy, there was never any possibility of their being accepted as a binding creed in the sense in which Christianity has a binding creed.

How far the Jewish nation has always been from fettering itself in purely theological or metaphysical questions may be gathered from the fact that, while belief in the creation of the world has generally been regarded as fundamental to Judaism, there have been eminent Jewish thinkers who have held the contrary Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of matter. An interesting light is thrown on the whole question of the place of dogma in Judaism by a statement of Maimonides which implies that if he had accepted this theory of Aristotle, he could have explained away the passages in the Bible which seem to conflict with it. And of course the habit of excommunicating people because they hold heretical ideas is foreign to Judaism. Maimonides himself was bitterly attacked for his 'Guide for the Perplexed,' in which he attempted to reconcile Judaism with Aristotle's philosophy, so that among strictly 'orthodox' Jews the book is banned as heretical to this day, and many a living Jew who was brought up in the Ghetto will recall how he read it by stealth. But Maimonides remains none the less one of the greatest of Jewish teachers, and nobody would suggest that his other books should be consigned to oblivion because this one is tainted with heresy. More than that: the heretical 'Guide for the Perplexed' has probably had at least as great an influence on Jewish thought as

its author's more orthodox works. In the case of Spinoza, again, it is at least probable that the Jews of Amsterdam hastened to excommunicate him only because they were afraid that otherwise their Christian neighbours would make them suffer for a heresy which was more dangerous to Christianity than to Judaism. It may be said in general that the Jewish people does not accept or reject its thinkers according as they are or are not loyal to established dogmas. It is the national instinct of self-preservation—often, no doubt, acting unconsciously—that determines what modifications of doctrine or of practice can be admitted. Is this book, this movement, this proposed reform going to make for or against the maintenance of the national separateness of Israel? That is the question which has to be answered. And the answer comes automatically, by a sort of natural selection. For any movement which tends to the breaking-down of barriers will carry those who follow it away from their people into the world beyond; and the remnant who survive as Jews will be those who manage to cling to the right spiritual defences—that is to say, to those beliefs and practices which are calculated to maintain their national separateness.

It is in response to the national instinct of self-preservation that the Jews in exile have woven around their belief in a universal God an all-embracing web of ceremonial practice, which for the best part of two thousand years has been at least as essential to Judaism as any particular religious belief. For the salvation of the individual soul a set of dogmas and moral rules may be enough; but if a nation wishes to preserve itself after it has lost the ordinary attributes of nationhood, it must have a distinctive mode of life. It goes without saying that the characteristic Jewish mode of



life has come down to the present day as something specifically religious. For the Jew took with him into exile nothing but his God and his Law, and the development of his national life had to proceed in a single channel. With parliaments and armies and navies, with the making of roads and railways, with the development of styles of art and architecture, with the devising of improved mechanical means for the satisfaction of human wants—with all these things the Jewish nation as such has had nothing to do since the dispersion. The national energies had to find their outlet in the working out of a scheme of life which should preserve the identity of a nation without a territory or a parliament or a gun or a ship to call its own. And nowadays, when we place parliaments and guns and ships in one half of life, and religion in the other, we naturally think of the system so worked out as a religious system, because it is not a political system. But obviously there is no direct connection between the religious consciousness of modern times and a rule of life which embraces—not as optional customs, but as essentials—such prescriptions as the dietary laws of Judaism ; and the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth cannot, one would think, be delayed by the introduction of organs into synagogues, or by the substitution of Sunday for Saturday as the religious day of rest. And yet it is in matters such as these that the Jewish people as a whole is most tenacious of its traditions.

To look at the same fact from the other end : if the Jew in Europe became so attached to the yellow badge, which was at first forced on him by his alien masters, that he clung to it long after he was at liberty to give it up, as though it had been really a part of his tradition, this means that we must look for the source of the

Jewish mode of life, though we may call it 'religious ceremonial,' in something which is not denoted adequately by the term 'religion.' The persistent objection of the Jew to eating pork, no less than the more transitory objection of the ghetto Jew to a short coat, is to be referred not to an individual spiritual experience of the kind that we call 'religious conviction,' but to that deep-rooted instinct which makes him insist at all costs on being something different from his surroundings—an instinct which is religious as well as national only because the nationality of the Jew is inseparable from his national and universal God.

The western Jew, no doubt, tries to draw distinctions between custom and custom. Thus the so-called 'reformers' would make the Bible the only source of Jewish religious law, and would reject all later accretions; and among 'orthodox' Jews there are some—though these are scarcely a defined sect—who would like to go back as far as the Talmud only, and to discard what is of later origin. But both these parties are drawing artificial distinctions: they are both false to the idea of continuous revelation, which is one with the idea of the permanence of Israel as a nation. The Bible represents one stage of Jewish evolution; the *Shulchan Aruch*, the complex code of the sixteenth century, represents another. In either case the nation is expressing, in a manner conditioned by the circumstances of the time, that attitude to life which is the essence of its nationality; and in so doing it is building for itself a bulwark against the external enemy. The buildings have not all the same permanent value; but they all serve the same end for a longer or shorter time.

Thus it is misleading to speak of the Jewish system of life as a religious system if we are using the term 'religious' in the sense in which it is ordinarily taken.

What in fact the Jewish nation has been doing during the last two thousand years is only a continuation, under different conditions, of what it was doing before the Exile. It has been preserving its identity as a nation, which no merely physical weapons could have secured, by means of spiritual defences—that is, by turning its national-religious idea to that use which circumstances dictated, ever adapting and developing that idea and its consequences under the stress of changing conditions, to the end that it might live. This struggle for life is essentially the struggle of a nation which desires to breathe freely, and to express itself fully as other nations do; it is not the endeavour of a church to spread its own religious doctrine. But the Jewish nation and its God are inseparable, and the Jewish God has become in the course of history the universal God; so that the national striving has inevitably a religious significance, in that it involves the periodical recasting not merely of political and social institutions, but also of ideas which (when regarded apart from the history of this particular nation) are, in the strict modern sense of the word, religious.

Now it is obvious that the mere existence of a nation which claims to have a God of its own, and maintains itself by means of its God-idea amongst nations which maintain themselves by means of armies and navies, is an anomaly at the present day. We are accustomed to regard a man's nationality as determined by the State of which he is a subject, and his religion as determined by the Church to which he adheres; and since we Jews have no State, it is an easy conclusion that we have, as Jews, no nationality. In the countries of Western Europe, where Jews have long enjoyed political rights, they are very ready to jump at this conclusion, and so to escape from an anomalous position. They

profess to belong by nationality to the country in which they live, and to be Jews by religion only. But it follows from what has been said above that this attempt to reduce Judaism to a Church is doomed to failure. Judaism, robbed of its national basis, has no chance of life. Its ceremonial practices become irksome and apparently useless in a form of civilised life with which they have no essential connection. Its moral teachings are displaced by the English or French or German morality which the emancipated Jew unconsciously imbibes with his English or French or German education. And as a set of metaphysical dogmas it has little appeal to the modern man. For Judaism has no message of salvation for the individual soul, as Christianity has: all its ideas are bound up with the existence of the Jewish nation. Hence those emancipated Jews who are most religiously minded in the modern sense, those who are most concerned with the salvation of their individual souls, tend to go over to Christianity, or to evolve a form of so-called Judaism which is only a stepping-stone to Christianity; and those who remain more or less true to traditional Judaism are just those whose cravings for individual salvation are least strong—so that with the outside world, for which spirituality means other-worldliness, the Jew gets the reputation of being a materialist. It is a strange sequel to the long history of a nation whose whole life has been a spiritual struggle, whose whole conception of nationality has for so long been bound up with the idea of the one God.

Does, then, the political emancipation of the Jew mean the disappearance of Judaism in lands of political freedom, or at best its continuance as nothing more than a meaningless survival? If we can say 'no' to this question, the movement which makes a negative

answer possible is, naturally enough, a nationalist and not a religious movement. The national instinct of self-preservation expresses itself just in the re-assertion of that sense of nationality which the emancipated Jew is in danger of losing, and for lack of which his Judaism is in danger of becoming a dead weight. It has no use for a mere tinkering with religious ideas or practices in order to make them less glaringly out of harmony with a life of which they were never meant to form a part. It demands the more radical remedy of a restoration of Jewish national life in the land to which the Jewish nation is bound by its history and its religious associations.

The movement which aims at effecting this restoration is often described by its western adherents, whose ideas are European, as a political movement; and they are sometimes at pains to emphasise its non-religious character. And indeed, so long as we accept that distinction between 'political' and 'religious' which is true as applied to the European State, the movement must be pronounced political and non-religious. But this description is misleading, because the distinction does not apply to the Jewish nation. If one is justified in drawing inferences from history, and if it may be assumed that an ancient nation cannot change its character in a few generations, then it is legitimate to believe that the restored Jewish nation of the future will be distinguished precisely by having as the central principle of its being that element of the national life which European nations segregate as religion; in other words, that its main achievement will be to give, throughout the whole range of its national institutions, a new expression to that attitude to life of which the basis is the conception of a God at once national and universal.

What forms this expression will take, in the vastly altered material conditions of modern life, it is of course impossible to say. It may be that the Jewish nation, in the mere process of living and maintaining itself as a nation, will evolve fresh spiritual conceptions which the world, stripping them of their national context, will be able to accept (or profess to accept) as religious truths. But they will not be merely religious truths in the sense of being truths about God and the other world. For the Jewish nation itself they will have a distinctively national value: they will be the new spiritual defences by which the eternal nation will secure its permanence through yet another stage on the road to the final consummation.

## HEBRAISM AND HELLENISM <sup>1</sup>

THE terms 'Hebraism' and 'Hellenism' have become so familiar as members of the large and distinguished family of 'isms,' that it may seem ungracious to suggest that their right to a place on the family tree might be questioned. And yet, if we examine them closely, they look very like interlopers. They do not satisfy the test of family resemblance. Your ordinary 'ism,' when you divorce his body from the suffix, refers you back to some definite doctrine or system of belief, either directly or through some individual who is so closely associated with a definite doctrine or system of belief as to have given his name to it. You have on the one hand 'Socialism,' 'Syndicalism,' 'Protestantism'; on the other hand 'Platonism,' 'Wesleyanism,' 'Hegelianism'; and so forth. But 'Hebraism' and 'Hellenism' refer you back to something much wider than a doctrine or system of belief, and they refer you back neither directly nor through the name of an individual, but through a race name. This endowment of each of two race names with an 'ism' of its own is significant. It means that we regard each of these two nations, the Hebrews and the Hellenes, as having, or as having had, the power of expressing itself in spiritual terms, in a certain national way of thought and attitude to life. In speaking of

<sup>1</sup> 1915.

Hebraism and Hellenism we imply the conception of a nation as something more than a group of individuals with certain characteristics and institutions in common. We attribute to the nation a certain reality, or spirit, of its own, which, of course, can get itself expressed only in and through individuals, but is yet independent of its individual media. This reality, or spirit, in regard to the two particular nations in question, we call the 'ism' of the nation. Hebraism, then, and Hellenism are terms which designate not merely the sum total of Hebraic and Hellenic institutions, literature, art, and so forth. They designate in each case what Aristotle would call the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of the nation—that in virtue of which its individual members constitute a nation.

But if a nation has an independent spiritual reality of its own, it is none the less true that a nation can continue to exist as such only in so far as it continues to find concrete expression in individual human beings; and the individuals who secure its continuance do so not necessarily by understanding and expressing its spirit, but simply by regarding themselves as members of the nation and acting accordingly. Nationality, for the individual, is not a matter of belief or of adherence to abstract principles; it is a matter of feeling and habit. There must be some intermediate link between the nation as pure idea and the individual as a member of the nation; and the permanence of the nation as such will depend on the durability of that link. The spirit of the nation must clothe itself in some concrete form which will command the instinctive attachment of successive generations of individuals. And 'concrete' in this connection does not necessarily mean 'material.' The link between nation and individual may be itself an idea, but an idea more definite and more direct in



its appeal than such a pure abstraction as 'the national spirit.' In fact, the nation which finds the link in an idea will have a better guarantee of permanence than one which depends on more material things, because an idea has the advantage of being relatively independent of circumstances.

The problem of national survival, then, when we speak of a nation in the true sense, is one phase of the eternal problem of spirit and body—the problem of establishing a harmony between the abstract and the concrete; and we may best explain the different fortunes of the Hebrews and the Hellenes, and the differences between their contributions to civilisation, if we regard them as two nations which attempted the solution of that problem in different ways.

A cursory examination of the earliest written records of the two nations is sufficient to show that they approached the problem from different ends. The Greek, as we see him in Homer, is interested primarily in the physical world around him. His gaze is turned outwards. Himself he takes for granted; and he interprets the universe in terms of himself, filling it with beings in his own image, who differ from him only in their perfection of form, their changelessness and their ampler physical powers. Not being in the least introspective, he has no moral problem and no idea of moral perfection. Hence also, he has no notion of progress. His golden age is in the past, when men were bigger and more heroic, in closer touch with the gods and more like them. Not that the earlier men were morally better than the later: for he has no moral standards, and the estimation of men as morally better or worse does not enter into his thought.

The Hebrew mind, on the other hand, looks inward from the start. It does not take man for granted as

part of the physical universe, but fastens precisely on that which seems to divide him from the rest of nature, and is at pains to explain how he comes to be able to distinguish good from evil. Its postulates, the things that it accepts as given, are good and evil, not the sun and the moon and the stars. It has no particular interest in things physical and physical standards of value. Its one abiding reality is a God who is pure spirit, and whose distinguishing characteristic is that he knows good from evil. It is in a sense true that the Hebrew, no less than the Greek, interprets the universe in terms of himself; but he interprets it in terms of his spiritual self. He is not inclined to remake the sun and the sea in his own physical image. His first care is to subordinate the whole of the physical universe to the perfected image of himself as a moral being.

Thus the problem of spirit and body is approached by the Hebrew from the side of the spirit, by the Greek from the side of the body. This fundamental difference of attitude explains the widely different lines of development along which the Greek and the Hebrew mind moved in later history. The Greek, starting with the external world as his reality, was bound sooner or later to find himself a problem. For a time he was content to speculate about the nature of things, to attempt to find a single unity behind the multiplicity of phenomena, while on the moral side he was satisfied with vague poetic exhortations. But in the fifth century B.C., when the Persian invasion tightened up his national self-consciousness and his civic life, the problems arising from the nature of man as a social being—that is, as a moral being—were thrown into prominence. As the old laws and customs ceased to suit changed conditions, the whole idea of law was called in question; for law, apart from purely physical law, was no part of that universe which

the Greek began by taking for granted. The Sophists, with their negation of absolute law—'Man is the measure of all things'—expressed the natural reaction of the Greek mind to this new set of circumstances. Man as a part of physical nature, as a being essentially as much without ideals or principles as a tree, was for them the mirror of social life, just as for the earlier Greeks he had been the mirror of the physical universe. But whereas the physical universe did not suffer because Greeks saw the sun as a beautiful Greek called Apollo, social life could not but suffer by the negation of any absolute moral basis for human institutions. Thus any attempt to find a stable basis for social life necessitated the overthrow of the sophistic teaching. This was the work of Socrates, who attempted to establish the moral law by showing that abstract moral principles of universal validity were in fact implied in the ordinary actions and judgments of men who never thought about them—thus carrying into the sphere of social life that method of seeking the One in the Many which the earlier Greek philosophers had followed in relation to the physical world. Plato went further, and sublimated the abstractions of Socrates into a hierarchy of ultimate realities, with the Idea of Good at their head. He thus arrived at a point of view something like that from which the Hebrew mind had started. He had reinterpreted the universe in terms of man as a moral being.

There was no demand and no opportunity for a corresponding development of metaphysical and ethical thought in the life of the Hebrews during the period of their ancient national existence. The Hebrew had taken the One as his starting-point, and had no need to go searching for it in the Many. Nationally speaking, he had put metaphysical problems behind him once for all. His intellectual energy thus finds its natural outlet in

the sphere of practical ethics, in the attempt to fashion his national life in all its details on the pattern of what he conceives to be the divine will. The process of national consolidation can bring him face to face with no new theoretical problem, because the basis of his national cohesion—that in virtue of which he is essentially a Hebrew—is the acceptance of a theory of the universe which leaves no room for metaphysical speculation. His traditional customs, being the result of an attitude of mind for which man is first and foremost a moral being, provide a framework sufficiently wide to hold the more developed nation with its more intricate social problems. Hence the course of his national life does not produce a chain of individual philosophers, each attacking the problem of the universe in a way determined more or less by the external conditions of his age. It does produce a literature which is national in the strictest sense—in the sense that it has a direct relation to, and tends to preserve and to strengthen, the idea with which his national existence is bound up—that idea of a single abstract moral being with which he started.

We shall find the same difference if we look at and contrast the elements of Hebrew and of Greek national consciousness.

Self-consciousness, in the nation as in the individual, shows itself primarily as the consciousness of difference from that which is not the self. The Greeks had a strong sense of being different from the rest of the human race, whom they designated, not without a touch of contempt, as *βάρβαροι*. We shall probably not be wrong in assuming that the idea of difference of language lies at the root of this distinction: as early as Homer we find people spoken of as *βαρβαρόφωνοι*, 'men of barbarous speech,' though the general sense of difference between

Hellene and Barbarian was not at all well developed at that period. In later times, however, the Greek became conscious of another broad difference. If a Greek of the fifth century B.C. had been asked what distinguished Greeks from Barbarians, he would no doubt have pointed to the free political institutions of his native land. There were of course differences in degree of political freedom within Greece itself; there were tyrannies and oligarchies as well as democracies. But the oriental despotism in which the king is everything and the subjects nothing, in which the whims of the despot and the intrigues of his concubines count for more than the wishes of a whole population, was entirely foreign to the Greek spirit, at all events in what we regard as the classic age of Hellenism. The Greek prided himself, and justly so, on his high political development; and the art of government was a subject to which Greek thinkers gave a very large measure of their attention. When Plato tries to work out an ideal kind of human life, it is as a *πολίτεια*, an ordered system of government, that his Utopia takes shape in his mind. The problem of producing an ideal life presents itself to him as the problem of creating a perfectly-governed commonwealth.

We may say, then, that the national self-consciousness of the Greek expressed itself primarily as the consciousness of having a distinctive language and a distinctive type of political life. It was in virtue of these things that the thinking Greek knew and avowed himself a Hellene.

With the Hebrew both these elements of national self-consciousness are conspicuously lacking. We find nowhere in Hebrew records any insistence on the fact that the Hebrew nation had a language of its own. We have in early Hebrew mythology an account of how different groups of men came to have different languages;

but it is not mentioned in that connection that the Hebrew group became distinguished by the Hebrew language—an omission which is all the more surprising when we remember that the whole story of the creation and the subsequent early history of the world seems designed merely to lead up to the story of Abraham and the foundation of the Hebrew nation. In this matter the later history of the Hebrews accords exactly with what we should gather from the Old Testament. The Hebrews, while always clinging tenaciously to their own language and regarding it as 'holy,' have picked up and used other languages with perfect freedom, from the Aramaic of the first exile to the Judæo-German of modern times. True, they have always given the borrowed languages a peculiar stamp of their own; but they never seem, as a people, to have been conscious of difference of language as a feature distinguishing them fundamentally from other human groups. It never seems to have mattered to them. Again, it is notorious that the Hebrew nation, even in the days when it lived as a nation in the ordinary sense, achieved little or nothing in the way of political development. Its history, as told by its own records, is a history of good kings who are rewarded by God and bad kings who are punished by God. There is scarcely even a vague hint of how the country was governed, nor the slightest trace of political speculation. And in the period of the second Kingdom, when the Hebrews are brought into conflict with the all-devouring power of Rome, they appear, from the point of view of political sagacity, as the veriest tyros at a game which many centuries of national life ought to have taught them. A squabble for the throne between two brothers is the occasion of Pompey's entry into Jerusalem; and later the sects go on warring in the city while the Roman battering-rams are beating

down its walls. This people clearly attaches no special value to self-expression in the political sphere. It does not feel itself distinguished from its neighbours by its political institutions any more than by its language.

There is, however, another element in nationality which appears to be scarcely present in the Greek national consciousness, but is very prominent in the Hebrew; I mean the common land. A universal negative is dangerous; but I think that it would be difficult to find in Greek literature any suggestion of an intimate connection between the particular piece of territory which we call Greece and the Greeks as a nation. On the contrary, the Greeks found it perfectly easy to transplant their language and their political institutions to other lands; and there was nothing in their national consciousness to prevent the centre of Hellenism—not merely the political centre, but the spiritual centre as well—from shifting to other soil. But with the Hebrews it is just the reverse. The conception of 'the land of Israel' is from first to last part of the very stuff of which their national consciousness is made. I say advisedly 'the *conception* of the Land of Israel,' for the attachment of the Hebrew to his land is something fundamentally different from that which we ordinarily understand when we speak of attachment to the homeland. Analyse, for instance, the Englishman's love of England, and you will find as an element in it—not necessarily as the whole of it—love for the English countryside, for the purely physical characteristics of the land. But in the love of Israel for Palestine, essential as that is to the being of Israel as a people, there is no trace of that element. It is rather the *idea* of Palestine that is the indispensable object of national attachment. Palestine appears first of all as a hope, as a promised land for men who

have yet to win it. When promise has been turned to fulfilment, the land falls into the background as a national *motif*, to reappear when actual possession of it has been lost again. The idea of Palestine affords a basis for the national consciousness through generations of men who have never seen it and are completely indifferent to its physical characteristics. The idea may get whittled away for a time to something purely spiritual, but the nation as a whole never deludes itself into thinking that the centre of its attachment is a 'heavenly Jerusalem'; and when circumstances are favourable the love for the unknown Homeland is able readily to crystallise into an actual return to the country. And side by side with this dependence of the Hebrews on Palestine for their national existence, and as a corollary to it, we find an entire incapacity to establish a complete Hebrew life anywhere else. The Hebrew appears outside Palestine as *Judaeus*, as *Juif*, as *Jude*, as Jew; as Hebrew, never.

Now what distinguishes the land on the one hand from language and institutions on the other is this: that the land is a concrete thing, and exists independently of this or that group of human beings, whereas language and institutions are abstract and spiritual, and are a product of the group life. And it is just for that reason that the Hebrew rests his sense of nationality on the land, while the Hellene rests his on language and institutions. The Hebrew, beginning always at the spiritual end, demands something concrete to which he can attach his spiritual idea; and it must be something independent of himself and more permanent. Thus he finds the symbol and the guarantee of his nationality in the land. The land becomes for him a spiritual thing, an idea, a memory, a hope—but only so long as it remains the actual concrete land. Once



let it become spiritualised away to a pure symbol, and it loses its value as an instrument of cohesion. The Greek, on the other hand, starting from the physical end, demands something abstract and spiritual to give meaning to his nationality. His national self-consciousness expresses itself in language and political institutions, which are independent of geography. The process is from abstract to concrete on the one side, from concrete to abstract on the other; precisely as the Hebrew mind develops (as we saw above) in the direction of forming a practical rule of life on the basis of the idea of God, while the Greek mind tends to abstract philosophy, trying to find the One in the Many, the spirit behind the phenomena of the material world.

Thus the Hebrew nation, laying hold at the outset on something which cannot slip from its grasp—having at the root of its national consciousness the idea of a universal God and the idea of a definite land associated for all time with itself—has achieved in some degree, as a nation, the synthesis of spirit and body. In other words, it has achieved in its national life a reconciliation between the absolute and the relative, between that which is eternally true and that which has human value because it ‘works.’ God is eternal and transcendental, but his will works itself out on earth in and through the history of the Hebrews. The land is the same land whether it is Hebrew or not, but it means nothing except as ‘the land of Israel.’ The two absolute terms have pragmatic value for the national survival—have pragmatic value precisely because they are absolute: for of all the pragmatic needs of men or nations, an Absolute is the most enduring. And the Hebrews are able to maintain their distinctive group-consciousness after losing the ordinary attributes of a nation, because their abstract idea, itself universal

and unchanging, is capable of different partial expressions in the national life as circumstances demand the emphasising of this or that aspect of it. This national adaptability has given the Hebrews an extraordinarily long lease of life. It shows itself not in any exceptional adaptability on the part of its individual members—that would have led to the disappearance of the Hebrews long ago—but in the capacity of the group-consciousness to present itself in different forms at different times, as circumstances demand. Thus, for example, when in the eighteenth century Jews began to be admitted into the social and political life of European nations, they found it possible, after a period of unstable equilibrium, to adjust themselves to the new surroundings by finding the be-all and end-all of Jewishness to lie in adherence to a certain religious cult. The idea that Jews are a religious sect, precisely parallel to Catholics and Protestants, is nonsense. But there was in Jewish tradition a tendency to insist on religious faith and practice as the differentia of the Jewish people—a tendency sufficiently strong to be able, when need arose, to become among certain sections of Jews the only and sufficient expression of their national consciousness. So with the more recent revival of political nationalism. The idea that the Jews are a nation precisely like the French or the Spanish nation is nonsense. But the purely nationalistic element in Jewish tradition is strong enough to become, in time of need, a basis for the re-assertion of Jewishness.

But if the national self-consciousness of the Hebrews is rooted in something eternal, and has so far a guarantee of permanence, the Hebrews pay the penalty in lacking the possibility of perfect self-expression at any given time through an individual man or work of art. They

depend for their existence as a nation on holding fast to an ideal which cannot be realised in this imperfect world ; for the complete working out of the divine will in a corporate human life is beyond human achievement. Hence the Hebrews as a nation are always looking towards the future and towards the past—the fields in which imagination has free scope. Of the present, which obviously offers no hope of the realisation of the ideal, they are careless. Their national literature bears the stamp of this indifference to the present in its lack of form and order ; their political history bears the same stamp in its indication of the absence of statesmanship and understanding of the art of government. It is characteristic of them that the early code of laws which is the basis of all their subsequent legal development is a chaos of ethical, social, and ritual prescriptions, containing precepts of an obviously ideal character alongside of others which are strictly practical, and purporting to have been promulgated in the wilderness, though intended to be brought into use in a country still to be conquered. Again, the Hebrew mind tends to extremes : it tends to strive after the infinite, and to demand the complete domination of one idea. This tendency to extremes shows itself in the fact that in the Hebrew conception the highest human type is that of the Prophet—the man who stands for absolute righteousness, and is constantly at war with actual life for the sake of an ideal which in actual life cannot be realised. A man of that type is incapable of complete harmony, which demands acquiescence in the brute facts of life, and is bound to spend himself in a struggle which seems vain. And it follows naturally that Hebraism, finding its highest individual ideal in a man of that type, pays scant regard to the demand of the ordinary individual as such for

the satisfaction which springs from a consciousness of direct personal union with the infinite. The conception of personal immortality was originally foreign to Hebraism, and when it was adopted it was transformed into a belief in a physical resurrection, in which all the members of the nation should take part in its ultimate triumph. So with the Hebrew conception of God. The ordinary man has a pragmatic need of God for help and comfort in time of trouble: and the lady who (as recorded by William James) said that it was 'so nice to be able to cuddle up to God' was giving naive expression to a fundamental truth about religion. But Hebraism revolts from any humanisation of God, and its God is relatively of little use for cuddling purposes. It is not an accident that the section of the Hebrew people which maintained its separateness two thousand years ago was that section which refused to accept the divinity of Jesus; or that Jewish sects which have emphasised the idea of mystic personal communion with the Deity have become merged in Christianity; or that the Psalms, which bulk so largely in Christian worship because the notion of direct individual leaning on God appears to be more prominent in them than elsewhere in the Old Testament, have for the Jew a less personal and more national significance. In a word: Hebraism tends to insist on the Hebrew nation as the mediating term between its individual members and the infinite, and for that reason the Hebrew as individual is relatively incapable of achieving in his own life the synthesis of spirit and body, of attaining complete harmony and equilibrium.

The Greeks, on the other hand, striving to find the One in the Many, and basing their national consciousness on such secondary things as language and political institutions, could not as a nation achieve the synthesis

between spirit and body. For them the antithesis between *φύσις* and *νόμος*, between that which is naturally and therefore eternally right or true, and that which is right or true for a given body of men at a given time, remained unbridgable. Their national life did not provide a mediating term, because there was no Absolute at the root of their national consciousness. Their intellectual development went on independently of the development of their national life, and it was just when their typical national institutions were crumbling that their philosophical zenith was reached. And when external circumstances became unfavourable, their distinctive group-life disappeared altogether: there was no transcendental idea to hold the individual members of the group together.

But the Greeks were able, as the Hebrews were not, to live in the present. They had no vision of a millennium, of a glorious if distant future. They conceived a golden age as having existed in the past, but it neither trammelled nor helped them as a nation. Limited in aim, they were able to achieve perfection of form, to which limitation is essential. In the Greek City-State no less than in the Greek statue or the Greek drama, we have a positive, perfectly rounded achievement beside which the Hebrews have nothing similar to set. And so that synthesis of spirit and body which the Hebrews achieved as a nation was achieved by the Greeks on the plane of the individual—that is to say, in the individual man or in the individual artistic creation. The idea of balance, of a harmony of conflicting tendencies, lies at the root of the Greek ideal of personality. The antithesis between *φύσις* and *νόμος* is transcended in the individual life and death of Socrates, who, after standing out for absolute against pragmatic truth all his days, ends by drinking the hemlock rather than

escape from prison in defiance of the city's laws. There is a superficial resemblance between Socrates and the Hebrew Prophets, who were constantly at war with their environment for the sake of an absolute ideal. But the resemblance is superficial only. The Prophet chastised his people not merely for falling short of *his* ideal, but for falling short of *their own* ideal, the ideal to which they professed adherence by the very fact of being a nation ; and he was not more the castigator of their faults than the spokesman of their national hopes. In Socrates the national note is conspicuously lacking.

Thus the Greeks and the Hebrews, attacking the problem of spirit and body from different ends, move along different lines. The tendency of the Greeks is to produce manifestations of the national spirit in the work of individuals ; the tendency of the Hebrews is to produce a single national work, in which the individual is subordinated to a strictly national purpose. In other words, the matter in which the spirit clothes itself is for the Greek the individual (that is, individual writer or sculptor or individual work of literature or art) ; for the Hebrew it is the national life, the organic whole of national thought and custom. And so the individual products of the Greek genius survive the ancient Greek nation, whereas the individual products of the Hebrew genius depend for their survival on the continued life of the Hebrew nation. In that sense the products of the Hellenic spirit are more universal than those of the Hebraic. They are less dependent on specifically national elements. Though they are not consciously inspired by any conception of human brotherhood, they are the work of a people which grappled with the problems of life in a way of its own, and as such they have a permanent value for humanity.

Their value is independent of the national existence of the people which produced them ; once there, with their harmonious beauty and clean-cut perfection of form, they are there for ever, assured of immortality in their own right. With the products of the Hebrew spirit it is otherwise. With all their insistence on the conception of humanity, they are in the strictest sense national ; they are unintelligible apart from the national sentiment and the national history of the nation which produced them, and they depend for their existence on the jealous guardianship of that nation. True, the Bible has its place in the literature of every European nation, and is read and revered by many more people than can appreciate Pheidias or understand Plato. But it is the translated Bible that counts, not the original. Whatever may be regarded as the particular value of Homer for the modern world, no sane man would assert that that value would remain unimpaired if the original were lost and only translations remained. But the particular service for which modern men look to the Old Testament is performed much better by translations than it could be by the original. It is worth while to learn Greek in order to appreciate the majesty of Homer's verse and the flexibility of his language ; it is not worth while to learn Hebrew in order to appreciate what are called the religious ideas of the Old Testament. And the other products of the Hebrew spirit—the Talmud, for instance—do not count at all for the modern world. They have no independent immortality. If the Hebrew nation perished to-morrow, they would perish with it.

This difference between the products of the Hebrew and the Greek spirits—the dependence of the one on particular historical phenomena, in contrast with the unconditioned immortality of the other—is due

ultimately, as I have tried to show, to the fundamental difference between Hebraism and Hellenism. But immortality, in the sense in which the term is used of spiritual products, has its subjective as well as its objective side. A book or a work of art remains alive not only by virtue of its intrinsic character, but also because there is something in the outlook of successive generations of men to which it appeals. The subjective explanation of the different parts played by the products of Hebraism and those of Hellenism in modern European life is not far to seek. The modern man, individualistic to the core, is attracted above all things by freedom of thought and beauty of form; and Hellenism gives him these in full measure. He can be influenced by Hellenism without detriment to his own national consciousness, which consists largely in the sense of belonging to this or that State—for the products of Hellenism are independent of nationality, and their teachings will not run counter to any particular national ideal. The products of Hebraism, imperfect in form and strictly national in their message, are much less attractive to the modern man. He has no incentive to study them for their own sake; and if he understood them aright they might be subversive of his national attachment, because their essence lies in a conception of nationality which is incommensurate with his own. Historically, however, the products of Hebraism have found their way into his life in various forms; and he has no need to get rid of them, because he can turn them to his own individualistic ends. He takes his Hebraism in the form of religion, and of a religion devoted to the cure of individual souls, and without a message or meaning for the nation.

It would be idle to attempt to assess the relative merits of Hebraism and Hellenism, or to determine



whether the one or the other is capable of being of more value to humanity. Both have their place as vital forces in the shaping of human thought and conduct; and they will remain as contending forces until such time as they find reconciliation in some higher form of human life. Till then, it may be imagined, the one or the other will be in the ascendant according as the circumstances and needs of humanity determine. But at the present time in particular it is to Hebraism that the world should turn for help in the desperate straits into which—possibly through neglect and maltreatment of Hebraism—it has brought itself. It should turn to Hebraism not as 'standing for' religion against art, or morality against intellect, or faith against scepticism; for it has enough and to spare of inartistic religion, of stupid morality, and of irrational faith. It should turn to Hebraism as enshrining a conception of nationality which has a peculiar value in these days—the conception of nationality as a spiritual bond depending in the last resort neither on territory nor on political machinery, but simply on the sense of common service to a universal ideal. Only on the basis of such a conception—which cuts the throat of that devouring Leviathan which the State has become—will it be possible to introduce any sort of decency into international relations. We hear a great deal nowadays about democratic control of foreign policy, which means giving a large number of people the opportunity of creating the same muddle which has hitherto been created by a few. We hear on the other hand—or we did before the war, and shall again when it is over—a great deal about breaking down national barriers and overriding national distinctions in the name of a common humanity; as though human life could be made better by an attempt to destroy that group-sense on which the possibility of a good human

life depends. What is needed is not a change of machinery, domestic or international, but a change of ideal, on which the necessary adaptation of machinery would follow. What is needed is nothing short of a complete reversal of the sequence of ideas in regard to the conception of nationality; so that the members of a nation, instead of being in fact cemented by geographical contiguity and community of political interest, and then attempting to read into their national life ideals of justice, or Kultur, or what not—the progress being from body to spirit, which is the way of Hellenism—should feel themselves bound together in the first place by the subtler and more enduring bonds of spiritual community, and on that basis create, adapt, and discard machinery at will—the progress being from spirit to body, which is the way of Hebraism. It is not suggested that this is an attainable ideal for our time or for any time that we can foresee. It is the way of ideals to be unattainable—therein lies their eternity and their pragmatic value. But if the world is to move in the direction of this ideal at all, it can best find a stimulus in Hebraism. And since the products of Hebraism, unlike those of Hellenism, have no permanence and no capacity for exerting their proper influence independently of the existence of the nation which gave them birth, it appears that Hebraism can become capable of giving that stimulus only if the Hebrews attain a fresh lease of complete national existence, and a renewed opportunity of complete self-expression.

## ZIONISM AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM<sup>1</sup>

THE phrase 'The Jewish Problem' is current on the lips of Jews and non-Jews alike. Its use indicates not so much a clear understanding of a definite problem which requires solution as a vague sense that there is something wrong about the position of the Jews in the modern world. The average English Jew, if he were asked what exactly is wrong, would probably say that there are a large number of Jews in the world who live under bad conditions, being either denied elementary human rights or exposed to social prejudice and the attacks of anti-Semites. He would define 'the Jewish Problem,' if he were pressed to define it, as the problem of obtaining decent treatment for Jews everywhere. But a very little cross-questioning would force him to confess that this definition was inadequate. He would have to admit that even in England, where anti-Semitism is practically unknown, there is none the less a Jewish problem, because the Synagogues are empty, and the younger generation does not seem to be so Jewish as its parents, and there is a great deal of drift into assimilation and intermarriage. If he were pressed further, he might be compelled to admit that the most Jewish Jews are those who live in countries where the Jews are not decently treated ; that it is only the influx of Jews from

<sup>1</sup> *Zionist Pamphlets*, No. 1, 1915.

those countries that saves the Jews of England from absorption, and that, therefore, from one point of view, the Jewish problem is more acute in England than in Russia. At all events, it would become clear that the problem is a more complex one than he had imagined, and is not to be solved simply by the grant of equal rights to Jews everywhere. The real solution must lie in something that goes to the heart of the problem. That Jews are persecuted in one country, attacked by anti-Semites in another, and assimilated in a third—these are only the forms in which the problem presents itself. We must get beneath the forms and find the cause of these different phenomena. Then we shall know what the problem is, and if we can remove the cause we shall have solved the problem.

The root cause to which these different phenomena are traceable, put in its simplest terms, is that there is no country in which the Jews as a body are in the position of a man in his own home. The individual Jew is no doubt 'at home' in those countries which tolerate Jews and allow them the rights of citizenship; but, as has been pointed out above, the Jewish problem would not be solved—it would only take on a different form—if that condition were universal. And the reason is that the individual Jew is not only an individual, but also a member of a particular ethnic group, and so long as he does not completely sever himself from that group there remains inevitably an element in his life which makes him to some extent a stranger, a being different from his neighbours. Some nations are by their nature and circumstances more tolerant than others of strangers; but at bottom all men have a certain feeling of mistrust and dislike for the stranger, and even where conditions are most favourable this feeling is liable to be roused to active operation by new circumstances. Further, in

the case of the Jews this feeling, when it does become active, is apt to be intensified by the fact that they are not only strangers, but strangers who come from nowhere, who cannot point to any place where *as a body* they are not strangers. Hence the various phenomena of anti-Semitism, actual and potential. In one country Jews are subjected to positive persecution and restriction; in another they suffer under the milder forms of social anti-Semitism; in a third new circumstances lead to a growth of anti-Semitic feeling which may at any time break out in active intolerance. How shall the Jew escape these evils? At first sight there appears to be only one way. He must endeavour to make good his claim to be accepted as an equal by showing that he can cease to be different—that he can sink his own individuality and become an exact copy of his neighbour. Naturally, he cannot do that completely without ceasing to be a Jew altogether. So, despite his efforts to become exactly like his neighbour, he remains something different, and his neighbour remains conscious of the difference. Thus the phenomena of assimilation and anti-Semitism show themselves side by side, and the very men who try hardest to assimilate are the targets for the arrows of the anti-Semite.

In a country where Jews play a large part in economic and intellectual life, their success arouses the envy and hatred of those who feel that these aliens have no right to be running their businesses and writing their literature. And yet these very Jews may be Jews only in spite of themselves—only in so far as they cannot get rid of their distinctively Jewish characteristics. Even where open anti-Semitism does not prevail, it happens often enough that the reputation of Jews as a people suffers precisely because of an individual Jew who has lost all contact with Jews and Judaism. Such a man is of no

service to his people, but he is made on occasion a stick to beat them with. Neither he nor his people is allowed to forget that he is a Jew, so soon as he achieves an undesirable notoriety. Sometimes, again, a non-Jew who wishes to be friendly will demonstrate the excellent qualities of Jews by saying that he has known Jews for years without suspecting their Jewish origin; or a Jew will himself boast that throughout a long literary career he has never betrayed his Jewishness by a single word. Such tragi-comedies as these can happen only in the life of a people which has not a home, which is and yet is not a people, which cannot be either itself or something else, but is always partly the one and partly the other.

A people without a homeland of its own, without a centre in which its individuality can take shape in concrete institutions, loses the respect both of itself and of other peoples. Respect demands understanding; but the Jewish people, situated as it is at present, cannot be understood—it cannot be understood even by Jews, and they begin to have doubts of its existence, because it has no recognised central institutions through which its ideas and aspirations can voice themselves. Hence, too, Judaism is always in solution; nobody can say what Judaism is, nor what being a Jew means. We can only attempt to say what Judaism ought to be and what a Jew ought to do. But even our abstract definitions of Judaism and of the Jew as he ought to be are a chaos of opposing conceptions, because we have no living reality to serve as a guiding norm. And so Judaism loses its hold on the individual Jew, and the process known as 'assimilation' becomes possible. The tragedy of assimilation is not that the Jew ceases to be a Jew, but that he remains a Jew and becomes something else at the same time. He becomes an anomaly, Jew and not-Jew in one. He is bound by a close and well-

defined tie to the people of his adoption ; but he is also bound by a loose and indefinable tie to Jews in other countries, however much they may differ from him in religious ideas or political status. This anomalous position he can end at present only in one way—by giving up the Jewish tie. But it ought to be possible for him to end it by the other alternative, by rejoining the Jewish people.

He would have that possibility, if there were a concrete Jewish life of which he could become a member at the expense of renouncing something else—in other words, if the Jewish people had a home. Obviously not all Jews could or would avail themselves of that possibility. It would only be a minority of the Jews in the world who would actually return to their own land and their own people. For that minority the escape from the conditions of which anti-Semitism and assimilation are the fruits would be complete. But for the majority also, for those who remained outside the Jewish land, the existence of a centre of Jewish life would be a fact of profound significance. It would give Judaism a new meaning and reality in their lives. They would see in the Jewish land a living expression of the Jewish character and Jewish ideals ; they would have in it a standard by which to measure their own Judaism, and a source of spiritual influence to keep their Judaism from decay. They would no longer feel it necessary to aim at becoming exact copies of their neighbours ; they would find it worth while to be different from their neighbours, even at some cost to themselves. They would be proud to carry into the world something of the Jewish outlook on life, and to help in bringing the world to a better understanding of that outlook. Thus they would be a spiritual force in the world, giving as well as taking, and earning their right to a place in

civilisation by remaining Jews, not by renouncing Judaism or whittling it away to nothing.

At present there is no centre in which the Jewish people can live in its own life, and from which Jews elsewhere can derive the knowledge and the influence of the Jewish outlook. The Jewish people, so far as it exists at all except in idea, is to be found in the great ghettos of Eastern Europe. There Jews live as Jews, untroubled—or troubled comparatively little—by the need to accommodate the fact of their Jewishness, and the mode of life in which that fact expresses itself, to non-Jewish conceptions and institutions. In the ghetto Jews have developed a form of life which is their own, determined primarily by their own national character; and that centre of Jewish life has been for over a century the great reservoir of Judaism, the source from which the scattered Jewish communities outside it have been able to draw something of Jewish feeling and Jewish culture. It is because of the existence of that centre of Jewish life that the Jew in lands of freedom is able to remain in some measure a Jew, to import some treasured relics of his own tradition into the non-Jewish life which he is compelled to live. But, much as the emancipated Jew owes to the ghetto, he is unable to look on it with respect and affection as the source of his Judaism and the standard expression of what Judaism should be, or to imagine himself returning to it in order to regain closer contact with his people. To leave the ghetto is to escape from slavery to freedom, from darkness to light; and no sane man would travel in the reverse direction. For the Jews of the ghetto themselves, escape into better conditions is an ideal; return to it can never be an ideal. Thus the ghetto—the only concrete form in which the life of the Jewish people exists—cannot perform the function of a national centre. It has no



moral hold on those Jews who are outside it, and it is a matter of necessity, not of choice, for those who remain in it. No Jew can point to it with pride and say, 'That is the home of my people, that is how Jews live when they are able to live as members of the Jewish people.'

But even if the Jewry of Eastern Europe could perform that function, its day seems to be passing. It no longer holds together and resists external attack as it did. Before our eyes it is being broken up by the combined forces of persecution and European culture. Its time-hallowed institutions are losing their hold on those who are brought up under their influence; its capacity to reproduce a single type of life from generation to generation is undermined. The present war, bringing unthinkable loss and suffering to the Jewish masses, must hasten the process of disruption. That process will not be completed in a year or in a generation; but it goes on surely and not slowly, and it will end in the disappearance of the ghetto as we know it, the ghetto through which whatever of Judaism survives has come into the modern world. And with the ghetto there disappears the one unifying force in Jewry, the one concrete link between the present and the past. For centuries Judaism has had a home—though neither a comfortable nor a beautiful home—in the ghetto, where alone the Jewish people has lived as the Jewish people. If the ghetto disappears—and who does not want it to disappear?—Judaism will be left without even the semblance of a home, and the will and the power of the Jew to be a Jew will be weakened still further.

The Jewish people without a home and Judaism without a home—these are two sides of the same fact. For Judaism and the Jewish people are related as soul and body, and neither can exist without the other. And similarly the anomalous position of the Jews in the

modern world and the decay of Judaism are two sides of the same fact. The Jew is both Jew and not-Jew, and is unable to be completely either, because there is no concrete embodiment of Judaism from which he can learn to understand what Judaism is.

It is this central problem—the homelessness of the Jewish people and of Judaism—that Zionism attacks. Its distinctive feature is that it sees the problem as a national one, not as the problem of this or that group of individual Jews; and it aims at removing the conditions which make the problem so acute, not at administering a palliative here or there. For so long as the conditions remain, the problem must always recur. So long as the Jewish people remains without a home, it must always be faced with the same terrible alternative—either a cramped and stunted Jewish life in the ghetto, or the decay of Judaism and the Jewish consciousness under emancipation. But to find a home for the Jewish people does not mean to congregate all Jews together in one place. That is obviously impossible, even if it were desirable. The millions of Jews in Russia could not be transplanted by the wave of a wand to a Jewish land; and any gradual emigration must be more or less counterbalanced by the natural growth of population. The economic problem of the Jews now living in the countries of Eastern Europe must be settled, for the great mass of them, in those countries themselves. Emancipated Jews, again, are for the most part unwilling to leave the countries of their adoption. Materially speaking, they are sufficiently well off where they are, and probably it will only be a minority in whom the Jewish consciousness will be sufficiently strong to draw them back to their own national centre. But, taking East and West together, there is a sufficiently large number of Jews who would be eager, given the opportunity,

to help in laying the foundations of a new Jewish life in the Jewish land.<sup>1</sup> The task of Zionism is to create that opportunity. As to the land that is to be the Jewish land there can be no question. Palestine alone, of all the countries on which the Jew has set foot throughout his long history, has an abiding place in his national tradition. It was in Palestine that the Jews lived as a nation and produced the highest fruits of their genius. Palestine has been a vital element in the national consciousness of the Jewish people through all the centuries of exile, and the memory of it and the hope for it have been among the most powerful forces making for the preservation of Jewry and of Judaism. The task of Zionism, then, is to create a home for the Jewish people in Palestine ; to make it possible for large numbers of Jews to settle there and live under conditions in which they can produce a type of life corresponding to the character and ideals of the Jewish people. When the aim of Zionism is accomplished, Palestine will be the home of the Jewish people, not because it will contain all the Jews in the world (that is impossible), but because it will be the centre to which all Jews will look as the home and the source of all that is most essentially Jewish. Palestine will be the country in which Jews are to be found, just as Ireland is the country in which one would look for the real Irish type, though there are more Irishmen outside Ireland than in it. And similarly Palestine will be the home of Judaism, not because there will be no Judaism anywhere else, but because in Palestine the Jewish spirit will have free play, and there the Jewish

<sup>1</sup> The sufferings inflicted by the war and its aftermath on the Jewish people have raised this 'sufficiently large number' to a number much more than sufficiently large, and the Zionist Organisation is now (beginning of 1920) in the unpleasant position of having to warn the persecuted masses that Palestine must not be overcrowded.

mind and character will express themselves as they can nowhere else.

Such is in outline the Jewish problem as Zionists see it, and such is the Zionist solution. In one form or another the idea of a national return to Palestine has been an active force in Jewish life for quite half a century, and it is therefore much older than the modern Zionist movement, which was founded by Dr. Theodor Herzl in 1896. But it is in the Zionist movement that the idea has taken most practical and permanent shape, and come most prominently before the world, and the idea is therefore rightly associated with the name of Zionism. A complete account of the Zionist movement, of its history, its organisation, its institutions, and its achievements, would be out of place here. For the present purpose it will suffice to set forth the aims of the movement as formulated in its programme, and to indicate briefly the steps which have been taken to put theory into practice.

The programme of the Zionist movement was laid down at the first Congress, at Basle, in 1897, and is known as the 'Basle Programme.' The first article of the Basle Programme, which is a general statement of aim, runs as follows :

'The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.'

The programme was originally formulated in German, and the phrase translated above 'secured by public law'—*öffentlich-rechtlich gesichert*—cannot be exactly rendered in English,<sup>1</sup> because of the difference between

<sup>1</sup> It should be superfluous to point out that the English translation which is—or used to be—current—'a publicly-legally assured home'—is quite meaningless, and is not even English. Another version is 'publicly recognised, legally secured'; but this makes no real attempt to reproduce the sense of the original.

English and German legal conceptions. The distinction between *öffentlicheres Recht* and *privat-Recht* is one that does not exist in English law ; and though *öffentlicheres Recht* may be rendered by 'public law,' the use of the word 'public' does not give the term any precise meaning. What the framers of the programme meant, in effect, was that there was to be some sort of guarantee for the Jewish settlement in Palestine, a guarantee given to the Zionist organisation, or to the Jewish people, as a body, over and above the implied guarantee of rights which the individual resident in a country has as an individual. The precise form of the guarantee was not defined. In the early years of Zionism most people thought of a 'Jewish State' under international guarantees, or of a charter from the Turkish Government with the guarantee of the European Powers for its observance. But later, and especially after the Turkish Revolution of 1908, this idea fell into the background, and, while Jewish life in Palestine was visibly growing from year to year, and the Jewish settlement suffered little molestation (though it was far from receiving active help or even official countenance) at the hands of the Turkish Government, the question of guarantees, international or otherwise, ceased to trouble Zionists to any extent. To this point, however, we shall have to return later in dealing with the means by which the Zionist movement strove to attain its aim.

These means are thus formulated in the Basle Programme :

1. The promotion by appropriate means of the settlement in Palestine of Jewish agriculturists, artisans and manufacturers.
2. The organisation and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of suitable institutions, both local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

3. The strengthening of the Jewish national feeling and national consciousness.

4. By way of preparation, steps towards obtaining the consent of Governments, where necessary, in order to reach the goal of Zionism.

Briefly, these four branches of Zionist work may be summarised as follows: first, the colonisation and development of Palestine; secondly, the cementing of the scattered sections of Jewry; thirdly, the strengthening of the Jewish national consciousness; and fourthly, the enlistment of the sympathy and assistance of powerful nations.

It is obvious that these four methods of activity do not all stand in the same relation to the aim of Zionism. Two of them—the first and the third—are direct means of promoting the end in view; the other two are indirect. That is to say, all that the aim of Zionism demands is, first, that conditions favourable to the rebirth of Jewish national life shall be created in Palestine, and secondly, that the right attitude of mind shall be cultivated among the Jews throughout the world, so that numbers of them will be willing to become pioneers in the work of building up a Jewish life in the country. To bring into closer connection the different bodies of Jews scattered over the globe, and to obtain recognition and assistance from the nations—these are subsidiary measures, however important; and the possibility of carrying them out in practice depends entirely on the progress made in colonising Palestine and in reviving the Jewish consciousness. For only those Jews in whom the Jewish consciousness has been awakened will join a world-wide organisation of Jewry; and the extent to which Zionism can become a political force, capable of winning the sympathy and the active support of governments, must be determined entirely by the strength of the Jewish

holding in Palestine on the one hand, and the strength of the desire of the Jews for Palestine on the other.

In practice the kind of work which holds the second place in the programme—the organisation and knitting together of the scattered bodies of Jews—has resolved itself into the formation in all Jewish centres throughout the world of Zionist Societies, which are grouped in local Federations, and through the local Federations in the Zionist Organisation. The aim of uniting all Jews in the organisation has not been realised. But the number of shekel-payers (the shekel is the symbol of membership of the organisation) has risen to something like 200,000—a number which is very considerable in view of the difficulties involved in organising groups of individuals spread over the whole world and speaking all the languages under the sun. And the effect of the Zionist idea on Jewish life is not wholly to be measured by the number of professed adherents of the movement. Large numbers of Jews in every country have shown practical sympathy with Zionist aims, though they have not entered the organisation.

The other indirect means to the Zionist end—that of winning the sympathy and support of the nations—played a large part in the early history of the movement. It was regarded by Dr. Herzl as a cardinal point in his programme. Approaching the Jewish problem as he did at a time when Turkey was 'the sick man,' and when the break-up of the Ottoman Empire seemed imminent, he not unnaturally thought that there could be no hope of security for the Jewish settlement in Palestine unless it were established under a charter signed and sealed by the European Powers. Hence he devoted a large part of his energies to negotiating not alone with the Sultan, but with the rulers of Western countries as well. This particular form of activity had its most splendid

triumph in the offer by the British Government of a territory in East Africa for a large autonomous settlement of Jews. But the masses of Zionists would have nothing to say to a settlement outside Palestine; and the most important effect of the East African scheme was to produce a strong reaction in favour of immediate practical work in the country which was admitted on all hands to be the ultimate goal of the movement. Circumstances conspired to strengthen this tendency, and to throw diplomatic activity into the background. The death of Dr. Herzl in July, 1904, robbed the movement of the leader whose gifts and genius fitted him pre-eminently for diplomatic activity. And later, the whole situation was changed<sup>1</sup> by the Turkish revolution, which gave the Ottoman Empire free institutions and representative government. In face of the new *régime* in Turkey the need for a charter could no longer be maintained, and the sphere of diplomatic activity was much reduced. This combination of causes—the reaction against East Africa, the death of Dr. Herzl, and the Turkish revolution—led to a greater concentration of Zionist effort on those lines of activity which we have called direct means to the end—on the work of colonisation in Palestine, and on the strengthening of the national consciousness outside Palestine.

It is not the purpose of this essay to sketch even in outline the progress which Zionism has made along these two lines of activity. It may suffice to say that under the influence of the movement, direct or indirect, there have grown up in Palestine the beginnings of a new Jewish life—small beginnings as yet, but full of promise

<sup>1</sup> Or rather, seemed to be changed: for the promise of the Turkish revolution was not fulfilled, and the new *régime* has been if anything less friendly than the old to Jewish national aspirations.



for the future. In Palestine to-day there are Jews settled on the soil and in the towns whose national consciousness is Jewish and whose language is Hebrew. The ideal of the return to the land of Palestine, as the home of the Jewish people, has begun to take concrete shape. And concurrently with this development, and partly as a result of it, there has gradually come about a change in the outlook of Jews—a change which can be more easily felt by those who are in touch with Jewish affairs than it can be measured by facts and figures. There are still far too many Jews in whom the Jewish consciousness—the sense of belonging to the Jewish people and sharing its hopes—has not been awakened. But the national idea has begun to affect spheres of Jewish life in which a generation ago the drift towards assimilation was the only visible movement; and its influence will grow with the growth of its concrete embodiment in Palestine.

It will be apparent from what has been said that Zionist activity has taken different forms in different periods. That is natural enough. The goal is one, but the roads are many, and the choice of road must be dictated by circumstances. What is essential is a clear conception of the goal, a clear understanding of the problem which Zionism sets out to solve and of the way in which it can be solved. Nothing but confusion can be caused by an attempt to represent Palestine as an immediate remedy for all the ills under which individual Jews or bodies of Jews suffer. Zionism does not hold out a prospect of a sudden and miraculous 'ingathering of the exiles.' There must always be Jews in exile—*i.e.* outside Palestine—so long as the human mind can foresee. But, when Jewish life is firmly established in Palestine, and Palestine has become the recognised centre of Jewry, the Jewish people and Judaism will no longer be in exile.

That is what Zionism sets out to accomplish, and what it has begun to accomplish. To improve the conditions and relieve the misery of individual Jews is the work of other agencies. Zionism does not belittle the importance of such work. But the national need transcends the immediate needs of individuals ; and Zionism, because its concern is with the supreme national need, claims to be more vital to the Jewish people than any philanthropic organisation can be. It does not combat philanthropic effort, but it does combat the idea that as between the Jews of the West and those of the East the proper relation is that of bestower and receiver. It rejects the notion, so natural to the English Jew, that our 'foreign coreligionists' require help from us and can give us nothing. It recognises that it is these 'foreign coreligionists' who have borne the brunt of the battle, and have preserved Judaism and the Jewish consciousness and faith in the Jewish future under intolerable conditions of life ; whereas their would-be benefactors are giving up all that could make the long agony worth while. It sees the supreme task of Jews not in doling out material aid to the poor and the persecuted—however necessary such work may be—but in staying the disruptive forces which threaten the very existence of Jews and of Judaism. That task can be accomplished by no philanthropist, be he never so wealthy and so generous. It demands the united effort of all those Jews, be they rich or poor, in whom the consciousness of being Jews—of being the heirs of the Jewish tradition and of having the responsibility for its preservation—is still a living force. It is a task to which no man can set his hand in the right spirit if he thinks that he is working for others. Every man must work for himself and for the nation, for himself as a member of the nation in idea, if not in fact. Only

if he has that ideal attachment to the nation can he help to create the possibility of an actual attachment, for himself or for his children. Just as 'every Jew should regard himself as having taken part in the exodus from Egypt,' so should every Jew regard himself as a participant in the national regeneration which is yet to come. It must be something vital to himself as a Jew. That is the key to the Zionist attitude of mind, and the measure of its difference from the philanthropic attitude.

Jewish philanthropists may alleviate the lot of individual Jews or groups of Jews who are less happily situated than themselves. But to create a home for the Jewish people, to transform 'the Jewish people' from an abstraction into a reality, and to make the Jewish spirit once more a living and productive force: that is an aim which demands the heart and soul of every Jew who prefers life to death. And that is the aim of Zionism.

## HEBREW EDUCATION IN PALESTINE <sup>1</sup>

AMONG all the manifold branches of work that have to be undertaken by a national movement there is none more vitally important than the work of education. This is true of a national movement among a people which is already concentrated, to a greater or a less extent, on its own historic soil, but is robbed of the possibility of full national development, or is in danger of losing its identity through the influences of a foreign culture stronger than its own. In such a case, the success of a national movement must depend on the extent to which the younger generation retains its hold on the national ideal; and that in turn must be determined very largely by the extent to which the younger generation is educated in the national spirit, taught to know and to reverence the national past, and accustomed to regard as valuable whatever survives of the national tradition. Education is, then, the very life-breath of a national movement. But of no national movement is this so emphatically true as of Zionism, which is an attempt to restore national life to a people cut off almost entirely from its ancestral land, scattered over the face of the earth, participating in every culture, speaking all languages, assimilated to all types of national life, and thus in constant and

<sup>1</sup> *Zionist Pamphlets*, No. 8, 1916.

ever-growing danger of being split up into fragments and losing all semblance of national cohesion. The problem of Zionism is much harder than that of other national movements. It has to bring back the people, or some considerable section of it, to the land—a task complicated by all sorts of political and economic difficulties; and at the same time it has to secure that the heterogeneous body of human beings so brought together shall be fused and moulded into a recognisable national group. The first of these objects is to be achieved by organisation, political effort, and practical colonising work in Palestine; the second demands above all things a national system of education for those who are to live in Palestine, since it is primarily through education that the fusion of the diverse elements into a national whole must be brought about. It is idle to argue as to the relative importance of the two kinds of work. Both are essential. But if it is true that the aim of Zionism cannot be achieved without the concentration of a large number of Jews in Palestine, it is equally true that Zionism cannot fulfil its function as a national movement without national education in Palestine.

But what, it may be asked, is a national education? An answer is obviously impossible, if what is expected is a precise statement of the methods that a national education ought to adopt, and the subjects that it ought to include. A national education is defined rather by its aims and its results than by its methods or content: it is an education which aims at producing, and does produce, in a given group of human beings, the sense of being a nation, of being bound together, and distinguished from other groups by a common national tradition and a common national hope. But two requirements may be postulated as essential. In the

first place, a national education must be carried on in the national language: for that group-sense which is necessary to the being of a nation is intimately bound up with the tie of a common and distinctive idiom. And in the second place, a national education must insist on maintaining and emphasising the sense of continuity with the national past. A new nation may be formed in course of time through the fusion of a number of heterogeneous human beings who happen to be congregated in a given piece of territory. But if what is desired is not a new nation, but the continuance of one already in existence, then the link with the past is all-important; and while in the case of an established nation that link may be maintained by the persistence of beliefs, customs, and habits of thought and action, which are handed down unconsciously from one generation to the next, in the case of a nation struggling for new life, and uncertain of its hold on its past, the school has an important part to play in familiarising and vivifying the distinctive elements of the national tradition to the minds of the growing generation.

Thus, while the precise form and scope of the national education that we need in Palestine cannot be mapped out in advance, it is at least essential that the education should be in Hebrew, which is our national language, and that it should pay considerable attention to the history of our own people, to the characteristic ideas and ways of thought with which our national life has been associated in the past, and to the literature in which those ideas and ways of thought are embodied. It is important to remember that the battle is not ended when Hebrew has been established as the language of the school and the university. It is possible to conceive a national group educated in the Hebrew language, and yet educated in a spirit quite different

from, and even hostile to, that of our national past, and so becoming in effect a new nation, attached by no real tie of historical continuity to the Hebrew nation of days gone by, or to the Jewish people of to-day. This danger is sometimes exaggerated by anti-Zionists, who regard the revival of the real Hebrew nation as a bad thing, and are therefore very ready to seize on and denounce any development which seems likely to lead to the creation of a Hebrew-speaking but un-Hebraic national group—since it is convenient for them to mask their antagonism to the real revival under a righteous opposition to the sham. We need not take too seriously their suggestion that the life and education of Jews in Palestine cannot claim to be Jewish unless they reproduce in every detail the mass of rite and custom and belief which has attached itself to Judaism in the long centuries of exile. We must be prepared for development in Palestine, and for far-reaching development. But we shall do well to remember that the maintenance of historical continuity is far more important for Zionists, who want the Hebrew nation to live, than for anti-Zionists, who do not, and that continuity cannot be secured by language alone. The problem of working out an education which shall satisfy the demands of past and present alike is one of the most difficult of those that confront us in Palestine; but it can be solved if it is approached in the right spirit. And the insistence on Hebrew is a necessary condition, if it is not a guarantee, of a really national system of education.

The problem as it presents itself to us to-day did not exist for the philanthropic organisations of Western Jews which first took in hand the provision of educational facilities for the Jews of Palestine. They had no vision of a restored Jewish national life; they scarcely

even recognised in Palestine a country having special claims on Jewish effort. The problem of the Jews in Palestine was for them but a part of the general problem of the Jews in the East, who were sunk in poverty, ignorance, and superstition, and needed to be uplifted by education of the western pattern. Thus the task which these organisations set themselves was entirely different from that of Zionism, and their work in Palestine has no direct bearing on the creation of a system of national education in our sense of the word. None the less, their work is by no means without importance from the Zionist point of view. If not for them, the conditions with which Zionism had to cope when it commenced its work in Palestine would have been far different, both for good and for evil, from what they actually were. Some account of the work of these organisations is therefore necessary in a survey of Hebrew education in Palestine.

The earliest and biggest of them was the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, founded in Paris in 1860. The *Alliance* aimed at being an international organisation for the protection of Jewish interests throughout the world, but in practice it remained predominantly French, and its sphere of work was restricted to the Orient and Eastern Europe. As early as 1870 the *Alliance* founded an Agricultural School—*Mikveh Israel*—near Jaffa. This step was due to the influence of a Rabbi of Posen, Hirsch Kalischer, who in 1862 advocated the agricultural colonisation of Palestine by Jews; and the school might have done much to further that end if not for the French spirit which permeated its teaching, and led its pupils to prefer emigration from Palestine to remaining in the land. Some years later, when there was a considerable influx of East-European Jews into Palestine, the *Alliance*



considerably extended its educational work in the country. Between 1881 and 1906 it founded over a dozen schools in the principal towns—Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Safed, and Tiberias. Besides ordinary boys' and girls' schools, the *Alliance* has special schools for training in handicrafts. Generally speaking, the tendency of its schools is to give a French education with a slight Jewish colouring. The language of instruction is French; the teachers are for the most part imbued with French culture, and have no interest in Palestine for its own sake; and the result is that the ideal of the pupils is generally to get to Paris. Thus, while the *Alliance* has done excellent educational work, in the sense that it has provided an education and the possibility of making their way in the world for thousands of children who without it would have remained ignorant and economically useless, yet from the point of view of national Jewish education its alien spirit and ideals make it a danger. It should be added, however, that not all the Palestinian Schools of the *Alliance* are of quite the same type. A good deal of freedom is left to the teachers, and, where they are to some extent in sympathy with the national movement, the schools are less aggressively French. The *Mikveh Israel* School is a case in point. The recent appointment of a new headmaster, whose leaning is towards Hebrew, has transformed the spirit of the school, and it may yet become a valuable asset of the national revival.

The contribution of English Jews to Palestinian education is the Evelina de Rothschild School, which was founded in 1880, and was taken over by the Anglo-Jewish Association in 1898. Naturally, the language of instruction was English, as that of the *Alliance* schools was French; but the school reflected English

and Anglo-Jewish characteristics in two ways which gave its development a different turn from that taken by the schools of the *Alliance*. It was more inclined to lay stress on the Jewish religion ; and it was more open in practice to the influence of ideas to which its supporters were opposed in theory. Hence the school was able not only to maintain a Jewish spirit, but even to admit Hebrew as a language of instruction for something like one-half of its curriculum. In practice its pupils are much more at home in Hebrew than in English ; and while the school is not likely ever to become avowedly Hebrew, it may be expected that it will be more and more influenced by the Hebrew revival, and will not be a serious stumbling-block in the way of national education.

The *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden*, the great German-Jewish organisation which does educational work in Palestine, has moved in a direction precisely opposite to that taken by the Anglo-Jewish Association. The *Hilfsverein*, founded in 1900, at a time when the Hebrew revival was already well established, appeared to be very amenable to the new influence, and its schools were practically Hebrew schools from the start, despite the absence of any avowed nationalist sympathies. The *Hilfsverein* lays special stress on Kindergartens, of which it has three in Jerusalem, three in Jaffa, and one each in Haifa, Safed, and Tiberias. It has also a Teachers' Seminary and a Commercial School in Jerusalem, as well as Boys' and Girls' Schools.<sup>1</sup> Thus this organisation promised to be a valuable asset to the cause of national education. But three or four years ago a change came over its policy, and a tendency set in to introduce German as the language of instruction.

<sup>1</sup> These schools were closed after the British advance into Palestine of 1917-18.

The result of this change was the 'language struggle' which followed the disagreement between the Zionist Organisation and the *Hilfsverein* over the proposed Technical School at Haifa.<sup>1</sup> This struggle has produced a breach between the two organisations which is possibly irreparable ; but it has had also the effect of stimulating the cause of Hebrew education in Palestine, through the opening of a number of new Hebrew Schools in the towns.

The three bodies mentioned above, English, French, and German, have all worked to provide a modern education for Jewish children in the Palestinian towns ; but each has worked along lines conditioned not so much by any specifically Jewish aims, as by the outlook which its leaders derived from being themselves assimilated to the culture of this or that European country. Their activities helped to determine the conditions with which Zionists had to deal when they in turn came face to face with the problem of education in Palestine. On the one hand, they had familiarised certain sections of the Jewish population with the methods and subjects of western education. They had established schools of a modern type, a type hitherto unknown to Palestinian Jews, who but for their efforts might have remained content to leave their children either without education, or with no education other than that of the *cheder* and the *yeshivah*. Also, they had introduced education for girls, thereby making good a very serious deficiency in the traditional Jewish system, which generally regards *Torah* as an exclusively male privilege. But on the other hand, they had set up a false conception of the object to which Jewish education in Palestine should be directed, inasmuch as they had associated the idea of modern education with the idea of English, French, or German education.

<sup>1</sup> See *Zionism and the Jewish Future* (John Murray), pp. 182-3.

Thus from the Zionist point of view, which demands a system of education that shall be modern in method and extent, but at the same time true to the national spirit, and free from any tendency to assimilate the pupils to other nations than their own, the work of these organisations was in some ways helpful, but in others harmful. This, however, applies only to the towns. In the agricultural colonies, which sprang up as a direct result of nationalist strivings, the Zionist idea had freer scope in the field of education. The schools in the colonies were not provided by philanthropists for Jewish children who would otherwise have had no education (at least in the modern sense), but came into existence with the colonies themselves, and therefore they express, with more or less completeness, the spirit which animates the colonisation movement.

There are about thirty Jewish agricultural colonies in Palestine (excluding farms and small settlements), and each of them has its school, where the children of the colonists receive an elementary education. The language of instruction in all these schools is Hebrew. That seems a simple and natural fact, but it is in reality the result of a great deal of idealism and hard work. For the mother-tongue of most of the colonists was Yiddish, and the line of least resistance for them would have been to bring up their children also in Yiddish. But the idea of the return to the national language was closely bound up with that of the return to the national land, and the teachers, who were enthusiasts for Hebrew, found no opposition on the part of the parents to their determination to make the schools of the colonies Hebrew schools. The difficulties with which they had to contend arose rather from the fact that Hebrew had been so long out of use as a medium of every-day intercourse, and was not even their own

mother-tongue, nor the language of the homes from which their pupils came. It speaks much for the enthusiasm and the ability of the early teachers that they overcame these difficulties, and established Hebrew firmly as the language of the schools. It is thanks to their work that, though the older settlers still retain their Yiddish, Hebrew is the natural language of the younger generation of Palestinian Jews on the land, and that, so far as language can secure it, the attachment of the colonists' children to their people and their land is secured.

The education given in the colony schools comprises the usual elementary school subjects, as well as Arabic, some knowledge of which is necessary for the Palestinian Jew. The Bible and Jewish history are, of course, taught. In some of the colony schools the pupils are taught French. This is explained by the fact that many of the colonies were for some time (and some still are) under the control of the Jewish Colonisation Association, which is a French body. Even in those colonies which are now wholly independent the school is subventioned, through the Jewish Colonisation Association, by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, to whom the new Jewish settlement in Palestine owes so much. But the subvention carries with it no interference in the internal management of the schools, which is left entirely to the colonists.

The colony schools have been spoken of as a whole, but it is not to be imagined that they were originally planned on a single model, or according to the views of a single central authority. They have grown up independently of one another, and therefore differ in character according to differences of local circumstances. But of recent years some degree of co-ordination and conformity to a single standard has been introduced

through the work of the *Merkaz ha-Morim*—the Palestinian 'National Teachers' Union,' which appoints teachers for the colony schools, and furthers educational development by the issue of a Hebrew pedagogical journal (*Ha-Chinnuch*) and by other means. When this process of standardisation has been carried somewhat further (assuming that present conditions continue to obtain after the war), the colony schools will form in their totality a national elementary school system—though on a minute scale—with the Baron's subvention taking the place of State aid, and the *Merkaz ha-Morim* performing some of the functions of a Board of Education.

The colony schools are sometimes criticised—in common with the whole of Zionist work in Palestine—on the ground that they are not 'religious' in character. This criticism is largely based on a misunderstanding which is not unnatural in western Jews. The conditions under which Jews live in western countries cause them to regard 'Jewish' and 'religious' as convertible terms when applied to their own lives. Reading, writing, arithmetic, languages, and so forth are for them 'secular' or 'non-Jewish' subjects: they are studied by Jews in company with non-Jews, and in the language of the country, and are therefore not specifically Jewish. Such Jewish education as their children receive is given by a special teacher, or in the 'religion class,' and is concerned (at all events in theory) solely with 'religious' matters. It is analogous to the teaching which the Christian children are given in the Sunday schools. For people accustomed to this state of things it is very difficult to imagine an educational system in which there is no distinction between 'Jewish' and 'non-Jewish,' and in which the day-school performs the functions both of the

'secular' school and of the 'religion class.' There is obviously no need for special classes to give the child of a Palestinian colonist the rudiments of Hebrew, which is his natural language, and the language in which he receives all his instruction; nor is there need for special classes to teach him about the feasts and fasts of the Jewish calendar, or the ceremonial observances, because these are part of the texture of his life, and he becomes familiar with their historical origin through learning the history of his people as an ordinary school subject. The character of Jewish life, and the facts of Jewish history, are such that a Hebrew school in a Hebrew-speaking colony cannot be 'secular' in the sense of shutting out everything which western Jews call 'religious'; and if this fact is remembered, much of the criticism of the colony schools is at once discounted. But it is true, generally speaking, that the schools do not aim at cultivating a 'religious spirit,' or at enforcing ceremonial observance. Nor is it part of their real function to do so, since the attitude of the individual in matters of that kind must be determined by temperament and the custom of the home, rather than by the teaching of the school. This does not mean that the colony schools have necessarily attained the ideal attitude on the problem of religious education. There is room for experiments of different kinds, like the 'Talmud Torahs' founded in the colony of Petach-Tikvah and elsewhere by a German-Jewish organisation, which aim at giving a more 'orthodox' bent to the children's minds than they are thought likely to acquire in the ordinary colony school. But ultimately the ideals of a school, in this as in other matters, must reflect the wishes of those for whose benefit the school exists, and cannot be strait-waistcoated by theorists at a distance.

Schools of the elementary type are the only schools in the agricultural colonies, none of which is as yet large enough to need a Grammar School of its own. But the growth of the colonisation movement naturally produced a demand for secondary education, and led to the foundation of secondary schools in the towns, where the needs of elementary education had already been met to some extent by the philanthropic organisations. Not that Zionist effort in the field of elementary education has been entirely confined to the colonies. The Hebrew Girls' School in Jaffa, founded some years ago by the *Chovevé Zion* of Odessa, is entirely a creation of the new spirit, which demands that Jewish education in Palestine shall be national; and the recent difference with the *Hilfsverein* led to the secession from the schools of that body of a number of nationally-minded teachers, who founded Hebrew schools in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. But it remains true that elementary education in the towns is mostly in the hands of the philanthropic organisations. In secondary education, on the other hand, the Zionist movement has led the way, and it is in this field that it has produced its most considerable educational achievement—the Hebrew Secondary School of Tel-Aviv (the Hebrew suburb of Jaffa). For the Jaffa *Gymnasium*, as it is called, though not directly founded by the Zionist organisation, is a product of the Zionist spirit, and its building stands on land of the Jewish National Fund.

The Jaffa *Gymnasium* was founded in 1907, to meet the demand for a more advanced education than could be obtained in the Hebrew schools then existing in Palestine. The resources of the Committee which started it were small, but they were fortunate in securing the sympathy and assistance of Alderman Moser, of Bradford, who provided a handsome and capacious



building, and has liberally supported the school for many years. Financial difficulties were not the most serious with which the promoters of the school had to contend. They set out to give a modern higher education in a language which had never been used for that purpose. They had to create the terminology required for teaching scientific subjects, and the teachers themselves had to learn before they could teach in Hebrew. Moreover, the *Gymnasium* attracted pupils from Russia, who were not familiar with Hebrew as a spoken idiom, and this added to the difficulty of making Hebrew the sole medium of instruction. But what seemed impossible was achieved. To-day the curriculum of the *Gymnasium* embraces, in the higher classes, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and Latin, besides European languages, Turkish, and Arabic. A number of Universities in Europe have accepted its leaving certificate as equivalent to that of a European Secondary School. The experiment has thus been amply justified from a general educational standpoint. And the popularity of the *Gymnasium* is proved by the fact that the number of its pupils, which was under 100 in 1907, had risen to 700 before the war—this in spite of the fact that a certain amount of hostility has been aroused by the alleged non-religious or anti-religious character of the school. What has been said above on this subject in regard to the colony schools is true also of the *Gymnasium*; but the *Gymnasium* has had to face severer criticism, both because it is more in the public eye, and because the scope of its education is wider, and therefore gives more points for attack. In particular, the use of the methods of 'higher criticism' in Bible teaching has been fastened on as indicating an anti-Jewish tendency. This question is a thorny one, and its discussion is not rendered easier by the fact that critics of the school are wont to talk as though 'higher

criticism' were doled out to the pupils in the lowest classes; while in the heat of attack and defence there is a tendency to overlook the important fact that the *Gymnasium* does make an honest attempt to bring home to its pupils both the spiritual value and the beauty of the Bible, and is in that sense working on truly national lines. Nor is any lack of reverence for Jewish tradition evident among the pupils, who study Talmud with as much zest as could be expected in any *Yeshibah*. The war has sent many of them temporarily back to Europe, and those who meet these products of the *Gymnasium* education will find in them no evidence of the undermining tendencies of which the school is accused in certain quarters. It is necessary in dealing with the *Gymnasium* to distinguish between criticism of detail, which may be well founded, and general accusations of un-Jewishness, which emanate from those who are hostile to the national revival. Judged from the standpoint of the revival, the *Gymnasium* is a contribution of high value to the work of Jewish national education.

There is a second *Gymnasium*, in Jerusalem, which is smaller than that at Jaffa, and somewhat more 'orthodox' in tendency. There is also at Jaffa a higher-grade school, called *Tachkemoni*, which was founded by the orthodox wing of Zionists (the *Mizrachi*). Beyond these three schools secondary education in Palestine has not gone. The proposed Technical School at Haifa is in abeyance, thanks to the volte-face of the *Hilfsverein* on the language question; and the Hebrew University is as yet but a project, to be realised, one may hope, soon after the return to normal conditions.

In the *Bezalel* School of Arts and Crafts at Jerusalem the national movement has attacked the problem of

education on the artistic side. The attempt to create a specifically Jewish art is fraught with many difficulties. Broadly speaking, Jewish artists are not Jewish except by birth: their subjects and methods of treatment are borrowed. The Jewish tradition of the last few centuries is almost wholly devoid of any interest in art. It cannot yet be said whether the carpets and woodwork and filigree-work of the *Bezalel* will stand out as creations at once artistically valuable and specifically Jewish in character. But at least the work of the *Bezalel* has already done much to stimulate the national feeling among Jews in many parts of the world. The same is true, in a lesser degree, of the lace-work schools of the Union of Jewish Women for Cultural Work in Palestine. They are symptomatic of the craving of the national spirit to express itself in all possible ways.

The work of national education in Palestine, like the colonisation movement of which it is an integral part, is still at an early stage of development. What it has achieved so far is to establish Hebrew as the language of the schools, and to indicate the lines on which the various problems can be solved. And that is much. If immigration proceeds at a more rapid rate after the war, and new schools have to be provided quickly to meet the new needs, they will have the existing Hebrew schools as a model to follow. There will be no hesitation as to the possibility of giving a complete education in Hebrew, and no lack of teachers qualified in that language; there will be no foundation for the suggestions, which will no doubt be heard in Europe, that modern schools in Palestine must be English or French or German schools, that Hebrew is a dead language, that Hebrew cannot find words for scientific terms, and so forth. The experiments already made are sufficient to dispose of those suggestions. As the Jewish settlement

in Palestine grows, whether quickly or slowly, the network of Hebrew national schools will grow with it, to perform its function of moulding the children of immigrants from East and West into the nucleus of a healthy Hebrew nation.

## 'ONE OF THE PEOPLE'<sup>1</sup>

WHEN Achad ha-Am completed twenty-five years of literary activity, in 1915, the Hebrew monthly *Hashiloach* (of which he had been the first editor) devoted to him a complete number. The number contained many articles by different writers on various aspects of Achad ha-Am's thought; but it contained very little in the nature of personal reminiscence. In this it reflected accurately the position which he holds in Jewish life. He counts not as a 'personality,' but as a thinker: and this not because he lacks personality—his is, indeed, one of the most strongly marked personalities in contemporary Jewish life—but because it is of the essence of his personality that his aim as a writer is to get rid of the personal equation, to analyse ideas in the clear, cold light of reason, to see facts as they are and not as he would wish them to be, to judge men and events by standards that are absolute and independent of persons. This impersonality is not simply one of the characteristics of Achad ha-Am: it is the keynote of his temperament and of his thought. The differentia of Judaism, he says, is its objectiveness, its rejection of the personal; and the secret of his own influence lies partly in the fact that in this most essential matter his instinctive attitude is the attitude of Judaism.

<sup>1</sup> First part in the *Menorah Journal*, February 1917; second part in the *Jewish Forum*, September 1919.

He calls himself simply Achad ha-Am, 'One of the People,' as though to emphasise at the very outset the unimportance of the personal element—as though he would do everything in his power to keep your thoughts off the individual who puts forward this view or that, and to concentrate them on the views themselves.

In the life of such a man a literary anniversary is a far fitter occasion for a display of public interest than the mere completion of so many years of existence. Of the popular hero let it be recorded on what day he was born, of what colour are his eyes, what is his favourite dish, and so forth. But the thinker—what matters it whether he be tall or short, whether he be forty years old or seventy? It is the ideas that matter, not the personality of him who puts them into words. And so one has a certain shyness, a certain sense of intrusion, in trumpeting the fact that Achad ha-Am has reached sixty years of age, and in making that an occasion for writing about him and congratulating him in public. Strictly speaking, Achad ha-Am is not sixty years of age, or any age at all. Achad ha-Am is an abstraction, a sort of collective name for a body of ideas about Judaism and the Jewish people. So we should regard him if we could live up to his own teaching and rise to the height of his own impersonality. The fact that it is so-and-so many years since the body of ideas began to get itself written down is one that may be worth noting and celebrating; but the fact that one Asher Ginzberg has attained to so-and-so many years of life has no relevance. And if, being but human, we must needs take account of this purely personal and therefore strictly irrelevant fact, perhaps the least that we can do is to confine our reflections and observations on the occasion to what really does concern us—to the point of view and the

ideas that are presented to us by Achad ha-Am, or, as I should prefer to put it, that *are* Achad ha-Am.

Behind Achad ha-Am's Zionism there lies a philosophy, an attitude to things in general, which must be understood before we can understand his Zionism. This general philosophical standpoint partly determines and partly is determined by his attitude to Judaism and Jewish problems. He has, it is true, no cut-and-dried philosophical system : he is not strictly a metaphysician, and his mind never works purely in the abstract. He is interested primarily in human life, in ethical and social phenomena. But he brings to bear on that field of investigation certain abstract principles, postulated rather than demonstrated, which the metaphysician would discuss for their own sake. This combination of practical sense with appreciation of fundamental ideas—a combination of what are roughly the distinguishing characteristics of the English and of the German mind—is thoroughly Jewish.

Achad ha-Am's philosophical point of view may be indicated broadly by the phrase ‘ spiritual evolution.’ The concept of evolution—the idea that things grow or develop, that effects follow causes in a natural way, throughout the whole of existence—is for him axiomatic. He rejects any idea of the supernatural, if by that is meant something which works arbitrarily outside the chain of cause and effect. He rejects equally, and as a corollary, the teleological conception—the idea that everything that exists in nature exists for a pre-conceived purpose ; or perhaps it would be more correct to say that he regards that conception as irrelevant. Whether the egg exists in order that the chicken may come out of it, or whether the chicken appears because the egg in certain circumstances develops in a certain way, is a question which does not trouble him. He would say,

if I understand him aright, that it makes no difference. What we do know is that eggs do produce chickens and not kittens, that chickens come out of eggs and not out of acorns. But Achad ha-Am is not of those who think that they have solved all problems and removed all difficulties by pronouncing the magic word 'evolution.' For him evolution is a fact, not an explanation; and he is content to accept the fact and to apply it in his thinking about history and about human problems, in which he is mainly interested. His indifference to pure metaphysics might induce a student of philosophy to write him down a pragmatist; and in this connection it is not without significance that he quoted Bergson as far back as twenty years ago. Yet really he is not a pragmatist.

Nor is he a materialist, though the full acceptance of the evolutionary standpoint is often in fact, and perhaps always in the popular mind, associated with materialism. For he never thinks of evolution as merely the process from physical cause to physical effect. His point of view is thoroughly spiritual. The material evolution is simply the expression of an inner, spiritual change. Matter is, in fact, intelligible only as the outward manifestation of spirit. He does not, however, apply this conception to the physical universe as a whole, not being particularly interested in explaining the universe. He applies it to human beings, to human life and institutions. The actions of men are determined not by 'purely physical' causes, but by their inner needs: and not only actions, but ideas, beliefs, moral standards, and religious aspirations are determined by what men need. It is the spiritual condition that shows itself in the outward action or profession. Here again we seem to see a trace of pragmatism in the reference of all actions, beliefs, and standards to the needs of



human beings. But Achad ha-Am does not draw the extreme pragmatic conclusion that 'what I believe is true'—which is in effect a denial that there is such a thing as absolute truth. He is not concerned with the metaphysical doctrine of truth. He neither postulates absolute truth nor denies it explicitly. All that he assumes is that as a matter of fact men's beliefs are conditioned by their spiritual needs. He has himself a fastidious regard for truth, as something independent of personal feelings and wishes.

Applying this idea of spiritual evolution to Jewish history, Achad ha-Am regards the Jewish people as a group of human beings which has developed certain characteristic ideas, institutions, habits, as a result of historical circumstances. These ideas, institutions, and habits are the expression of the 'spirit' or inner reality of the nation, just as the ideas and habits of an individual man are the expression of his inner spirit or personality. And just as when we speak of a man we mean his personality, and we can say indifferently 'a man expresses his personality,' or 'a man's personality expresses itself': so also we mean by the nation its spirit, and we can say that the national spirit expresses itself in these or those ideas or institutions or habits. Achad ha-Am often uses this mode of speech, in which the spirit is personified, and seems to be regarded as acting independently of human beings. In fact, of course, it is only the work of individuals that we see; and when Achad ha-Am says that 'the national spirit' did so-and-so, he is not to be understood as meaning that the individual men who performed the action in question were simply the passive instruments of some supernatural force. What he means is that the impulse which led the individual men so to act arose from their being members of the national group and acting on the

lines of the national traditions and aspirations. The personification of the national spirit is a convenient way of expressing the fact that, as we look back on history, we can and do trace certain continuous lines of evolution, which are lines of evolution, and not merely disjointed series of actions or events, by virtue of their spiritual continuity.

The history of the Jewish people, then, is the evolution of the spirit of the Jewish people. So long as that spirit continues to express itself in actual life, the Jewish people exists; if the spirit is prevented from expressing itself, the people dies. And since for Achad ha-Am, as one of the Jewish people, the continued existence of that people is naturally to be desired and striven for, it follows that for him the essential thing is to preserve the continuity of the expression of the Jewish spirit. It is for that reason that his Zionism is rightly called 'spiritual Zionism.' But this name becomes a misnomer if we inject into it any idea of a 'spiritual Zion,' as distinct from the actual Zion of Jewish history and Jewish aspiration. We have always to remember that the spirit lives only by expressing itself in concrete manifestations; so that spiritual Zionism demands first and foremost a concrete life of real human beings which shall correspond to the true character of the Jewish spirit. If we keep that well in mind, we shall avoid the misconceptions which have arisen from Achad ha-Am's insistence on the 'national spirit' and the 'spiritual revival.' What Achad ha-Am considers essential is, as I have said, 'to preserve the continuity of the expression of the Jewish spirit.'

To say this implies that the spirit has ceased to express itself, or at least that its self-expression is unduly hampered by pressure of external circumstances. And

that is in fact the case. As a man's personality cannot express itself unless his physical organism is substantially intact, so also the national spirit must flicker out if the physical organism which corresponds to it—that is, the national group to which it belongs—is broken up into fragments which have lost or are losing their organic connection. Now there can be no doubt that under modern conditions (leaving out any consideration of the effects of the European war) the body corporate of the Jewish people is seriously threatened with dissolution. The terms ‘ Jew ’ and ‘ Jewish ’ no longer connote a single type of life. The Jewish communities in different countries no longer feel themselves linked to each other by a bond as strong as that which attaches each of them to the people in whose land it lives. Where Jews are allowed some measure of political and social equality, they become assimilated to their environment—that is to say, they develop along lines determined less by the character, the traditions, and the aspirations which belong to them as members of the Jewish people than by the character of their non-Jewish surroundings. Where intolerance and persecution hem the Jews in, they remain more true to their own past, and carry on in fuller measure the continuous development of the tradition and the way of life which belong to them as Jews ; but that very fact serves to widen the gulf between them and the Jews in freer lands. Moreover, generations of grinding persecution cannot fail to have a demoralising effect on those who remain as the ‘ last guard ’ of the Jewish inheritance. In so far as the Jewish people is exposed to persecution—and that is true of more than a half of the people—its possibility of self-expression is necessarily curtailed. In a word—for the argument is by now too familiar to need developing at length—Jewry to-day presents the sad spectacle of an ancient

people struggling against external forces—forces of persecution and of assimilation—which are too strong for it, and the gradual effect of which is to sap its vitality and to transform what was a single organism into a number of disconnected and therefore decaying members.

It is clear that the complete, the ideal solution of the problem which this process of disruption presents must lie in the annihilation of the hostile forces to which the process is due. But it is equally clear that, as a matter of practical politics, it is impossible to place the whole Jewish people beyond the reach of persecution and of assimilation. The most that we can hope to achieve within a measurable period of time is to establish a strong counteracting force, which will increase the power of resistance of the Jewish people to such a point that it can escape destruction. And for Achad ha-Am, from his standpoint of spiritual evolution, that counteracting force must be something which will restore the spiritual unity of the scattered fragments of Israel. But since the spiritual evolution proceeds through the concrete manifestations of the spirit, what is needed is something more than a mere abstract idea. We need a concrete Jewish life, which shall express throughout the whole range of human activities the essential characteristics of the Jewish people, and shall be recognised by Jews the world over as the embodiment of that which is Jewish. Palestine is marked out by its place in Jewish history and in the heart of every conscious Jew as the seat of this Jewish life. What we need, then, is to make Palestine in actual fact what it has been for centuries in idea—the centre of Jewry. The centre must be a concrete, material thing—a settlement of farmers and merchants and workmen and doctors and teachers and so forth. But its effect

on the people as a whole will be an effect on their spirit : it will be a point of attachment, a binding force, a means of preserving the consciousness of unity. And for that reason he calls it a 'spiritual centre.'

Thus the establishment of a 'spiritual centre' of the Jewish people in Palestine is, in Achad ha-Am's view, the immediate means of preserving the continued life of the people and its continued power of self-expression. But it is not to be supposed that the establishment of a 'spiritual centre' in Palestine will mean the complete solution of what we call 'the Jewish problem' in all its phases. That is a much larger matter. The complete solution of the Jewish problem really demands that 'ingathering of the exiles' which is the full expression of the national hope. It is a vision of the distant future—an ideal which is necessary, and will always remain necessary, to give the Jewish people courage and strength to persist on its thorny way. 'Political' Zionism is itself an illustration of the value of that ideal. It required all the glamour of Herzl's personality and the vivid picture of an immediate redemption which he painted to spur even a small fraction of the people into practical effort for the national restoration. But Achad ha-Am points out that what Zionism is in fact achieving is not the national redemption in the fullest sense. It is doing what the national instinct of self-preservation demands as the immediate step. It is creating in Palestine that 'spiritual centre' which is urgently needed to restore to the Jewish people the power of self-expression.

There could be no better illustration of Achad ha-Am's point of view, and of his merciless insistence on recognising facts, than is afforded by his attitude to the Jewish settlement in Palestine. He would like, no less than the most ardent 'political' Zionist, to see 'the

redemption of the people by the redemption of the land.' But he sees clearly that the laborious establishment of a few Hebrew colonies and schools in a land neglected for ages, and peopled by a large non-Jewish population, is not in fact achieving that object. The efforts of those who think that they are attaining the larger end, at present unattainable, are in fact being turned without their desire or knowledge to the attainment of another end, not so vast and splendid, but none the less valuable, because it is what the Jewish people needs here and now for its continued existence. As Achad ha-Am puts it himself, in an essay written after his last visit to Palestine in 1912:<sup>1</sup> 'What matters it that the work is professedly directed to an object which it cannot attain? *L'homme propose . . .* History does not trouble about our programme; it creates what it creates at the bidding of our "instinct of self-preservation." Whether we ourselves understand the true import and purpose of our work, or whether we prefer not to understand—in either case history works through us, and will reach its goal by our agency. Only the task will be harder and longer if true understanding does not come to our aid.' And that which is in fact being created in Palestine he describes in these words (*ibid.*): 'a fixed centre for our national spirit and culture, which will be a new spiritual bond between the scattered sections of the people, and by its spiritual influence will stimulate them all to a new national life.'

The same point of view of spiritual evolution is applied by Achad ha-Am to Jewish thought in its historical manifestations. He necessarily pays much attention to the characteristic ideas of the Jewish people, as well as to its immediate needs at the present time, because from his point of view 'the Jewish

<sup>1</sup> Translated in the *Jewish Review*, vol. iii. p. 89.

problem' means the problem of a human group which has certain characteristic ideas. The economic problem of a given body of Jews may seem to be simply the result of certain definable economic factors, but on a deeper analysis it is clear that Jews as such have problems at all only because they are the heirs of a certain national tradition. Thus the idea of a 'spiritual centre' in Palestine, which is to give Jewry renewed strength to face its problems, involves recognition of the value of those historic manifestations of the Jewish spirit by virtue of which Jewry is Jewry. Achad ha-Am, then, is concerned not only with the Jewish colonisation of Palestine, and other present-day manifestations of a revival of the Jewish consciousness. His outstanding position as the philosopher of the modern Jewish nationalist movement is due by no means solely to his having given meaning and currency to the conception of Palestine as a 'spiritual centre' of Jewry. It rests certainly not less, and perhaps even more, on his contributions to the elucidation of those ideas which underlie Jewish nationalism—to what may be termed comprehensively the philosophy of Hebraism. True to his characteristic method, he has not attempted a complete and connected exposition of that philosophy; but his essays are full of illuminating suggestions on the subject, and some of them deal expressly with one or other of its aspects. Among the essays which are of capital importance from this point of view are 'Moses,' 'The Supremacy of Reason' (a study of Maimonides), 'Flesh and Spirit,' 'The Transvaluation of Values,' and 'Judaism and the Gospels' (a criticism of Mr. Claude Montefiore's *Synoptic Gospels*). By bringing together the main ideas of these essays we may arrive at an outline of Achad ha-Am's philosophy of Hebraism.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> All the essays named here exist in English translation.

Achad ha-Am finds the most typical expression of the Hebrew genius in the conception of the Prophet, and in the ideal figure of Moses as the greatest of the Prophets. While other nations point to statesmen or warriors or philosophers or poets or artists as their highest and most characteristic products, the Jewish people points to its Prophets. In other words, the qualities of the Prophet are those by which the Jewish people sets the greatest store, those in which it feels its essential character to be most fully expressed. What are these qualities? The gift of what we ordinarily call prophecy, of foretelling the future, is not essential. Moses, whom our tradition regards as the greatest of the Prophets, is not represented as primarily a foreteller of the future. The Prophet is fundamentally a man who has vision—who sees into the innermost reality of things—and gives his vision to the world as he sees it, without regard to consequences. His ideal is absolute truth and justice (which is 'truth in action'), and his aim is to make that ideal supreme in the world. Life as we know it does not admit of the realisation of an absolute ideal; it demands compromises, the sacrifice of one half of the ideal for the sake of attaining the other half. This habit of compromise, of accepting the hard facts of life, of taking half a loaf rather than no bread at all, is typified in another figure which we meet in Jewish (as in non-Jewish) history—the Priest. The Priest is a follower of the Prophet; he believes in the ideal, and wants to make it supreme. But as a practical man he is content to achieve what seems possible at a given moment. Aaron, no less anxious than Moses that the children of Israel should reach the promised land and be able to serve their God, gives them a golden calf when they want a visible object of worship. His calculation is a perfectly reasonable one. Unless



he gives them what they want, they will return to Egypt, and then all hope of the attainment of the ideal will have vanished. Surely it is better to make this temporary concession to their weakness than to lose the great ideal for good and all. So argues the Priest, and he argues as any reasonable, practical man must argue in dealing with a concrete problem. But not so the Prophet. Moses will have none of this compromise. Better that the whole people should perish, better that the attainment of the ideal should be postponed indefinitely, than that its essence be sacrificed. The Prophet, then, is essentially an extremist, an impracticable person, always at war with reality, always demanding of life more than it can give, always a voice crying in the wilderness. For that reason he is not fitted to be a leader of men in the practical affairs of life. But for that reason also he is an elemental force, an inspiration to mankind ; he prevents humanity from settling down for ever in a comfortable acceptance of compromises and half-truths, and summons incessantly to fresh struggles towards the unattainable ideal. And as the Prophet, so the people which has taken the Prophet as its highest type. The Jewish people, too, is fundamentally incapable of acquiescing in the half-attainment of the ideal, of compromising in essentials. At turning-points in its history it definitely refuses to come to terms with reality. Thus, the Jewish people might have preserved its national existence by accepting the gods of Rome. But it preferred to go into exile, and thus to maintain its national ideal unimpaired while postponing its attainment. It chose the distant hope of complete fulfilment rather than any half-satisfaction in the present.

But what in actual practice is that ideal of absolute truth and justice to which the Prophet and the people

of the Prophet are pledged? We come here to the question of the basis of conduct as conceived by the Hebrew mind. His answer to this question Achad ha-Am gives in his essay on Mr. Montefiore's *Synoptic Gospels*, in which he contrasts the Jewish with the Christian ethical standpoint. Briefly, he finds the characteristic of the Jewish outlook to be objectivity, the exclusion of the personal element. He emphasises from this point of view the injunction 'Thou shalt have no graven image,' and contrasts the method of Moses, who says 'Thus saith the Lord,' with that of Jesus, who says 'Thus say I.' The divinity of Jesus is a conception fundamentally opposed to the Jewish way of thinking. The Jewish God is completely impersonal; he works through human agents, but the distinction between God and His agents is complete and unbridgable. This metaphysical difference of outlook between Judaism and Christianity has its counterpart on the ethical side. To the natural un-moral man, who is a bundle of desires which demand satisfaction, and has to be schooled into self-restraint if social life is to be possible, Christianity says: 'It is wrong to attempt to gratify your desires without regard to others. You should do what your neighbour wants, not what you want yourself. Gratify your neighbour, not yourself. Be unselfish; sacrifice yourself; deny yourself; so only shall you find yourself.' Thus Christianity substitutes one personal standard for another. It denies the right of the 'ego' to be the guiding rule of conduct; it puts 'the other' in its place. The right rule is to do what somebody else wants. But Judaism sweeps away the personal standard altogether. It is not what I want that must guide me, nor what you want. My judgment must be objective, based on the facts alone, regardless of personal considerations. I must give every man

his due—and 'every man' includes myself. I must learn to judge my own case impersonally, as though it were another's. I must not favour myself unduly; but neither must I sacrifice myself unduly. It is not my business to do to another as I would be done by. If I followed that rule, I should have to sacrifice myself; because clearly what I want is infinite, and I should like everybody else to sacrifice himself for me. My rule should be the rule of Hillel—not to do to another what I should not like him to do to me. Only in that negative form is the so-called 'golden rule' of value as a guide to conduct. The negative form corresponds to the Jewish ruling out of the personal factor, just as the positive form adopted by Christianity corresponds to the Christian insistence on the personal factor. The Jewish moral doctrine is thus much harder than the Christian; harder, because the Christian doctrine demands merely the encouragement of the altruistic impulses and the negation of the egotistic, whereas the Jewish doctrine demands the subordination of both alike to an objective judgment. But it is characteristic of Judaism to insist on an ideal which on the one hand does no violence to human nature, but on the other hand, men being the imperfect creatures that they are, is not completely attainable in human life. Judaism will not be satisfied with the ideal of a tamed beast; it demands the perfect man.

The key-note, then, of Judaism is that insistence on the realisation in life of an absolute ideal of truth and justice—called in religious language 'the kingdom of heaven'—which has its highest expression in the Prophets. In thus holding up the prophetic ideal as the Jewish ideal, Achad ha-Am seems at first sight to be following in the footsteps of what is called Reform Judaism; for the Reformers claim to go back behind

the Talmud to the noble ideals of the Bible, and particularly of the Prophets, which, they claim, have been overlaid by Rabbinic Judaism with a mass of irrelevant rite and ceremony. But in reality the difference between Achad ha-Am and the Reform school is fundamental. What the Reformers emphasise in the Prophets is the universality of their outlook. For them the Prophets symbolise the merging of the Jewish people in the broad stream of humanity, the abandonment of the separate group-sense for a broader conception of the brotherhood of man. Achad ha-Am is no less conscious than they are of the universality of the prophetic ideal. But he never loses sight of the fact that the universal ideal which the Prophets preached was an ideal for their own people, an ideal for which their own people, as a people, must live and work, and that therefore the prophetic teaching involves not the merging of Israel in the nations, but the persistence of Israel as a nation, and as a pattern to the other nations, right up to the very end of days. The Prophets did not tell their people to carry their law into the world and give it to the other peoples. Their vision was of a day when the nations should come up to the mount of the Lord to learn the way of truth. Once let the Jews give up their sense of separate identity, and the possibility of their realising the prophetic ideal is gone for ever. What we call Jewish nationalism is therefore a direct outcome of the prophetic teaching. And if we see it in that light we shall see how immeasurably it stands above the bastard nationalism which regards the mere possession of a territory and political self-government as the essential thing. It is this close connection with the prophetic ideal that gives to the nationalism of Achad ha-Am its peculiar dignity and nobility. His nationalism is the fulfilment of all that

is highest in Jewish tradition. Its motive force is not the petty ambition of the diplomatist, but the matchless vision of Isaiah and Amos.

The corporate existence of Israel, then, is not a stumbling-block in the way of the realisation of the universal ideal of Hebraism ; rather it is an essential element in that ideal. The teaching of the Prophets is carried on, after the age of prophecy, in the life of their people. The Pharisees are the heirs of the prophetic teaching. They, too, see life steadily and see it whole. They avoid on the one hand the error of the Sadducees, the materialists, who think that the political existence of the Jewish people is worth preserving at the sacrifice of the distinctive Jewish outlook ; and on the other hand the error of the Essenes, who give up the ordinary life of this world as radically bad, and retire to practise an ascetic self-suppression in the desert. The Pharisees, true to the spirit of Hebraism, will accept neither of these half-loaves—neither the purely material nor the purely spiritual achievement. They demand a corporate life in which soul and body shall be harmonised and united in the service of the highest ideal. Thus the great problem of human conduct, the conflict between pure materialism and pure spiritualism, is lifted in Hebraic thought off the individual on to the national plane ; its antithetic terms are seen as embodied in the concerted action of different parties or sects within the nation, and its solution is looked for in the national life as a whole. In the same way, while Hebraic thought is familiar with the conception of a Superman (distinguished, of course, from Nietzsche’s conception by having a very different standard of excellence), yet its most familiar and characteristic application of that conception is not to the individual but to the nation—to Israel as the

super-nation or 'chosen people.' In fact, the Jewish nation is presupposed in all characteristically Jewish thinking, just as it is presupposed in the teaching of the Prophets. Even in the philosophical works of Maimonides, where there is a complete absence of explicit nationalism, the national idea is an implied postulate. And here we arrive at the meeting-point between Achad ha-Am's philosophy of Jewish nationalism and his philosophy of Hebraism. Jewish nationalism and Hebraism are indissolubly bound together. Hebraic thought depends for its meaning and value on the existence of a Jewish national life as the concrete medium in which its standpoint and its ideals are embodied or to be embodied; and Jewish nationalism has meaning and value because it is a striving to give renewed vitality to Hebraic ideals.

The foregoing outline does not pretend to be a complete account of all that Achad ha-Am has to say about Hebraism. Any attentive reader of his essays—many of which are accessible in translations—will find much more than I have attempted to retail here. He will probably find also that it is impossible to present by analysis the full import of Achad ha-Am's thought, that there is always something which eludes the grasp of the summariser, something as it were alive and organic. The reason lies superficially in the fact that Achad ha-Am has no cut-and-dried system, but more fundamentally in the fact that he is so essentially Hebraic in outlook and in feeling, and is so much more the mirror of his people than an abstract exponent of its thought. It is in his truth to Hebraism, in his unfailing responsiveness to what is most abiding in the Jewish soul, that his real greatness lies. The problem for the Jew is always—so long as the *galuth* continues—one of adaptation. He has from time to time to restate the

fundamental truths of his tradition in terms suited to the conditions, material and spiritual, of the age. To Achad ha-Am belongs the distinction of having performed this work of restatement most completely and most harmoniously for the age in which we live. He shows us not so much the line along which the Jewish people ought to go, as the line along which it is going, under the stress of that inner impulse which forbids it to die, and makes it find always the way of self-preservation. His work, more fully than that of any other writer, is the literary counterpart of the movement towards the restoration of a concrete Jewish national life in Palestine, which is in our day the most striking and the most fruitful evidence of the Jewish will-to-live. And just as in his own view soul and body are interdependent, as manifestations of the same underlying spirit, so it may be said that on the one hand his literary work would not have been possible if not for the rise of the practical Palestinian movement, and on the other hand the real meaning and value of the Jewish rebuilding of Palestine are to be understood only in the light of those Hebraic ideals by which all his writing is inspired.

The position of Achad ha-Am in contemporary Jewish life is unique. He is not, like Herzl, a popular leader, destined to become almost a legendary hero. That position could never be his. The populace calls for glamour, colour, romance; its immediate need is for a flag, a watchword, a dream, not for an idea. Above all, the populace demands to be told that something which it wants to believe is true; it has no patience with a truth which is entirely objective, and no understanding of a thinker for whom facts are facts, be they pleasant or unpleasant. Achad ha-Am's position is something greater or something less than that of the popular hero, according to one's point of view. He is

not the propounder of a solution of the Jewish problem, or the creator of a new organisation to cope with that problem. He is—as nearly as a Jew in *galuth* can be—the mouthpiece of the Jewish people, the channel through which what is deepest and most abiding in the national spirit makes itself heard. It is for this reason that his influence goes so deep and is even becoming so wide, despite persistent misunderstanding (whether involuntary or deliberate) of his ideas. He stands for something real and permanent, and can afford to wait confidently for justification. Solutions and organisations come and go, but the essential tendencies and demands of the Jewish people remain unaltered; and for our generation at least, and probably for many more to come, these tendencies and demands of the people find their truest and clearest expression in the written word of ‘One of the People.’



## PALESTINE AND JEWISH NATIONALISM <sup>1</sup>

AMONG all the surprises of the war there is perhaps none more striking than the emergence of Zionism, the Jewish national movement, from comparative obscurity into the sunshine of popular acclamation and international sanction. Four years ago Zionism lay outside the orbit of the student of political affairs. It had, indeed, solid achievements to its credit. It had created a world-wide organisation, numbering some quarter of a million of Jews of every possible political allegiance and every possible shade of belief. The regeneration of Palestine by means of Jewish agricultural and urban settlements had made considerable progress, despite the manifold obstacles imposed—rather passively than actively—by Turkish rule, and there had been a marked growth of Jewish national sentiment in these settlements, which found expression in 1913 in a revolt against an attempt to oust Hebrew in favour of German as the language of instruction in some schools controlled by a German-Jewish organisation opposed to Zionism. When war broke out Zionists were busy with a scheme for a Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which would have been—and will be—a rallying point of Hebrew scholarship and idealism and a powerful means of

<sup>1</sup> *Round Table*, March 1918; reprinted in pamphlet form, with the addition of the footnotes enclosed in square brackets, October 1918.

restoring to Hebraism its rightful place in the life of the civilised world. These phenomena pointed to the steady if not rapid or easy development of a self-conscious and self-dependent national centre of Jewry and of Judaism in Palestine. But there was nothing to attract the attention of the statesman to what Zionism had done and what its achievements foreshadowed. Though various Governments had on occasion expressed sympathy with the aims of Zionism, and the British Government in particular had made the Zionist Movement an offer (which proved abortive) of a territory in East Africa as the home of a Jewish settlement with some measure of autonomy, Zionism was not, and had no apparent prospect of becoming, a factor to be reckoned with in international politics.

Now, almost suddenly, all that is changed. Thanks to the breadth and sincerity of British statesmanship, to the inherent justice of its own aims, and to the ability with which those aims have been presented, Zionism has received the official approval of the British Government—an approval which, in the circumstances in which it was given, makes the realisation of the objects of Zionism one of the avowed war-aims of the Allied Powers. The way in which the Government's declaration of support has been received shows that substantially it speaks the mind of the whole British nation, and indeed of the whole Commonwealth.<sup>1</sup> And while, no doubt, for many people the declaration obtained its special significance by virtue of its coincidence in time with the victorious advance of Allied troops in Palestine, it is none the less true that the permanent

<sup>1</sup> [The declaration has since been formally endorsed by the French and Italian Governments, and is known to have the approval of President Wilson, though the United States, not being at war with Turkey, has given it no official endorsement.]

occupation of Palestine by Great Britain is in no sense made a condition of the support to be accorded by Great Britain and her Allies to Zionism. Mr. Lloyd George, in his statement of British war-aims on January 5, 1918, did not stipulate for a British Palestine, but laid it down that the 'separate national conditions' of Palestine must be recognised : and this statement, taken in conjunction with the Government's earlier declaration, means that, in whatever way the political future of Palestine may be determined by the peace settlement, Great Britain will insist on explicit recognition of the right of the Jewish people to establish there its 'national home.' This position accords both with the general spirit of Allied war-aims and with the requirements of Zionism, which, while it imperatively needs a just, stable, and progressive government in Palestine, and knows how such a government is most likely to be obtained, would obviously be travelling beyond its proper sphere if it attempted to insist on the transference of Palestine to the control of one or more specified Power or Powers.

Be that as it may, the Zionist question has definitely attained political importance of the first rank, and the time is ripe for an attempt to understand what Zionism is, what it has done, and what it aims at creating. What is precisely the place of Palestine in the Jewish scheme of things? What have Jews done in practice to substantiate the claim that they can build a 'national home' for themselves in Palestine, and ought to be given facilities for doing so? What political conditions must be created as regards Palestine if Jewish hopes are to be realised? And what are likely to be the consequences, both immediate and more remote, of the establishment of a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine? These are among the questions that call for an answer.

## I. WHAT PALESTINE MEANS TO THE JEW

The Jewish love of Palestine is a thing unique in its kind, and its particular quality requires elucidation if the meaning of Jewish nationalism and the significance of the Jewish return to Palestine are to be understood at all.

Love of his country is a natural instinct of the normal man, an instinct which can call forth the utmost endeavour and sacrifice of which he is capable. Nor does the attachment necessarily cease when a man leaves his own country for another. Not only does the emigrant himself retain the sentiment, but he may transmit it to his children and his children's children, so that it persists through generations of men who have never set foot in 'the old country.' But this sentiment does not live and grow in the hearts of the absent except on the prop of some concrete connection. Contact is maintained through friends and relations who remain behind; the sentiment, the spiritual fact, finds concrete expression and nourishment in the interchange of letters, of newspapers, of personal visits. At the very least, there is the living recollection of some ancestor who once lived himself in 'the old country,' and whose portrait, perhaps, is treasured as a family relic. When every concrete connection of this kind—trivial in itself, but important because it is the material basis of something spiritual—has vanished, the sentiment can scarcely survive, and sooner or later the descendants of those who left 'the old country' become merged heart and soul in the life of the new.

With the Jews and Palestine the case is very different. It is not, perhaps, so different as might appear at first sight: for, though the number of Jews who have had

any concrete personal connection with Palestine during the last fifteen centuries or more must have been an insignificant minority, yet throughout that period, whenever there have been Jews in Palestine, the collection of funds for their maintenance has been recognised as an integral feature in the life of every traditional Jewish community elsewhere. But the existence of a link of this kind is an effect, not a cause, of the Jewish love of Palestine. There seems to be no reason in the nature of things why a Jew in Russia should contribute money for the support of Jews in Jerusalem whom he does not know, and with whom he has no personal contact of even the most indirect kind. The fact is that the link between the Jew and Palestine is a national link in the most absolute sense—in the sense of being entirely independent of any sort of personal connection. The individual Jew may live his life outside Palestine, and his tradition gives him a scheme of values and a code of religious, ethical and social practice which can make his life distinctively Jewish. He may have no idea that there will be any concrete restoration of Jewish national life in Palestine before the Messiah comes to fulfil the promise of the Return. But deep down in the roots of his being, bound up with the very sense of his Jewishness, there is the conviction that until the Return takes place his nation is in exile, because, however satisfactorily he and millions of other Jews may adjust themselves to their different environments, the life of his nation cannot be properly lived except in Palestine. This it is that explains why for so many centuries the Jewish love of Palestine has found its most characteristic expressions not in political effort for the recovery of the country, and not even in pilgrimages (though these have not been wanting), but in constant prayer for the restoration of the Temple

as the symbol of the restoration of the full Jewish life ; in the elaboration and study of religious rites which cannot be performed outside Palestine ; above all, in the attitude of mind expressed in the Rabbinic saying that the Divine Presence is itself in exile, and will be restored to its home only with the restoration of Israel. The feeling underlying all these phenomena, and others of the same kind, is not one of personal dissatisfaction, of individual home-sickness or longing for something that the individual has lost, but one of national incompleteness.

The Jewish love of Palestine, then, as it has persisted through centuries of estrangement between the people and the land, is peculiar in its selflessness and its spiritual quality. And that fact has given rise to misunderstanding among men whose conceptions of the relation between the spiritual and the material and between nationality and religion are derived from the theory and practice of modern Europe, and not least among those Jews who have adopted the European standpoint as a matter of course in the process of assimilation to their environment. From that standpoint the Jewish love of Palestine comes naturally and almost inevitably to be regarded as something purely religious, as a feeling which has for its object not a particular piece of territory on the eastern side of the Mediterranean, but simply a 'spiritual Zion.' Palestine, it is supposed, has become for the Jews merely an abstraction, merely a symbol for the realisation of their religious and ethical ideals : the Return, so long and earnestly hoped and prayed for, does not mean a physical restoration to the physical land, but merely symbolises the establishment of the Kingdom of God and the empire of righteousness. Christianity has helped to give currency to this notion by its practice of

using the concrete terms of Jewish history in a spiritual sense of its own. But nothing could in fact be more opposed to the whole spirit and tendency of Jewish teaching. Judaism knows nothing of a 'new Jerusalem' which exists only in Heaven. Judaism spiritualises the material, but for Judaism to spiritualise is not to dematerialise. The material remains material: but it derives a spiritual value by virtue of its being regarded as the necessary basis of an idea. Body is body and spirit is spirit, but in life the two are necessarily interdependent, and if it is the spirit that gives meaning to the body, it is the body that gives to the spirit the possibility of expression and activity. Throughout the whole range of Jewish ideas there runs this conception of a relation between body and spirit which is such that, while the spiritual is supreme, the material has a necessary part to play, and would lose its power of playing that part if it were transmuted into something merely abstract or symbolical.

What Palestine means to the Jew can be understood only in the light of this Jewish attitude to the problem of body and spirit. In the course of centuries of exile Palestine has become spiritualised—but spiritualised in the Jewish sense. It has not become, and never can become, an abstraction or a symbol. It is the actual, physical land that matters, though its geographical position and its physical features are absolutely unknown to millions of those who pray for it. If once the masses of Jews were to abandon their belief in the future restoration to Palestine in favour of a belief in a 'spiritual Zion,' to be realised in the world to come, the principle of Jewish cohesion would be gone, and the Jews would soon cease to exist as a distinct human group. But, on the other hand, if the spiritual ideal which is associated with Palestine in

the mind of the Jew were removed—if his love of Palestine became simply the desire for a country with so much milk and honey, so much natural wealth, so many harbours, so much scenic beauty—then Jewish nationalism would equally be a dead thing and 'the Jewish people' an empty phrase. It is the combination of the material and the spiritual element, each indispensable to the other, that gives its specific quality to the Palestine-sense of the Jewish people. It is this alone that explains the extraordinary persistence of the feeling of exile in a people which has ceased to be a nation in the ordinary sense, has built up prosperous communities in many parts of the world, and has provided itself with a way of life which is capable of adjustment to the most widely differing environments. That feeling of exile is, as was said above, a feeling of national incompleteness: an instinctive recognition of the fact that in the national life the elements of body and spirit are not developing side by side and co-operating as they must do for its full self-realisation, because the material basis—the national land—is lacking, and whatever spiritual development takes place without it can be nothing more than a semblance of life.

It is instructive in this connection to contrast the position of Palestine in the life of the Jewish people with that of Greece in the life of the ancient Greeks. Probably the Greeks were much more alive than the Hebrews to the physical beauty of their country, and loved their country for its own sake in a way of which ancient Hebrew literature shows little if any trace. But their national consciousness was independent of the particular piece of territory which they called Hellas. Their sense of the difference between themselves and other human groups had its roots mainly in two things—



in difference of language and in difference of political institutions. And they were able to carry their language and their City-State with them to other countries. They could be as Greek in Italy as in Hellas ; they could create a great centre of Hellenism in Egypt. The Hebrews, on the other hand, when they left Palestine ceased to speak Hebrew, and adopted for everyday purposes the language of the land in which they settled ; and they regarded the communal organisations which they built up as nothing more than temporary expedients. It could never occur to them that their own distinctive form of national life might be lived in its completeness as well outside as in Palestine. They took Palestine with them in their hearts : it remained an essential element in their national consciousness. Their physical land and their spiritual ideas were inseparable, and ' to sing the song of the Lord in a strange land ' was an impossibility.

In the light of what has been said it will be clear that the modern Jewish aspiration for a return to Palestine is not simply—is not fundamentally—a desire to change political conditions for the benefit of a particular nation. It is first and foremost a natural expression of his Judaism on the part of the modern Jew. It is as true to-day as it ever was that the ideas of the Jewish God, the Jewish way of life, the Jewish people and Palestine are inextricably bound together, are in fact but different facets of one central principle which is the *principium individuationis* of the Jewish people. None the less, modern Jewish nationalism is, like the nationalism of other peoples, an attempt at self-preservation. Its differentia is that in the Jewish people the idea of self-preservation is more consciously bound up with the sense of universal human values and ideals. And for that reason it may claim with some

justice that its realisation will be fraught with consequences of peculiar importance to humanity at large. If every nation, by virtue of feeling itself a nation—no matter what may be the elements of its national consciousness—is regarded as having an indefeasible right to the opportunity of self-development, and if the general concession of this opportunity will enrich human life, then surely humanity should reap a peculiarly rich harvest through the free development of a nation whose national consciousness has become bound up with its sense of universal spiritual values. In a very real sense the Jewish nationalist may claim that 'Palestine for the Jews' means 'Palestine for the world,' not because he wants Palestine to be anything but distinctively Jewish, but because he feels that the more distinctive and truly Jewish it is, the greater will be its influence on the world in the direction of establishing a truer understanding of the right relation between body and spirit, between the individual nation and the divine idea of human brotherhood.

But if modern Jewish nationalism, standing as it does in the closest relation to the fundamentals of Jewish thought, regards itself as charged in some degree with the fulfilment of the universal purpose which works through Jewish history, it remains none the less true that there is a gulf fixed between the restoration seen in the prophetic visions and the restoration for which Jewish nationalists are working here and now. That complete fulfilment to which the Prophets looked forward is and must remain a distant ideal, and one to which human effort can stand only in the relation of blind groping, not in that of conscious and well-calculated endeavour. It is in its very nature catastrophic, a sudden and complete reversal of things as we know them. To work for its realisation would

be like working to bring about a volcanic upheaval. Zionism is concerned with matters of human calculation and effort, with things that are, humanly speaking, attainable by a gradual evolution. But there is of course no contradiction here, though there is a difference. Zionism has suffered at times from being thought (and perhaps from being in fact) anti-Messianic, and at other times from indulging in visions too Messianic in their brightness. Its own inner development and the events of recent years have given it equilibrium and the possibility of understanding itself as a typically Jewish union of body and spirit—at once a concrete, practical attempt to re-establish a Jewish national settlement in Palestine, and an idea which derives from the Prophets and can have its ultimate fulfilment only in the fulfilment of their vision.

## II. RECENT JEWISH WORK IN PALESTINE

In actual practice ideas do not work themselves out by their own motion, and their realisation is not brought about solely or even mainly by the efforts of those whom they consciously inspire. Human beings generally need the pressure of some material need to rouse them to action for a cause, and every human movement can be interpreted with some degree of truth as a reaction to material stimuli. In the case of the Jewish national movement it would be absurd to ignore the material pressure which led numbers of Jews to emigrate to Palestine in the 'eighties' of last century; but it would be equally absurd to represent it as having created the national sentiment to which in fact it only gave an incentive to action. The conscious Jewish nationalism of modern times—as distinct from the nationalism which is implied and taken for granted in

the whole Jewish scheme of things—began as a reaction not against persecution or anti-Semitic prejudice, but against the tendency to assimilation which set in as an inevitable result of the political and social emancipation of the Jews in Western Europe. As far back as 1862 a German Jew, Moses Hess, published a book called *Rom und Jerusalem*, in which he subjected to a scathing analysis the prevalent assimilationist conception of the position of Judaism in the modern world—that conception which is conveniently summed up in the phrase ‘Englishman (Frenchman, German, etc.) of the Jewish persuasion’—demonstrated the essentially national character of Judaism, and forecasted the re-establishment of a national Jewish commonwealth in Palestine under French auspices. A little later a Russian Hebrew writer, Perez Smolenskin (1842–1885), again consciously attacking the assimilationist tendency, urged the importance of Palestine, along with the Jewish Law (*Torah*) and the Hebrew language, as a vital factor in Judaism. Nor were there wanting practical efforts towards the resettlement of Palestine. To say nothing of the schemes of Sir Moses Montefiore in the middle of the last century, in 1870 the Alliance Israélite Universelle founded an Agricultural School (called *Mikveh Israel*, ‘The Gathering (or Hope) of Israel’) near Jaffa. This step was taken on the suggestion of Hirsch Kalischer, a Rabbi of Posen, by whose writings Moses Hess had been influenced, and who himself took part in the foundation of a Jewish agricultural settlement near the Lake of Tiberias. A few years later some Jews of Jerusalem established on the banks of the Audja, near Jaffa, a small agricultural settlement called Petach Tikvah (‘The Gate of Hope’), which is now the largest and richest of the forty or more Jewish ‘colonies’ in Palestine.

But it was unquestionably the terrible outbreak of persecution and massacre in Russia, in 1880-81, which finally gave direction to the nationalist aspirations that were floating in the air of Jewish life. While the great tide of Jewish emigration from Russia set towards America, some of the more idealistic, including a number of University students, turned to Palestine, hoping not only to win a better life for themselves, but to set their people on the way to national redemption. These early settlers founded agricultural 'colonies' in Galilee, in Judea and in Samaria, and braved with extraordinary stubbornness the manifold difficulties with which their undertaking was beset—difficulties which were enhanced by their lack of means, of experience and of knowledge of the country. They could not have survived at all if not for help from without. This help was provided in the first place by societies of 'Lovers of Zion' (*Chovevé Zion*) which sprang up in Russia, and later in other countries, for the propagation of the national idea and the support of the Palestinian 'colonies'; afterwards, and in larger measure, by Baron Edmond de Rothschild, of Paris. Thanks to this assistance the colonisation movement survived the ills of infancy, and, though it achieved no results commensurate with the hopes of its early sponsors, gained at least the possibility of development when circumstances should become favourable.

It lies outside the purpose of this article to trace the history of Palestinian colonisation in detail.<sup>1</sup> Suffice it to say that by 1895 some twenty 'colonies' were established in various parts of the country, and the idea which underlay their work, the idea of the 'Lovers of Zion,' was surely if slowly gaining ground in the Jewry

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed account see *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*, by A. M. Hyamson (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1917).

of the Dispersion. Then an event occurred which gave a temporary set-back to colonisation work, and seemed likely to divert Jewish national effort for good and all into other channels. Dr. Theodor Herzl, a Viennese Jew living in Paris, published a brochure called *Der Judenstaat*, in which he asserted that the Jewish problem could be solved only on the lines of the recognition of the Jews as a nation and the provision of a territory in which large masses of Jews could live under conditions of autonomy, and outlined a scheme for the acquisition of a territory under the necessary international guarantees and the transference to it of as many as possible of those Jews who were not contented in their present surroundings. Herzl received his immediate impulse from the ugly manifestation of French anti-Semitism in the Dreyfus affair: and that fact explains both the strength and the weakness of his scheme. Jewish national effort may be stimulated by anti-Semitism; but an attempt to base Jewish nationalism entirely on anti-Semitism ('the pressure from without makes us one people,' says Herzl) is doomed to failure, because nationalism is a positive and not a negative thing. On the other hand, Herzl, looking at the Jewish problem from the external rather than from the internal point of view, was able to grasp the need for a big organisation and for work on a large scale. Had there not been a genuine Jewish national movement—of however modest dimensions—in existence Herzl might have wasted himself in endeavouring to carry out a purely 'political' scheme which ignored the real character of the Jewish people and the really vital elements of Jewish nationalism. As it was, there came about ultimately a fusion between Herzl and the 'Lovers of Zion.' It was the Russian 'Lovers of Zion' who came in largest numbers to the first Zionist Congress,

which he called together at Basle in 1897; and though they were on the whole too ready to yield to the glamour of his large political ideas, and to believe him capable of making bricks without straw, they at least secured the tying down of the Zionist programme to Palestine—a point which Herzl's brochure had left in doubt. This notwithstanding, the new Zionist movement was for a time unsympathetic to 'petty colonisation,' which did not accord with Herzl's notion of getting a charter and purchasing the country outright. But as time went on the true instinct of Jewish nationalism asserted itself. During Herzl's lifetime the movement took several important steps in the direction of Palestinian work, and after his death (1904) the diplomatic activity in which he had excelled sank for a time into the background, and the development of the settlement in Palestine became the chief care of the movement. The net results of Herzl's work—and they were invaluable—were the publicity given to Zionism, and the creation of an organisation which, when the time came, would be able to assert the claims of the Jewish people.

That organisation possessed, at the time when the war broke out, not only the support of some quarter of a million Jews, and the active sympathy of many more, but also a concrete basis for its claims in the Jewish *Yishub*, or settlement in Palestine. The number of agricultural 'colonies' had grown to upwards of forty, with a population of perhaps 12,000, engaged in the cultivation of vines, oranges, almonds, and cereals. Marsh lands had been drained and made habitable and fruitful. Afforestation had been begun on a small scale. The Jewish population in the principal towns had grown by leaps and bounds, and garden suburbs of European type had been built by Jewish energy and

capital. A proper system of credit had been introduced into Palestine by the Zionist Bank, the Anglo-Palestine Company. Farm-schools and an Agricultural Experiment Station had been established. Experiments had been made in co-operative colonisation and in co-operative workmen's settlements. The nucleus had been formed of a class of agricultural labourers who were at the same time small holders. The Jewish 'colonies,' left very much to themselves by the Turkish authorities so long as they paid their taxes, had dealt successfully with the problems of local government, administration of justice, and defence. A beginning had been made of the organisation of the 'colonies' for common purposes by means of a Council consisting of representatives of each. At the same time, the *Yishub* had become more and more conscious of its national character and significance. Hebrew had replaced other languages as the mother-tongue of the younger generation. Hebrew schools of all kinds, including a music school and a school of Arts and Crafts, were in existence, and the first steps had been taken towards the foundation of a Hebrew University.<sup>1</sup> In a word, there was scarcely a phase of national activity—excluding foreign affairs—in which the Jewish people, through this small advance-guard in Palestine, had not adventured. Everything was on a small scale, much was merely inchoate or experimental. But a national life was there in miniature.

The importance of this achievement in colonisation is not, of course, to be measured by its size. What it has done is to place beyond doubt the will and the ability of the Jewish people to regenerate Palestine, and

<sup>1</sup> [The foundation stones of the University, the site of which is on the Mount of Olives, outside Jerusalem, were laid in July 1918.]



itself in and through Palestine. And as a consequence it has given to the claims of Zionism a solid basis such as they could not have obtained by any amount of organisation and activity, whether propagandist or political, outside Palestine. The *Yishub*, small in size but large in potentiality, is the great political asset of Zionism. Without it the sentimental and historic claims of the Jewish people might have been disregarded, as they have been before; with it, they have become irresistible.

The potential value of the Jewish colonisation of Palestine—its value as an indication of what the Jews, and they alone, can make of Palestine—is enhanced by the fact that it has been carried out hitherto in spite of difficulties created not only by the absence of any State organisation behind it, but by the shortcomings of Turkish government. It must indeed be said, in fairness to the Turk, that from the Jewish national point of view his rule has had its good as well as its bad side. Talaat Pasha, in a recent interview, made much of the fact that anti-Semitism was unknown in Turkey, and that the Jewish 'colonies' in Palestine had been allowed freedom in local administration and in the use of the Hebrew language for educational and general purposes. He had a right to take credit for this tolerance, which, if it resulted rather from passivity than from active goodwill on the side of the rulers, was none the less of great value to the ruled. It may well be that if during the last thirty years Palestine had been in the hands of an efficient and centralised government, Jewish colonisation might have progressed more rapidly on the material side, but the settlers might have been much less easily able to learn the rudiments of self-government and to retain and strengthen their specific national consciousness. There is, however, a heavy account on the debit side. Not only has Jewish

colonisation been hampered by burdensome taxes, restrictions on the sale of land, and the neglect of the Government to provide those material facilities without which a country cannot be developed on modern lines ; but the absence of security has kept out of the country much Jewish energy and capital which would otherwise have flowed into it, to the benefit both of the Jewish national movement, of Palestine, and of Turkey as the overlord of Palestine. The Turkish revolution of 1908, which Zionists welcomed as the dawn of a new era of freedom and opportunity, turned out in fact to be the precursor of a policy of Turkification which was even more fatal to Jewish national effort on a large scale than the laxity of Abdul Hamid's *régime* ; and since the war broke out much has happened to destroy whatever lingering belief Zionists may have retained in the possibility of achieving their object under Ottoman suzerainty. It is clear, therefore, that Zionism imperatively needs a substantial change—whether or not accompanied by a formal change—in the political position of Palestine if the work of a generation is not to be practically wasted, and if the Jewish people is not to be doomed once more to fall back on hopes and prayers.

### III. POLITICAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR A JEWISH PALESTINE

There is room for divergence of opinion as to the precise settlement of the political problem of Palestine which would best accord with the legitimate demands of Zionism as well as with the wider interests that are necessarily involved. But so far as the Zionist side of the question is concerned, one or two propositions may be laid down with certainty. In the first place,

the relation between the Jewish people and Palestine must be recognised as the relation between a nation and its national homeland. This recognition is provided by the British Government's declaration of November 2, 1917, while the peculiar relationship of the Jews to Palestine is specifically mentioned in the programmes of war aims formulated both by the British Labour Party and by the international Labour Movement. Secondly, while Zionism cannot of course renounce all claim to ultimate political independence if the system of small States is to continue—its fundamental postulate being that the Jewish people is to have the opportunity of complete and unfettered self-expression—political independence for the Jews of Palestine would be a mere phrase at the present time and in the immediate future, and at the start some other agency must secure to the Jewish people adequate facilities for building up its national home in Palestine on the foundations already laid, by establishing and maintaining law and order in the country, by making proper provision for its defence against aggression from without, and by lending sympathy and active support to Jewish colonising work in the broadest sense. Thirdly, and as a consequence, the government of Palestine in the immediate future must be entrusted to a single Power, and not to a condominium or an international commission. There is much loose talk about the 'internationalisation' of Palestine, which, however well meant, is likely to do more harm than good. For experience shows that when a country is controlled by two or more Powers each of them is likely to care more about pushing its own interests than about the welfare of the country; and, however ardently one may hope for and believe in the growth of a better spirit in international relations, only a rash optimism could

expect progress in that direction to be other than slow and gradual. Equally bad would it be, from the Zionist point of view, if the Powers contented themselves with declaring Palestine neutral. A purely negative policy of that kind would not give the Jewish people the help that it needs if the promise of the Allies is to be made effective. 'Internationalisation,' then, in any sense which can be attached to the term at present, is to be avoided. This is not, of course, to say that international consent is not desirable. Nothing could better accord with the interests of the Jewish people and of Palestine than the universal recognition of the Jewish national claim, and the creation of such conditions as would secure Palestine against becoming again a bone of international contention. And that end might be secured if whatever Power undertook the control of Palestine did so as the mandatory of the Powers in general. But the possibility of a solution on those lines depends on the question whether something in the shape of a real League of Nations is going to emerge from the present war. If that aspiration is realised, it will be eminently fitting for one of the Powers to act for the League as sovereign of Palestine during the period that must elapse before the Jewish nation can grow to full maturity.<sup>1</sup>

#### IV. FUNCTIONS AND INFLUENCE OF A JEWISH PALESTINE

What a revived Hebrew nation in Palestine may mean to humanity in the future may conveniently be considered under two heads—first, the direct influence on the world's history of the development of Hebrew

<sup>1</sup> [The final expulsion of the Turks from Palestine, and the recent progress of the League of Nations idea, have brought a solution on these lines more nearly within the range of practical politics.]

national life in Palestine itself; secondly, the indirect influence which the Hebrew national centre will exert through the Jewish communities in other parts of the world. For, however rapidly and successfully the Jewish settlement in Palestine may grow under more favourable conditions than have prevailed hitherto, for many generations at least, if not for all time, the numerical majority of the Jewish people will remain outside Palestine, and the Jewries of the Dispersion cannot be left out of account in any forecast of the part which the Jewish people may play in generations to come. Such a forecast must naturally be speculative; but if certainty is unattainable in a matter of this kind, some developments may be regarded at least as probable.

Jewish effort in the past generation has already reclaimed parts of Palestine which had been swamp or desert for centuries. With increasing Jewish immigration and improved facilities, this work of reclamation should proceed apace, until at last the potentialities of the country are realised to the full. What those potentialities are is still a matter of some doubt: in particular, it is doubtful whether Palestine has the natural resources that are necessary for the building up of industries on a large scale. But there is no doubt whatever that the agricultural productivity of the country can be vastly increased; and it is equally certain that with proper harbours and railways it can become as of old a great highway of communication between the Mediterranean and the East. Palestine has, then, an economic future; and in making the most of its economic possibilities the Jews will not merely lay a secure foundation for their own national life, but will enrich the world by the addition of one more to the number of productive territories.

This economic development will be fruitful of benefit to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and the neighbouring lands. The Palestinian Arabs have already gained considerably as a result of Jewish colonisation work, with its modern intensive methods of agriculture, its scientific appliances, its western ideas of hygiene and business methods. There is every reason to hope that future Jewish development in Palestine will react favourably on the economic condition and the culture not only of the Arabs in Palestine, but of the Arab kingdom of the Hedjaz. The Arabs are apt to be regarded as a backward race, constitutionally incapable of joining in the onward march of modern civilisation. It is difficult to believe that charge of a nation with such an illustrious record of civilising work in the past. But for centuries the Arab has not had a chance. The rule of the Turk, though sympathetic to him from the religious point of view, is politically oppressive, and makes for stagnation rather than for progress. With the European he has too little kinship of ideas and temperament to be capable of learning from him what the West ought to teach the East. But there is a very real kinship between Jew and Arab—a kinship not merely of blood, not merely of language, not merely of religion (for Islam owes more to Judaism than even Christianity), but of joint work in the diffusion of knowledge. It was the Arab and the Jew who brought scholarship and medicine into Europe at the beginning of the Middle Ages. Jewish philosophers and scientists got their knowledge of Greek thought from the Arabs, and brought that knowledge with them into Europe. The Jews thus owe the Arabs a debt which they should be eager and able to repay when their genius has free scope in a national life of their own and the Arabs are their closest neighbours. Coming

to the Arabs not as strangers from an entirely different world, but as kinsmen who have gained a rich experience during ages of separation, they will help the Arabs by their influence and example to adapt themselves to modern conditions, and, side by side, the two races will realise their national possibilities.

In its co-operation with the Arabs the Hebrew nation of the future will be fulfilling a part, but only a part, of the function which should properly fall to it of acting as mediator between East and West. For Palestine will not merely become a highway of commerce in the material sense: it will be a meeting-place of ideas and civilisations. Politically it may have to be a kind of buffer-State; spiritually it will be the converse. Instead of serving as a barrier, which is the function of the buffer-State, it will hold open the door between East and West, and will help each to a better understanding of the other. Nor will it simply act as a transmitter of ideas: it will make its own positive contribution to the problem of harmonising the divergent conceptions of East and West. For centuries the Jews have been intermediaries in the sphere of ideas as in that of commerce: that was the natural *métier* of a people intellectually gifted, but lacking a solid basis of its own, and doomed always to wander from continent to continent in search of a resting-place. A restored Jewish nation in Palestine will aspire to something higher than that. It will be creative, not merely imitative; it will be, spiritually if not economically, a manufacturing and not merely a trading nation. And its creative work will express a spirit subtly compounded of elements from East and West—the eastern passion for righteousness, for ideas, for God, combined with western initiative and appreciation of the possibilities of man's command over nature. A

Hebrew University in Palestine, re-interpreting the ideas of the Prophets in terms adapted to the modern world, might draw students from distant East and distant West alike, and send them back to their homes with an outlook not merely widened by intercourse with men of the most widely different types, but deepened by contact with those spiritual truths of which Israel is still the guardian, and at present the mute guardian. In international politics, again, which will become more and more concerned with the relations between East and West, a Jewish Palestine might fulfil an important function as the seat of a Court of Arbitration. Both sentiment and geography point to Palestine as of all countries the best suited for this purpose; while the ideal of international brotherhood is so woven into the very fabric of Jewish national sentiment that concrete association with the cause of international peace would be one of the most natural manifestations of the Jewish spirit. A Court of Arbitration at Jerusalem would not be an exotic; it would be a real expression of Hebrew national life, and its moral force would be enhanced for that reason.

Both spiritually and politically, then, a Jewish Palestine may do much towards establishing that world-harmony, that accommodation and fusion of different conceptions, without which mere international settlements can be of no avail. And in such a task Jewish nationalism would be working in close accord with the ideals of the British Commonwealth. For it is one of the primary functions of the Commonwealth, stretching as it does across the Old World and the New, to bridge the age-long gulf between East and West, to create and develop a sense of human brotherhood and civic fellowship between their peoples.

Lastly, and not least important, the Hebrew nation



in Palestine should justify itself by contributing something of value to the solution of social problems. Even in modern Europe, under conditions of assimilation in which the essential character and ideals of the Jew tend to be submerged, the Jewish passion for social justice has shown itself time and again in individuals. Jews have been prominent wherever there has been a fight for liberty and equality within the State. In a Jewish Palestine this fundamental and ineradicable quality of the Jew would have free play ; and its fruits would be the more valuable in that it would be able to express itself in constructive work. Circumstances have too often driven the Jew in modern Europe into the revolutionary camp. But he is not by nature a revolutionary. He has a strong sense of social solidarity and a deep-seated regard for human life as a thing of value in itself ; and his individualism is tempered by an instinctive reverence for law and a habit of defining moral obligations with legal precision. A people with these characteristics should be capable of building a social fabric possessing the elements both of stability and of progress, and of adjusting aright the claims of the individual and of the community. Moreover, the conditions in Palestine are favourable to a new experiment in social evolution. On the one hand, the very atmosphere of Palestine at once recalls to the Jew the social ideals of the Prophets. On the other hand, he can start his work there with the aid of all the science and experience of modern Europe, and yet without the need for that constant struggle against the dead weight of outworn prejudices and institutions which nullifies so much of the energy of the reformers in a country of long-established economic and social traditions. The Jews in Palestine will have no relics of feudalism to fight against. The political equality of

men and women, towards which the nations of Europe struggle so slowly and painfully, is already an accomplished fact in the small Jewish settlements in Palestine. Democratic government and co-operative institutions are matters of course. The Hebrew nation has the advantage of beginning at a point which it has taken Europe centuries to reach, and of being able to experiment with the minimum of risk and of friction. Herzl, in his prophetic sketch of the restored Jewish community, described it as *Altneuland* (Old-New Land), and the name will prove an apt one. Before long the characteristic spirit of the nation will express itself in social reform as in art and literature, and it will give as well as take in that interplay of ideas through which values created by one nation become the property of all. It may even be that from the Judea of the future there will go forth to the world another great wave of religious and moral inspiration, to break, not wholly in vain, on the rock of materialism. At least, a world which has done homage to the Jewish Prophets of the past will not think the worse of the Jew if his national ambition takes the form of aspiring to produce successors of the Prophets in time to come.

Meanwhile, the Jewish communities of the Dispersion will have felt the beneficial effects of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine both in their inner life and in their relations with their neighbours. There has been much misapprehension, partly genuine and partly affected, about the effect of the restoration of Jewish national life on the political and social status of the Jewish communities outside Palestine. Some fear, or profess to fear, that when the Jewish nation has once more a political existence of its own Jews will no longer be allowed to exercise the rights of citizenship in non-Jewish lands, or even that they may be compelled

to leave those lands for their own. It was no doubt to allay such apprehensions that the British Government's endorsement of Zionism was accompanied by a proviso safeguarding the 'rights and political status' of the Jewish communities in countries other than Palestine. This proviso is valuable as placing on record the British Government's recognition of the fact that there is no inherent incompatibility between the realisation of Zionist aims and the continued enjoyment by Jews of social and political equality in Great Britain or any other country. It does not, and in the nature of things could not, afford any guarantee, because no Government could bind its successors, still less the Governments of other countries, as to the course to be adopted in circumstances which have not yet arisen. But no such guarantee is necessary. Only prejudice or loose thinking could set up the contention that the constitution of a Jewish nation in Palestine—even if it had full State sovereignty—would necessitate a change of political allegiance on the part of any single Jew who belonged by citizenship to another State; and if the apprehension of loss of equal rights does not rest on that contention, it rests on nothing. For, when once it is recognised that a Jew born in England, and exercising the rights of citizenship according to the law of England, can owe no political allegiance to a Jewish State in Palestine unless he goes to live in that State and becomes its subject by process of naturalisation, it becomes obvious that the creation of a Jewish State no more affects the political position of that particular Jew than would the creation of a Hottentot State. It may, indeed, be contended that the existence of a Jewish State, or even of a Jewish national home, would lend a handle to those anti-Semites who wish to rid their own countries of Jews, but cannot make out a plausible

case for expulsion, or for such restrictive legislation as would force Jews to emigrate, so long as the Jew has no place of his own to which he can go. But there is a simple answer to that argument. If the nations which have granted equal rights to Jews are capable of retrogressing so far as to substitute a policy of persecution for one of toleration, it would be absurd on the part of the Jews to expect to find in their own homelessness a shield against the evil which threatens them. Experience in Russia (under the old *régime*) and elsewhere proves that a country which for one reason or another is predisposed towards an anti-Semitic policy is not deterred from carrying it out by the consideration that the Jews have no country of their own. If, then, it be assumed that other States will in future model their treatment of the Jews on Czarist Russia, what ground is there for supposing that it will make any difference whether there is or is not a Jewish national home? The fact is that the Jews, as a scattered people, must always depend on the liberality and enlightenment of the States in which they live (or at any rate of those States which are too strong to fear punishment or reprisals at the hands of a Jewish State if one exists); and if the civilised world is going to relapse into chauvinistic intolerance, the outlook for the Jews is so bad that they would be well advised to secure at least a corner of the earth where they can hope to be beyond the reach of anti-Semitism. But there is no reason so to despair of human progress, at any rate within a year of the Russian Revolution.

To obtain an idea of what is really likely to be the effect of the realisation of Zionist aims on the position of the Jewries of the Dispersion, it is necessary to realise first of all what sort of relation will exist between those Jewries and the national home in Palestine. That

there must be some sort of relation goes without saying : otherwise the term ' Jewish ' must become a misnomer as applied either to the community in Palestine or to the communities outside Palestine, or to all alike. To assume that there will still be a Jewish people, with a national home in Palestine and settlements outside Palestine, is to assume that spiritual continuity with the Judaism of the past and the present will be maintained both in Palestine and outside it. And it is precisely for this maintenance of spiritual continuity that the national home will be of greatest value to the people as a whole. Its chief function, regarded purely from the point of view of the Jewish people, will be—to use a phrase made famous by Achad ha-Am, the ' master of those who know ' in Jewish nationalism—that of a ' spiritual centre.' Embodying in its own life what is best and most characteristic in the Hebraic outlook, the national home will be to the scattered Jewish communities a pattern on which they can model themselves in their attempt to realise Judaism in their own lives. Politically and economically the Hebrew nation in Palestine will move along lines determined by its own needs and circumstances, and the path which it takes will have no direct bearing on the position and the problems of extra-Palestinian Jewry. But in the realm of the spirit, in ideas, in religion, in ethics, it will exert a profound influence on the Jews of the world. They will turn to it perforce for a truer understanding of what Judaism essentially is, and of how far traditional Judaism requires adaptation, and how it can be adapted, to modern conditions ; they will look to it in large measure for their preachers and their teachers ; its scholars will help them to a deeper insight into their national past, its poets will give them a new vision of their national future ; they will send their sons and

daughters to its schools and universities, to come back with a quickened Jewish consciousness and a healthy pride of race. By virtue of a conscious individuality of outlook which will give their language, their history, and their customs a value in their own eyes and in those of their neighbours, they will gain a new sense of dignity and of self-respect, and will meet their fellow-citizens on equal terms, knowing that in the commerce of ideas they can give as well as receive. So the Jewish communities of the world, each adapting itself to the political and economic conditions of its environment, will yet remain united by a spiritual bond, and will transmit to the world whatever of value the national centre has to give.

Nor will this renewal of national spirit in the Jews benefit their race alone: it will also benefit all those with whom they live. Keen-sighted statesmen and thinkers in most countries where there is a large Jewish population have favoured the Zionist movement because they have recognised that Zionism, whilst making its disciples better Jews, makes them also better citizens of the State to which they belong. It is no accident that the leader of American Zionism has stood in the van of the social reform movement in the United States and has won his way by his untiring devotion to public service to a seat on the Bench of the Supreme Court. It may indeed be hoped that, when the promise of Zionism is fulfilled and its harvest is gathered in, many time-honoured prejudices against the Jew will be at last destroyed. For his fellow-citizens will be no longer tempted to regard him as a homeless man, a man who has lost his national birthright, and therefore in some vague sense inferior to themselves, incapable of service as wholehearted as their own to the State of his adoption, at the worst a parasite in the body politic. Not least

among the fruits of the renaissance of Jewish nationality will be a fuller sense of civic equality and human brotherhood between Jew and Gentile throughout the world.

A few words may be said, in conclusion, as to one particular effect which the realisation of the Zionist ideal ought naturally to have on the development of political thought and practice. Of all the questions which the present war has brought to the forefront of men's minds there is none more important and more insistently demanding solution than that of the relation of the conceptions of State and Nationality. Throughout the nineteenth century the prevailing idea in Europe was that State and Nationality should be coterminous; each nation, however small and however unfitted for self-government, should have the complete machinery and independence of a sovereign State. It was a period, therefore, of the creation of petty States and—what is worse for the cause of peace—of irredentist movements. And if the conception of the nation-state is to retain its predominance in political thinking, there will assuredly be no end of irredentism and no end of war. The only hope lies in the general acceptance of the opposite conception, according to which the ideal arrangement is that of a number of nations grouped together for the conduct of the affairs which concern them all in common, but maintaining each its own individuality in language and culture, and endowed with a sufficient measure of internal autonomy. The British Commonwealth comes nearer than any political organism of the present or the past to realising this ideal. The new Russia may perhaps in course of time approximate to it. But the day is yet far distant when the world as a whole will be organised on the basis of large groups of nations in free association for State purposes, and any new force which

will strengthen the tendency in that direction, theoretically or practically, should be welcomed by those who hope for real progress in international relations. Now in so far as the Jewish people develops along the lines here foreshadowed—and they are lines which it must follow if it remains true to itself—it will be a force making in that direction. For the existence of Jewish communities all over the world, keenly conscious of their own national distinctiveness, spiritually attached to their own national home, yet sharing politically and economically the struggles and the fortunes of the peoples among whom they live, will be an object-lesson in the true distinction and the right relation between State and Nationality. It will strengthen the hands of all those who are thinking and working for the great cause of removing the international rivalries and animosities which have now plunged the world in chaos. The Jewish nation, alike at its centre and at its circumference, will help to show mankind that a nation's life is best lived, not in isolation and conflict, but in community and co-operation; that nationality is essentially a thing of the spirit, not bound up with and fettered by political machinery, but working freely in the hearts and minds of men, and expressing itself in the effort of different human groups to approach the same summit by different roads, each striving upwards along the path marked out for it by its own character and spirit.



## THE RENASCENCE OF HEBRAISM IN PALESTINE<sup>1</sup>

THE modern Jewish development of Palestine, though it must await the end of the war and the establishment of proper political conditions before it can produce its full fruits, has been proceeding for at least a generation, and has achieved already quite considerable results when regard is had to the adverse conditions under which it has been carried on. Its material results—the extension and improvement of agriculture, the creation of urban and rural settlements of modern type, the establishment of a sound banking system, the increase in the volume of trade between Palestine and the outside world—are fairly familiar by this time. But it has another side to which perhaps less attention has been paid. Jewish effort in Palestine has for its object not only the regeneration of the country, but also the regeneration of the Jewish people through the creation of a national centre with a distinctively Hebraic type of life. On a broad view the fuller development of the latent resources of Palestine, important as that is for the world, may be said to be of less significance than the re-creation of a centre of productive effort in the sphere of thought and ideals. It will mean much for the world to get the most that can be got out of

<sup>1</sup> *Palestine*, October 5, 19, and 26, 1918.

every acre of cultivable land in Palestine, to bring the country's hidden mineral resources into play, and to facilitate intercourse between East and West by the opening up of a trade route in a position ideally adapted for the purpose. But it will mean even more to turn Palestine from a country that lives on its intellectual and spiritual past into the seat of a new civilisation, developing with the years and contributing its quota to the solution of the great problems of human society and human thought. It is for this reason that the Hebrew University at Jerusalem, the foundation stones of which have recently been laid, spells even more for the friends of progress than the large schemes of material development which will be taken in hand when the Jewish people has unimpeded access to its ancient country. For the Hebrew University will focus within itself the spiritual forces of Hebraism, and will be the most potent engine for the transmission of Hebraic influence to the world beyond. It will enunciate the underlying theory of Hebrew life, reflecting in its teaching and its publications the outlook and the principles which will find practical expression in the social and economic structure of Palestinian Jewry and in the relations of its individual members to each other and to the whole. Thus the inception of the University suggests at once the question, to what extent and in what ways the Jewish effort of the last generation has produced in Palestine, side by side with material progress, the beginnings of a distinctive type of life which can be called Hebraic.

The most obvious, and not the least important, sign that a development of that kind has begun is to be found in the revival of the Hebrew language. For those who understand what nationality means there is no need to emphasise the value of language as a

criterion of a distinctiveness that goes beneath the surface. A nation's language is so bound up with its individuality that the one can hardly exist without the other. Language may be an external thing, but it is external in the sense in which a man's skin is external, not in the sense in which a man's coat is external. It cannot be destroyed or mutilated without endangering the nation's health and even its life. And of no people is this more true than of the Jews, who throughout centuries of estrangement from their own soil and subservience to alien modes of thought and life have preserved their language precisely in relation to those aspects of life which they felt to be most intimately and inalienably their own, and most essentially bound up with their preservation and their separateness. Hence the revival of Hebrew as the language of everyday intercourse in Palestine is a fact of prime importance in connection with the development of a Hebraic type of civilisation. Given that revival, the first and most necessary condition of a unique and characteristic national self-expression is present.

Hebrew has never ceased to be used as a language of literature, of correspondence, and also of spoken intercourse between Jews who could not understand each other's vernacular. The middle decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a considerable extension of its use in Eastern Europe, where an extensive secular literature was produced, and much progress was made in the adaptation of the ancient language to modern needs. But it was only in Palestine that the revival could come to full fruit. There the conditions were exceptionally favourable. On the one hand, even before the modern Jewish colonisation movement began, the attraction of the Holy Land had drawn thither a steady stream of Jewish immigration from almost every country

in the world, and the close juxtaposition of the different groups of immigrants, who were settled almost exclusively in the four 'holy cities' of Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias, threw into glaring relief the need for a common language of intercourse. That language could be none but Hebrew, for no section of Jews would see any reason to change its habitual tongue for any other except the one which belongs to all Jews as such. On the other hand, the new type of immigrant who began to come in the eighties, with the idea of a national revival in Palestine well in the forefront of his consciousness, was impelled to make Hebrew his language not only for reasons of practical convenience, but also, and even more irresistibly, as a matter of principle. The result of this combination of idealistic and practical considerations is seen in the remarkable development of Hebrew speaking in Palestine at the present day, when the persistent striving of the idealists, aided by favourable conditions, enjoys its triumph. Hebrew has not, of course, entirely driven other languages from the field as the medium of everyday intercourse among Palestinian Jews. It is not to be expected that grown men and women will readily change the language which they have been accustomed to use from childhood. For them it is enough to adopt Hebrew as a second language. But there is now in Palestine a younger generation whose mother-tongue is Hebrew, and which thinks and expresses itself naturally in the language of the Bible. That is the achievement of the new type of school created by the new type of immigrant—a school which does all its teaching in Hebrew. This type of school had its origin in the Jewish agricultural settlements, where it was from the start the only type; but it soon spread to the principal towns, where it had to compete

with two earlier types—with the old *cheder*, a relic of the ghetto, in which instruction is limited to Jewish subjects and is given in Yiddish or in the corresponding jargon of the Sephardic Jews, and with the modern foundations of English, French, and German Jewish philanthropic associations, which give a general elementary education in a European language, using Hebrew as a second language of instruction to a greater or less extent according to the greater or less responsiveness of their managers to the new national current of thought.

In this competition time and the spirit of progress are on the side of the Hebrew school, which satisfies the requirements of modern education without either introducing the atmosphere of the ghetto, as the *cheder* does, or creating, as do the schools of the philanthropic associations, the artificial type of a Palestinian child who acquires his culture in a language foreign to the country in which he is to live. In Jerusalem, which is the stronghold of the older type of settler, as well as of the older type of European philanthropic effort, the Hebrew schools and kindergartens are making great headway, and are attracting the children of the class of parents who used to look askance at their 'modernist' tendencies. Moreover, the schools established by the German philanthropic association, the *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden* (which, be it remarked in passing, approximated more nearly to the national ideal in their use of Hebrew than the schools of the English and French Associations) have recently been closed by the British authorities and handed over to the Zionist Organisation to be run as Hebrew schools. There can be no doubt, then, that the future of Hebrew as *the* language of the Palestinian Jew is assured. Before very long it will be the medium of instruction in all

the schools, of whatever type—whether modern schools in which specifically Jewish subjects take their place side by side with the ordinary constituents of a modern curriculum, or more ‘traditional’ schools, which lay most stress on the teaching of the Bible and the Talmud. And as the proportion of native-born to immigrant Jews grows, and the younger generation is less and less under the necessity of accommodating itself to an older generation for which Hebrew is only a secondary language, it will become as true to say that Hebrew is the language of Palestinian Jewry as it is to say that English is the language of the English people.

Nor must it be thought that the revival of Hebrew is even to-day a reality only among the younger generation. The older men and women, as has been remarked above, still retain their original languages for many everyday purposes; but Hebrew is already the language of the Jewish settlement in Palestine in the sense that it is used for all public and official purposes. Any public body would naturally keep its minutes in Hebrew; any announcement of a meeting or an election or a concert would be in Hebrew; at any public gathering no other language would be heard from the platform. It is a simple recognition of facts, and not a mere concession to sentiment, that the *Palestine News*, the official weekly organ of the British military administration in the occupied territory, appears in Hebrew as well as in English and Arabic.

It will occur to many to ask what precise relation the Palestinian Hebrew of to-day bears to the language in which the Bible was written. The answer is not easy to give without a fuller analysis than is here possible. But it may be said that the Hebrew of to-day is the lineal descendant of Biblical Hebrew through the post-Biblical, but still classical, idiom of the Mishnah and

later Rabbinic literature. Both in structure and in vocabulary the language has remained one through the ages. Of course, modern Hebrew borrows words from European languages, just as the Hebrew of the Mishnah borrowed from Greek and Latin; and as the language is still spoken and written so largely by men and women who were not brought up in it, there may well be a tendency to borrow to excess. But any such tendency should soon be corrected as the language comes to be moulded more and more by the influences of a purely Hebrew environment and the natural surroundings of Palestine. Much the same is true of modern Hebrew style. The Bible affords an unsurpassable model for simple narrative and for poetry, and the Mishnah for the clear and concise expression of ideas; but neither entirely satisfies the requirements of modern everyday speech or journalism. The ideal combination of native Hebrew idiom with the tone and temper of modern languages will be worked out in time, and meanwhile it is no reproach to the living speakers and writers of Hebrew if not all experiments in style are successful.

The use of Hebrew by whole communities as their normal spoken language (and not merely as a resource where communication is not possible in another language, or as a means of distinguishing the Sabbath from other days) is a new phenomenon created by the nationalist revival in Palestine, and probably without precedent since the time—considerably antecedent to the destruction of the Jewish State by the Romans—when Hebrew gave place to its sister language, Aramaic, as the ordinary idiom of the Jews in ancient Palestine. The use of Hebrew for general literary purposes, on the other hand, was well established before the modern colonisation of Palestine began, and in this respect

the Palestinians had only to follow an existing tradition. Nor has there yet been time for the centre of modern Hebrew literary production to shift from the Diaspora to Palestine. The greatest living Hebrew writers, whose work has been done during the period of the growth of colonisation in Palestine, and has had, in most cases, a direct relation to the nationalist movement, are men of Russian birth, and have remained in the West. Achad ha-Am (Asher Ginzberg), the philosopher of Jewish nationalism, lives in London; Byalik and Tchernichowsky, the two greatest poets, are still in Russia; and the long list of less distinguished, but still notable, writers of prose and poetry would include a relatively small number of Palestinian names. But the Hebrew literature of Palestine, if it has not yet achieved pre-eminence in quality, has certain distinctive features of its own. In the first place, the Hebrew books and periodicals produced by the Jews of Palestine are the only literature that they produce, whereas in other countries Hebrew is only one of the languages in which Jews express themselves by means of the written word. This means that in Palestine Hebrew writing has a more direct and natural relation to life than it can have elsewhere. Secondly, and as a consequence, Palestinian Hebrew literature touches the actual problems of life at more points than does the Hebrew literature of the Diaspora. It is concerned with questions of agriculture, of pedagogy, of industrial development, which can scarcely come within the scope of an author who is not himself in Palestine and does not write specially for Palestinian readers. And thirdly, in the domain of poetry and belles-lettres it is open, as Hebrew literature elsewhere is not, to the influences of Palestinian scenery and life and of the historic memories of which the land is so full.



The distinctive feature, then, of the contribution of Palestine to the Hebrew literature of the last generation is to be found not so much in its manner as in its subject-matter. The differentia lies not in the mode of expression, nor in the general attitude to life which is expressed, but in the relatively large place occupied by certain subjects. Thus, for example, weekly Hebrew papers existed in Russia long before any were published in Palestine; but whereas the Russian Hebrew weekly was always and inevitably a review of a general character, specialised only in so far as it dealt more particularly with events and questions of Jewish interest, the best Hebrew weekly in Palestine is—or rather was, for no periodical except the official weekly appears at present in the occupied territory—the organ of a union of Jewish agricultural labourers, named, like the union itself, *Hapoel Hazair* (*The Young Workman*), and interested primarily in advocating the union's special point of view on the labour question in Palestine. At the same time, *Hapoel Hazair* never was a specialised paper in the narrower sense. The conditions of the Palestinian settlement, while they demand a good deal of concentration on practical problems, do not permit of extreme specialisation in periodicals, for the mere reason that the settlement is as yet too small to support a large number of publications dealing exclusively with particular departments of life. And that severely practical reason co-operates with another of a psychological character: namely, that the Hebrew mind tends to see life whole rather than in water-tight compartments. There is something distinctively Hebraic in a paper of the type of *Hapoel Hazair*, which maintains the character of a party organ without losing its interest for the general reader. The same tendency may be observed in a series of publications projected and in

part issued since the outbreak of war, under the general title of *Agricultural Library*, and under the editorship of an agricultural expert who is also a man of letters. Of the two volumes of this series which have appeared so far, one is a collection of essays on the domestic economy of the farmer, the other a translation of 'Hermann und Dorothea'; and the volumes still to come fall into the two classes of technical studies on agricultural questions and belletristic works dealing with country life. The combination is novel and characteristic.

The problems of education have naturally occupied a great deal of the attention of Palestinian Hebrew writers. The Union of Hebrew Teachers, one of the most valuable organisations of the new Jewish settlement, produced for some years before the war a bi-monthly called *Hachinnuch* (*Education*); a Hebrew treatise on psychology, for teachers, appeared a few months ago; and a series of Hebrew readers for schools, carefully planned and beautifully executed, was in course of publication when war broke out. Akin to this educational work is that of the *Va'ad Halashon* (*Committee on Language*), which aims at performing something like the function of the French Academy in maintaining the purity of the language and standardising words and expressions. It is an interesting question, and one that only the future can decide, whether the Hebrew temperament will submit permanently to the authority of a body of this kind, or whether it will find the linguistic anarchy of England more congenial, or whether (as is perhaps the most likely) it will hit on some middle course better suited to it than either extreme. But at the present time a body of this kind can certainly fulfil a useful purpose. Ancient Hebrew literature contains a vast store of words and expressions

which could be used in everyday life (and especially in agricultural life), but have fallen into disuse during the long period of the exile, and are now unknown except to scholars. These hidden treasures can be restored to circulation by the systematic work of experts, and needless coining and borrowing can thereby be avoided.

An important contribution of Palestine to linguistic study is the monumental dictionary—*Thesaurus totius Hebraicitatis*—of Elieser Ben-Jehuda, of which four volumes (out of a total of ten) had appeared before the war. This is a Hebrew dictionary in the strict sense—in the sense in which the Oxford Dictionary is an English dictionary: that is to say, it is written in Hebrew throughout, and is meant for people whose language is Hebrew, not for those who want the meaning of a Hebrew word explained in another language. As its mere size indicates, it is conceived on a large scale. The Hebrew of all the ages, from the Bible to the latest coinage, is within its scope; it deals fully with questions of etymology; and it illustrates each word by copious examples drawn from the literature of every period. Incidentally, it also gives the equivalent of each word in Arabic and in two or three European languages. Its author, one of the pioneers of Hebrew speaking in Palestine, has devoted over thirty years of constant work to its compilation, and since his enforced departure from Jerusalem on the outbreak of war has been continuing his labours in America. The fact that the number of the slips on which his references are written amounted some years ago to something like a million indicates in itself an achievement in lexicography such as no man has ever before performed single-handed.

Absorbed as it necessarily has been in its own immediate problems, the young Hebrew settlement has not yet had time or opportunity to achieve distinction

in the field of what is known as ' Jewish Science '—the scientific elucidation and interpretation of ancient Hebrew literature and of Jewish history. During the nineteenth century that field was largely held by German Jewish scholars, whose work, valuable though it is, suffers from a tendency to treat the problems of past Jewish life and thought as matters proper to antiquarian research and having no relation to the present or the future. We may look to the Hebrew University to create in Palestine a school of workers in this field who will regard the Jewish national past not as a mine to quarry in (though it be even a gold mine), but as a living stream which has never ceased to flow, and has received a new impetus in the Jewish national life which will be their background.

The foregoing remarks are not, of course, intended as a survey of Palestinian Hebrew literature. Their purpose is simply to indicate where, in the domain of literature, the embryonic Hebrew nation in Palestine has begun to open up new paths. As the national life develops and its individuality becomes more clearly marked, so will its literature, which is readily responsive to its needs, find new possibilities of expansion along distinctive lines.

The same may be said of the Hebrew drama, which already exists in Palestine, though rather as an occasional adventure than as a regular feature of life. It is not a Palestinian drama in the sense of drawing its nourishment from the life and conditions of Palestine. It depends as yet entirely, or almost entirely, on translations. But the main thing is that there is no competing drama in any other language, and that the dramatic gift which Jews do not lack, whether as authors or as actors, will naturally find in Palestine a Hebrew expression. The new Hebrew life has already found voice in many new

folk-songs, which breathe love for the land and the soil ; and the small beginnings of Hebrew music and Hebrew art are discernible. It is too early yet to attempt to fix on the distinctive Hebrew note in these experiments in artistic self-expression : but whether in drama or in art, in music or in folk-song, the desire for self-expression is there, and is beginning to find its stimulus in the concrete phenomena of Hebrew national life.

The revival of the Hebrew language does not of itself amount to a renaissance of Hebraism, though it is the most palpable and unmistakable sign that a renaissance of Hebraism is in progress. The conventional use of the term ' Hebraism ' might, indeed, justify an assertion that the two things are not necessarily connected. Since Matthew Arnold we have become accustomed to think of Hebraism as denoting simply a certain attitude to life, which finds its clearest manifestation in the Hebrew Bible, and no doubt stands in some organic relation to the temperament and character of the ancient Hebrews and the conditions in which they lived, but can none the less be expressed in any other age and in any other literature. Hebraic elements are readily traceable, for instance, in the dramas of Æschylus, who did not know the Bible, as well as in the life and literature of the Puritans, for whom the Bible was a conscious inspiration. On this view ' Hebrew ' and ' Hebraic ' mean two different and not necessarily interdependent things ; and it follows, on the one hand, that Hebraism might be embodied to a greater or a lesser extent in the life of a social group which knew nothing of the Hebrew language, and on the other hand, that a social group might use Hebrew as its language of everyday intercourse and literature, and yet have an attitude to life which could not be described as Hebraism. The

use of the terms 'Hebraism' and 'Hebraic' in this abstract sense is certainly convenient when we are dealing with human life and thought in general, and trying to group the manifestations of the spirit of man under headings which transcend racial and national boundaries. But it becomes embarrassing when we are brought face to face with a re-birth of Hebrew national life. For, from the point of view of the Hebrew nation itself, 'Hebraism' cannot be merely an attitude to life which is expressible in the corporate activity of any human group. It must be something definitely and exclusively related to the corporate activity of this particular Hebrew group. The national re-birth means, in fact, nothing less than an attempt on the part of the Jewish people to recapture Hebraism for itself, to retranslate it into concrete terms, to restore the old interdependence of 'Hebrew' and 'Hebraic.' This attempt is, however, an essay in creation, not in mere imitation or restoration. There can be no question of a simple reproduction of Hebrew life as it existed in the days when Hebraism was its inner spirit. Even if the details of that life were sufficiently known, they could not be transplanted into the twentieth century without creating an anachronism instead of a living centre of civilisation. The problem is to re-interpret the old spirit in a way suited to the vastly different conditions of the modern world. And since the old spirit cannot be defined in mathematical formulæ, but is of the order of things that are recognised by sympathetic intuition rather than by intellectual analysis, it follows that there is no laying down in advance the lines along which the new national life must proceed if its attempt to make 'Hebrew' equivalent to 'Hebraic' is to be successful, and no real possibility of testing its success except for those, more favoured

in a sense than ourselves, who will be able to regard it with the backward-looking eyes of the historian. At the same time, one may even now, though with much caution and reserve, indicate here and there what seems to be a sign that the renaissance of Hebraism in Palestine is as real as the revival of Hebrew : the more so, because after all there has always existed, even in the Diaspora, a corporate Jewish life of a quite distinctive type, and that life, though only partly Hebrew, must also be at least partly Hebraic.

The distinctive type of life which has been lived for centuries by Jews in Eastern Europe, and in other parts of the world where Jews live in relatively large masses, and have assimilated comparatively little of the outlook and habits of their neighbours, presents a large number of characteristic institutions, which differentiate it from the life of any other known human group more radically than the life of any one European nation is differentiated from that of any other. Three of these institutions may be singled out for our present purpose, which is that of indicating the relation of present-day Hebrew life in Palestine to the traditional life of Jewry in exile. There is, first of all, the *beth-hak'nesseth*, or Synagogue, which is much more like what its name signifies—'house of assembly,' or 'meeting-place'—than are the churches of Western Christians or the Synagogues of Westernised Jews. The Synagogue is a frequent place of resort, in which prayers are said three times a day, and in which the worshippers will linger to gossip or talk business as readily as in any other place. The typical address (*d'rashah*) delivered in the Synagogue is at least as much like a lecture as like a sermon : it may contain much or little exhortation to piety and goodness, but it will certainly reflect the speaker's Talmudic knowledge

and gift for disputation. Thus the Synagogue satisfies an intellectual as well as a purely religious need. Secondly, there is the *beth-hamidrash*, the 'house of study,' hard by the Synagogue, and often used in preference to it as the place of prayer by the learned. Here men sit and study the Talmud in groups, during the day or after their day's work is done, fighting over again, with an extraordinary intellectual passion, the bygone controversies of the Rabbis. Thirdly, there is the *beth-din*, the 'house of law,' a court which adjudicates, in accordance with Jewish law, on points of ritual observance, of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and in civil cases generally. The extent to which its decisions are binding—that is to say, will be upheld by the ordinary courts as a matter of course—varies in different countries; but its decisions, even on matters outside the sphere of ritual or family law, are more likely than not to be accepted, though they may have no force behind them.

The Jews who laid the foundations of the modern agricultural development of Palestine, coming as they did from centres of Jewish life where the old tradition was strong, brought with them these three characteristic institutions, along with many other typical features of Jewish life. So in each colony there is a Synagogue, a house of study, and a Jewish court of law. But these institutions, which had become stereotyped in the course of centuries of life in the Diaspora, did not correspond fully with the needs of the new Palestinian community. They had, indeed, begun to lose their value even in the Diaspora for the growing number of young men and women who received a European education and threw off more or less completely the traditional reverence for the Talmud and the way of life of which the Talmud is, after the Bible, the princi-



pal foundation. And in Palestine, as elsewhere, the tendency has so far been for the new needs to be met rather by the creation of new institutions than by adaptation of the old. Thus, side by side with the Synagogue, there is the *beth-am*, the 'house of the people'—a sort of club where people meet for social purposes and lectures and discussions. By the side of the house of study there is the public library. And—in some ways most important of all—by the side of the *beth-din* there is the *mishpat hashalom*, the court of arbitration, which, though backed by no real force, has obviated resort to the corrupt Turkish courts in civil and even in minor criminal cases, and to which Arabs have been known to have recourse on occasion. The *mishpat hashalom* (there is one in each of the larger colonies, and a court of appeal at Jaffa), while it is guided to some extent by the principles and precedents of Jewish law, suffers somewhat from the lack of a definite code or corpus of practice; but it contains the germ—which should be allowed to develop—of a Jewish judiciary adapted to modern requirements. Its development need not interfere with the *beth-din*, which will find its proper sphere in ritual and family law.

If the growth of these new institutions indicates a certain breaking away from the traditional lines of Jewish development, it should not be assumed that a fusion between the old elements and the new, which would ensure the transmission into the new life of the truly Hebraic elements in the tradition, is impossible or even unlikely. Just as the Talmud was and will again be studied with zest, though not with the intensity and exclusiveness of past generations, in the Hebrew Higher Grade School at Jaffa—a co-educative school of the most modern type, now temporarily closed—so the younger generation of Palestinian Jewry is bound

to be influenced at innumerable points by the specifically Jewish tradition, though it no longer regards that tradition precisely with the eyes of its grandfathers. A ceremony which took place at Jaffa some months ago, when the Scrolls of the Law, which had been removed to a place of safety when the civil population of Jaffa was evacuated by the Turks, were brought back in a triumphal procession, of which the advance guard was formed by members of the 'Makkabi' Athletic Association, the very embodiment of Young Palestine, and an oration full both of piety and of national sentiment was delivered by a Rabbi of the younger school, and men of all shades of belief and unbelief were proud to carry the Scrolls back to their resting-place — this ceremony was symbolic of the way in which the interpenetration of religion and nationalism, which is so characteristic a feature of Hebraism, can find fresh and fruitful expression in the new Palestinian life. And the same truth is evident in the attitude of the young settlement to some of the traditional holidays—which are still holy days—of the Jewish calendar. A festival like the Feast of Tabernacles, laboriously and artificially observed by the town-dwelling Jew of the Diaspora, whose booth, decked out with flowers and fruit which he has not grown himself, is at the mercy of weather conditions not contemplated by those who ordained the rite, renews its youth in the natural setting of village life in Palestine, under its native skies. The Passover, the festival of Jewish freedom and the birth of the nation, is made the occasion of a display of Young Palestine's prowess in horse-riding and kindred exercises. Pentecost is associated with a flower festival and pageant. And some of the 'minor feasts,' which in the Diaspora are neglected or commemorated only by

special prayers, spring into life again as a result of the more intimate contact between the Jew and nature. All this suggests that the Palestinian settlement has begun to turn to account, in ways that are suited to its own needs and conditions, the forms in which the ancient heritage of Hebraism has been handed down through generations of exile, and that, despite all the experiments in mere modernity which are inevitably made by a nation not yet fully fledged, there is no likelihood that Hebrew life in Palestine will become merely a weak copy of the European life from which it must perforce derive much of its technique.

## THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE<sup>1</sup>

IN a sense the future of Palestine, like that of many another country, will be decided by the forthcoming Peace Conference. It will be for the Conference to decide what is to be Palestine—for at present the name 'Palestine,' familiar though it is to millions of men, denotes neither a political unit nor a strictly defined geographical unit—and also who is to be responsible for the government of Palestine in the immediate future. But in another and more fundamental sense the future of Palestine is independent of the Peace Conference. It is beyond doubt, humanly speaking, that Palestine is destined to be in the future what it was in the past, the national homeland of the Jewish people. It is true that the decisions of the Peace Conference may have a very important bearing on the question how long the accomplishment of that destiny is to take. If the Conference gives practical effect to the declarations of the Allied Powers in favour of 'the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People'; if it settles the questions of sovereignty and of boundaries in such a way as to create at once conditions which will secure to the Jewish people the maximum of opportunity to remake Palestine—then it will accelerate the process of development which is necessary before a Jewish

<sup>1</sup> *Asia*, January 1919.

Palestine can become a reality. If other influences prevail, and the Jewish people is robbed of the immediate hope held out to it by the Allied declarations, then the process will be retarded, perhaps for a very long time. But in either case the factor which will ultimately decide is the will of the Jewish people, and the will of the Jewish people is for a Jewish Palestine.

What, however, is meant by 'a Jewish Palestine'? The phrase is not free from the dangers which usually attach to convenient labels. There are some who seem to imagine that Palestine would become a Jewish Palestine by being merely handed over to some sort of Jewish government or government composed of Jews. That view will not bear an investigation that goes beneath the surface and looks for realities. Palestine has been under Turkish rule for some four centuries, but it has never been a Turkish country in any but a purely technical sense. It has remained throughout the period of Turkish rule what it was before that rule began—an Arab country by virtue of its prevailing type of life and language. There are men of a hundred races and creeds in Palestine, but if you wish to see what is typically Palestinian you must look for it not in the hospitals and schools and monasteries founded by immigrants from the West, nor even in the Hebrew agricultural villages, but in the life of the Arab town dwellers and the *fellaheen* of the country-side. And that fact could not be altered in a year or in a hundred years by the mere establishment of a Jewish government in Palestine. Jewish government or no Jewish government, Palestine can become Jewish only through the gradual creation in the country of a large Jewish settlement, which, by virtue of its superior capacity for progress and the greater strength of its national attachment to the land, will in course of time be able to give its own

tone to the life of the country, so that he who wishes to see what is typically Palestinian will seek it naturally in the habits and the institutions, in the literature and the art and the drama and the scholarship of the Jews (or rather the Hebrews) of Palestine. Then, and then only, will Palestine be Jewish in the full sense. It will be the home of the normal or typical Jew (Jews there will be outside Palestine, but they will be to a greater or a less extent deviations from the norm); and it will also be the country in which the normal manifestation of human activity, in whatever sphere, is the Jewish manifestation. That does not mean that there will be no room for other manifestations. On the contrary: Jews have no desire to dispossess the existing inhabitants of Palestine or their descendants, or to impose on them a belief or a culture which they do not want, or to exclude them from any rights or privileges that may at any time belong to inhabitants of Palestine as such. But Palestine is an undeveloped and under-populated country. It is the aim of the Jewish people, without encroaching on existing rights, to further the development and increase the population of the country in such a way that in time to come, however many non-Jews there may be in Palestine, *the* people of Palestine will be the Jewish people. The essential meaning of a Jewish Palestine is not expressed by saying that Palestine is to belong to the Jewish people. It is far better expressed by saying that the Jewish people is to belong to Palestine—to belong to Palestine in actual fact, as it has done for centuries in idea and aspiration.

It is possible already to forecast to some extent the main characteristics of the Jewish Palestine of the future. There are certain ascertained facts on which conclusions as to the future—some fairly certain, others

more tentative—can reasonably be founded. First and foremost, it may be stated with certainty that the language of the Jewish Palestine will be Hebrew. The Jews are a people of many languages. But in modern Palestine, which is already a microcosm of Jewry, practical considerations have combined with a conscious nationalism to make Hebrew in actual fact the language of the Jewish population. This renaissance of Hebrew in Palestine is of much more than linguistic interest. A nation's characteristic ideas can be fully expressed only in its own idiom. Particularly is this true of the Jewish people and Hebrew, a national language which has a history of three thousand years and has been the original vehicle of some of the ideas which have most profoundly affected human life. The Hebrew language is charged with images and associations that recall to the Jew the great creative days of his past. It is for him not simply a means of expression which the prophets and teachers of old used to convey their message; it is a part of his national soul. Hence the return to Hebrew both symbolises and promotes the return of the Jew to his true self, his escape from the shackles of alien modes of thought and expression, which, however high their value, are not those in which his spirit can move and breathe freely. It is the first and most essential step towards that reinterpretation of the universe in Hebraic terms which is one of the primary functions of a Jewish Palestine.

What we call Hebraism is an elusive thing, not to be bound down by dogmas or formulas, yet of an unmistakably distinctive quality. It is an attitude of mind, a tendency, which can never rest satisfied with one of two sharply-contrasted antinomies—with blind faith or pure reason, with materialism or idealism, with worldliness or other-worldliness, with self-assertion or

self-negation—but seeks always a way out which shall do violence to no side of man's nature. The Hebraic idea of God as an absolute, immutable, transcendent Being, who yet reveals himself and works out his will in and through the life of Israel his people ; who is at once tribal and universal, at once a metaphysical principle and a very present help in time of need, at once independent of all human agency and in some way unable to fulfil himself except through the striving of men after goodness—that idea is typical of an attitude to the world which can defy logic without sinking into mysticism, and can insist on the application of abstract principles in human life without making human life the slave of abstractions. In every manifestation of the Hebrew spirit that attitude can be discerned. It has still something to say to the world, and in the Jewish Palestine of the future its new word will be spoken—not merely, perhaps not primarily, through literature or art, but through its particular way of moulding the structure and handling the practical problems of an organised human society.

Towards this revival of Hebraism, this re-equipment of the Jewish people for the task of looking at the world through its own eyes and stamping its own corner of the world with the impress of its own spirit, the revival of Hebrew is already contributing. The special sphere of its contribution at present is education, and in that sphere its contribution is made in two ways. In the first place, the Hebrew schools of Palestine are already training up a generation of men and women in whom whatever they acquire of knowledge and culture will have the distinctive colouring that Hebrew gives, and will be organically combined with those elements of specifically Hebrew tradition which they imbibe from their teaching and from the life around them. For



while it is true that Hebrew geometry does not differ from geometry in any other language, it is equally true that a mind which associates geometry with Hebrew as naturally as it associates the Bible with Hebrew will be able to find scope even in geometry for its distinctive Hebrew quality. And in the second place, the schools themselves occupy a position in the life of Palestinian Jewry which is different from the position occupied by schools in the life of any other nation. For the Jew education has always been a matter of course, not an esoteric privilege of the select few. In Palestine, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, the school is the great focus and fosterer of the corporate consciousness. European in its methods and to a large extent in its curriculum, the Hebrew educational system of Palestine differs from any European model in that it is closely knit into the fabric of a society which on the material side is still at an early stage of development. Among the Jews of Palestine the establishment of a complete Hebrew school system, with kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools, a technical school and teachers' training colleges, has preceded the introduction of telegraphs and telephones and electric lighting. It has also preceded—and this is even more important—that sharp division of society into the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' which is the bane of European civilisation, so that in Palestine there is not and is not likely ever to be any question of a system of elementary schools for the masses and private and secondary schools for the select few. The Hebrew schools of Palestine know nothing of class distinctions. Their very atmosphere is inimical to the formation of a standard of social values based on wealth. The general adoption of co-education is another factor which should make for social solidarity, in so far as it promotes that understanding between

the sexes without which sex equality may increase friction rather than promote harmony.

It is in no sense an accident that the Hebrew schools occupy a central position in the young Jewish national life in Palestine, or that they are developed to an extent which western experience would lead us to regard as disproportionate to the material development of the country. It is a perfectly natural expression of the character of the Jewish people. Jews have spared and will spare no effort to make the most of the material opportunities which Palestine offers. But a purely or even a preponderantly material development is unthinkable to the Jewish mind. It would not correspond to the position which the Jewish outlook allots to the things of the spirit—not exalting them above material things to the hurt of both, but taking them for granted, almost in a matter-of-fact way, as part of man's natural inheritance. This characteristic of the Jew explains the enormous importance which is attached to the Hebrew University at Jerusalem. In the enthusiasm which the University project has evoked there is nothing of a nervous desire to show that Jews appreciate and want 'culture.' Nor is there any 'spirituality' in the European sense. The practical value of the university for the training of engineers and scientists to help in developing Palestine is as fully realised as is its value from the point of view of philosophy and ideals. It is simply regarded by Jews as a thing self-understood that the time for beginning agricultural and commercial development on a large scale is also the time for establishing a university.

The Palestine of the future, then, may be expected to develop, principally through its Hebrew schools and universities, a civilisation in which Hebraism, the characteristically Hebrew attitude toward life, will be one

of the principal moulding forces. That involves, as I have suggested, a particular way of handling the problem of the place of the spiritual in human life—a way which is as far removed from religiosity as from materialism. It involves also a particular way of handling the problems of social organisation. Already in the tiny Hebrew settlements of Palestine there are visible signs of a striving after the realisation of that ideal of social justice which is the keynote of Hebraism on the ethical side. The Hebrews of Palestine are, of course, progressive in their political and social institutions. Equality of the sexes, graduated taxation, communal control in matters affecting health, co-operativism, trade unionism—all these essentially 'modern' things are taken for granted. But this modernity blends in quite a new way with elements from ancient Hebrew tradition, and the individualism of the Jew, so strangely interpenetrated with a strong bent towards collectivism, gives a unique colouring to social experiments for which Europe and America provide the model. One may hazard a guess that in the Jewish commonwealth of the future the fundamental ideas of democracy and socialism will find a new kind of expression, that here a new solution will be attempted of the problem of harmonising democracy with respect for personality, and socialism with respect for individual freedom.

Progressiveness is equally the note of the Jewish contribution of recent years to the material development of Palestine. The Jews alone—apart from a few German settlements—have brought modern methods to bear on the cultivation of the soil. They use modern implements and machinery, while the *fellah* is content with the type of equipment which served his ancestors centuries ago. They have made swamps and desert places flourish again, have improved the yield of the

soil twofold and threefold, and have successfully introduced new products, such as the almond. An Agricultural Experiment Station in Palestine has already made valuable contributions both to the scientific study of local conditions and to the general stock of agricultural knowledge. Palestine is likely, so far as can be foreseen, to remain primarily an agricultural country, and its conditions favour intensive agriculture. The experience of recent Jewish colonisation justifies a belief that the Jews will make the most of its possibilities. Long neglected areas will be reclaimed and made fruitful, and Palestine will be turned from a largely barren land into one of the most productive countries in the world—a country which will support a population of some millions.

In commerce also Palestine has undoubtedly a great future. The commercial genius of the Jew will use to the full the advantages offered by its central position. Linked by railways with Europe and Africa, and possessing sea outlets on the Mediterranean and perhaps on the Red Sea, it will be on the high road of communication between East and West. Its own exports of wine and fruits and corn and its imports of manufactures from the West will be considerable; but its transit traffic will be of even greater commercial importance. And with this linking function in the world of commerce there will be associated a not less important function in relation to the deeper things of civilisation. A Jewish Palestine, facing eastwards and westwards, will be in a unique position both to blend in its own life and thought elements from East and West, and to transmit between East and West the very diverse spiritual currents which at present make two worlds out of what should be one. The middle term between oriental faith and fatalism and occidental science and progress can

be found in Palestine if anywhere, and by the Jewish people, born in the East and schooled in the West, if by any people. In this harmonising work the Hebrew University of Jerusalem will play a decisive part.

The future of industry in Palestine is probably a modest one as compared with that of agriculture or commerce, though one must beware of rating it too low. The sharp falls of the Jordan and other streams will afford motive power for electricity. The abundance of fruit and olives gives obvious scope for jam-making and soap manufacture, and the flowers in which Palestine is so rich will provide the raw material for the manufacture of scents. Paper of the finer qualities will be made from the papyrus of the Jordan valley, and cigarettes from locally grown tobacco. There are also the considerable and as yet largely unexplored mineral resources of the Dead Sea and its neighbourhood. But Palestine is not marked out for industry on the large modern scale. It has probably neither coal nor iron. That fact is from some points of view a disadvantage, but it has weighty compensations. A sturdy peasantry is a far better basis for a new or renewed national life than a crowded and cramped industrial proletariat; nor is it to be regretted that Palestine offers few attractions to the type of settler or of capitalist whose motive is a desire to get rich quickly rather than that love for the land which induces a willingness to work hard and steadily for a modest competence. And in view of the enormous problems which industrialisation has begotten in western countries, where it has created conditions which make a 'back to the land' policy as difficult as it is necessary, one may renounce the prospect of a vast industrial development for Palestine without qualms.

Any consideration of the future of Palestine would be incomplete without some mention of the influence which the revival of Palestine may be expected to have on the neighbouring countries. It may be anticipated that the Peace Conference will ratify the creation of an Arab kingdom of Arabia and Mesopotamia. That kingdom will include vast territories no less capable of agricultural and commercial development than is Palestine itself. The existence of a progressive Jewish settlement in Palestine should greatly improve the chance for the Arabs to attain that development, which they are scarcely in a position to undertake at present without assistance. The Jews are marked out to play an important part in the restoration of these countries to their ancient productiveness, not only because of geographical proximity, but also through the fact that there is a kinship both of race and of spirit between Jew and Arab—a kinship which history has obscured but not destroyed by the temporary severance of the Jew from his native surroundings. Both Jew and Arab will profit from a renewal of close relations, and the Jewish Palestine will benefit itself in benefiting the Arab countries. There may even be another Judæo-Arab intellectual partnership like that which restored medical science and philosophy to Europe in the Dark Ages.

Such, then, are the broad outlines of the future of Palestine as they present themselves to the eye of a Jew who stands on the threshold of the revival of his nation. It may perhaps be thought that the forecast errs somewhat on the side of hopefulness; but assuredly it is no mere Utopian fantasy. That Palestine can again be made to support a population of some millions, with a strong agricultural backbone; that it can again become one of the highly productive portions of the

globe; that the Jewish people, wedded once more to its historic soil, can create a civilisation in which the Hebrew genius will find a fuller expression than it can find to-day; that Palestine thus Hebraised can become a link between East and West, spiritually as well as commercially; that the revival of Palestine can supply the necessary stimulus to the awakening of the whole of the Near East—these are propositions which, if they cannot be demonstrated, at least run counter to no principle of reason, and make no excessive demand on the faith of those who know something of Palestine and of the Jewish people.

It has been assumed throughout this article that the new Palestine is to be essentially a Jewish creation. That is true in the sense that the impulse to the making of a new Palestine springs from the unquenchable national longing of the Jewish people, and that the Jews must be the architects of the new Palestine and the Hebrew spirit must mould and direct the forms of its life. But it is not intended to suggest that only the Jews of to-day and their descendants can take part in the work. In their own interests and in those of Palestine the Jews will welcome the co-operation of the native non-Jewish population of the country. A truly healthy Palestine is unthinkable so long as a section of its present population remains backward and unprogressive, and Jews do not want a 'native problem' to divert their energies and hamper their efforts. Time alone will show to what extent the *fellaheen*, oppressed for centuries by alien masters and absentee landlords, are capable of coming abreast of the times. The modern technical equipment of the Jew, his Hebrew schools and his democratic and collectivist institutions, should at least give these peasant inhabitants of the land the opportunity of

realising whatever capacity for progress they have. There are some who hold that Jewish blood runs in the veins of the *fellaheen*—that they are the lineal descendants of the ancient Jewish peasantry, which, though conquered by and intermingled with the Arab invaders, has never been entirely eradicated. If that is so, the gradual voluntary assimilation of the *fellaheen* into a Hebrew society—not necessarily involving a change of religion—may turn out to be less difficult than it appears at first sight. It is more likely, however, that the growth of a Hebrew civilisation in Palestine will stimulate the parallel development of an Arab civilisation, similar in technique but somewhat different in spirit, among the Arabs. At any rate, it must be the aim of the Jews of Palestine to enable all the inhabitants of the country, whether of Jewish stock or not, to participate fully in the benefits of progress, both economic and cultural, and contribute to its development. It should be unnecessary to add that in seeking that end the Jews must and will rely not on any kind of force, but simply on the attraction of a more efficient and more highly developed civilisation.

There is one other point, albeit a negative one from a purely Jewish point of view, which is too important to be omitted. Palestine is for millions of men, both Christian and Moslem, no less a Holy Land than it is for the Jew. It contains a number of sites and relics which have a peculiar sanctity for the adherents of different faiths. Jews have no desire to control or to interfere in any way with the Holy Places of other religions. The Jewish Palestine of the future will be at least as worthy as Palestine has been hitherto of the religious attachment of the non-Jew, and at least as free a field for the legitimate manifestations of that attachment. Freed from its unhappy rôle of an apple



of political discord, Palestine will be better qualified, not worse qualified, to serve as a rallying-point for the highest human aspirations, as a concrete symbol of that identity of ultimate ideal which unites what is best in all nations and all creeds.

## PALESTINE AS THE SPIRITUAL CENTRE OF JEWRY<sup>1</sup>

THE effects which the revival of Jewish national life in Palestine is likely to produce on the Jewish people as a whole may conveniently be considered under three heads : political, economic, and spiritual. The first two of these terms are sufficiently clear to need no explanation. Of the third it must be premised that it is used here in the widest sense of which the word is susceptible, as embracing everything that pertains to the domain of the spirit—ideas and emotions, beliefs and aspirations, principles and prejudices, intellectual, moral and psychological characteristics, together with their expressions in conduct and in worship, in literature and in art.

It is obvious that the Jewish Palestine of the future, to whatever degree of political and economic development it may attain, will not make all the Jews of the world into a single political or economic unit. Even in the case of a normal people, which has lived and grown on its own soil for centuries, there are always some individuals who live away from the national home-land, and are not directly affected by any change in its system of voting or taxation or tariffs. In the case of the Jews, who must remain at least for many generations to come more numerous outside Palestine than in it, any sugges-

<sup>1</sup> 1919.

tion of an economic or political unit embracing all the individual members of the people is a patent absurdity. Palestine can obviously claim no political hegemony over Jews who have never been in Palestine, and the economic condition of such Jews obviously cannot be dependent on the economic system of Palestine. To the Jew in the United States, for instance, considered purely as a citizen, it can make no difference whether the franchise in Palestine is limited or extended ; a constitutional change in Palestine will mean just as little to him, *quâ* citizen, as a constitutional change in France or in Kamschatka. To the same Jew considered purely as a tailor it can make no difference whether there is or is not a Tailors' Union in Palestine. The political unit to which he belongs as citizen, the economic unit to which he belongs as tailor, is not Palestine, but the United States. This is no doubt painfully obvious, but it is one of those painfully obvious truths which are often overlooked.

To say that the Jews of the whole world cannot become a single political or economic unit is not of course to say that a Jewish Palestine can have no reactions of a strictly political and economic kind on the life of Jewry as a whole. It has often been contended by Zionists that a Jewish state in Palestine would be able to help the masses of Jews in Eastern Europe to obtain political rights and economic freedom. The time has gone by for debating the correctness of that contention, because there is now good reason to hope that when the world settles down after the ferment of the great war the position of the Jewish masses in respect of political rights and economic freedom will at least be much better than it was before the war. But, setting aside any question of actual political intervention by a Jewish state, one can see already how the mere existence of a

Jewish Palestine may reinforce the political claims of the Jews in Eastern Europe. For what they claim is simply the recognition of Jewish national groups, entitled as such to participation in the affairs of the various states and to a proper measure of internal autonomy ; and while a claim of that kind is intelligible enough without reference to a Jewish Palestine, since the Jewish settlements in Eastern Europe are homogeneous groups with a language and a type of life which differentiate them from their neighbours, yet logically it presupposes a Jewish Palestine, because the very conception of a minority national group implies that the nation to which the group belongs has somewhere or other a national home-land of its own. Thus the Jewish claim to national rights in Eastern Europe loses something of cogency through the fact that a Jewish Palestine has still to be made a reality. Nor is it only the theoretical basis of the claim that suffers. For the question of national rights at once raises the question of the national language of the group which claims those rights, and in the case of the Jews the national language—Hebrew—is not their normal medium of intercourse. It is true that Hebrew as a living language has made great strides among the Jews of Eastern Europe under the impulse of the national revival ; but Yiddish is still the language of the masses, and, broadly speaking, occupies *de facto* the position occupied by the national language in the life of any other national group. For the present, therefore, the Jewish nationalist is bound to claim recognition for Yiddish as well as for Hebrew, and this fact complicates his case by necessitating explanations and reservations for which in the normal case there is no need. This partial abnormality of the Jewish claim to national rights in Eastern Europe can be removed only when it becomes possible for Hebrew

to be the general language of everyday intercourse, or at any rate of Jewish public business and of Jewish schools. Now there can be no doubt that that development will be immensely easier when there is in Palestine a model of a large Hebrew-speaking Jewish community. Thus a Jewish Palestine may react favourably on the strength of the political claims of Jewish groups in the countries of Eastern Europe, not by affecting political conditions in those countries, but by helping to remove an anomaly in Jewish life. The reaction will be strictly a spiritual one (in the sense defined above), but it will have, or at any rate may have, consequences of a political character.

In the economic sphere, again, it is possible that far-reaching changes will follow on, or even accompany, the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish Palestine. One must, indeed, dismiss the idea that emigration to Palestine itself will make a radical difference to the economic position of the Jews in those countries where, in consequence either of the general absence of economic development, or of anti-Semitism, or of both causes combined, masses of Jews live in a state of poverty. However rapid the development of Palestine may be, and however liberal may be the boundaries assigned to it, there is no ground for thinking that within any given period of time it will be able to absorb a number of immigrants from the present centres of Jewish population so large as to do much more than offset the natural increase of population in those centres. There are to-day not less than six million Jews in the territories which before the war were comprised in the Russian and Austrian empires. Now suppose that for the next twenty-five years Jews from those territories are able to settle in Palestine at the rate of 100,000 a year—really an impossibly high figure for the earlier years

at any rate—and that no other cause operates to reduce artificially the Jewish population (for we are considering the effects of emigration to Palestine alone, apart from other possible factors). Then at the end of that time two and a half out of the six millions will have emigrated. But, assuming a rate of increase of 10 per 1,000 per annum, which is a low rate for Jews, there will have been a growth of something like one and a half millions in the same period, so that the net decrease will not be more than a million. And it has to be remembered that if Palestine did absorb two and a half million Jews from Eastern Europe in the next twenty-five years, its capacity would be very much less in the succeeding period, for allowance has to be made both for the natural growth of population in Palestine itself, and for immigration from other parts of the world than Eastern Europe. From this it is plain that emigration to *Palestine itself* will never effect a radical transformation of the economic problem of the Jews in what used to be Russia and Austria. It is, however, not impossible that the Jewish development of Palestine may lead to a large Jewish emigration not only to Palestine itself, but also to Arabia and Mesopotamia, where there should be a wide field for Jewish enterprise, working in harmony with the interests of the new Arab state and of the mandatory power of Mesopotamia. Thus it may be that the development of a Jewish Palestine will have as one of its consequences a shifting of the numerical centre of Jewry to the Near East, with the result that the political and economic conditions which affect the lot of the great masses of Jews will no longer be those prevailing in Eastern Europe. That, however, cannot affect the iron fact that, wherever the masses of extra-Palestinian Jews are, their political and economic fortunes must be governed primarily by the political and economic

conditions prevailing in the territories in which they are, and not by those prevailing in Palestine.

What this brief analysis brings into relief is that the problem of the Jew *quâ Jew* is not a political or an economic problem, but—in our sense of the term—a spiritual one, and that if a Jewish Palestine can make any abiding contribution to the solution of the Jewish problem, it must be a contribution of a spiritual kind. Political and economic conditions have, of course, an important bearing on the problem, because life is one, and the departments into which we are compelled to divide it for purposes of thought and action are all closely interconnected. But the fact remains that we do not get at the heart of the Jewish problem by regarding the Jew simply as an individual (or a member of a group) enjoying or denied political rights or the possibility of economic development. We have to regard the Jew, wherever and whatever he may be, simply as a Jew, as a member of the Jewish people, before his real problem appears at all; and when we do that we are at once struck by a fact which explains what the real problem is—namely, that ‘the Jewish people’ is incapable of any precise definition. This term presupposes the existence of certain common properties which distinguish a certain unit of human beings from other units; but what those properties are no man can say. The Jewish people obviously is not, and cannot be, a single political or economic unit; the basis of its unity must, then, be spiritual. But in what common qualities or characteristics or beliefs or practices or interests does this spiritual unity find expression? The readiest answer is, no doubt, ‘in the Jewish religion.’ But that answer only repeats the question in a different form. For an examination of the Jewish religion as believed and practised on the one hand by the Jews in a Russian

ghetto, who carry on scrupulously the tradition of centuries, and on the other hand by the worshippers at a Jewish temple in New York, who have discarded the greater part of that tradition, would reveal much more of contrast than of similarity, and that not merely in the matter of outward observance, but even more in mental outlook and emotional quality and moral standard. And between these two extremes there are numerous shades and gradations of what purports to be 'the Jewish religion,' and it would tax the most ingenious to find any strictly religious principle which at once unites them all and distinguishes them from other religions. Besides, there are many Jews to-day who profess indifference or even hostility to any and every form of religion, and yet call themselves Jews and are regarded as Jews. Nor is the case any better if we try to substitute some metaphysical or moral or æsthetic criterion for the strictly religious one. A Jew may be a Spinozist or a Hegelian or a Bergsonian, an intuitionist or a utilitarian, a realist or a romanticist or a symbolist. Something, we feel, there must be, apart from the mere fact or supposition of common descent, which justifies the expression 'the Jewish people'; but we try in vain to discover what that something is. That would not matter very much if it meant merely failure to satisfy a thirst for abstract knowledge. But the impossibility of defining 'the Jewish people' is simply the theoretical counterpart of the hard and painful fact that large and increasing numbers of persons who have every right to be called Jews are insensibly drifting into a position in which the right to that name carries with it no sort of corresponding obligation towards the human group of which it betokens membership. To many a modern Jew the things which he is taught that he ought to believe and do as a Jew make no appeal,



because they do not square with the ideas which he derives from his general education and the character of his environment, and he finds himself in consequence unprovided with any acceptable and effective way of expressing in his own life his attachment to the human group to which he belongs by birth and by some of his deepest instincts. In the end this must lead him to sever himself from the group. And during the period of transition he misrepresents the group in the eyes of the world, which naturally assumes that, being a Jew, he knows what is Jewish and thinks and acts according to some pattern of Jewishness. But it is precisely because of the absence of any such pattern that the individual Jew so often leads a life in which (however estimable it may be) there is little or no specifically Jewish content, contributes nothing, or next to nothing, to the maintenance and strengthening of his own human group, and bequeaths to his children, as their only Jewish inheritance, an empty name of which they are glad to rid themselves.

The primary function of a Jewish Palestine in the life of Jewry as a whole is just to provide that 'pattern of Jewishness' for the lack of which the spiritual unity of the Jewish people has become weakened, and the tie that should bind the individual to the group has become incapable of definition and often ineffective in practice. This truth was first clearly perceived nearly thirty years ago by the philosopher of the Hebrew revival, Achad ha-Am (Asher Ginzberg), who has made famous the conception of Palestine as a 'spiritual centre' of Jewry. In the light of what has been said above this conception will be readily understood. It does not of course suggest, as has been sometimes absurdly supposed, that a Jewish Palestine is to have none but 'spiritual' concerns. It does not imply that a Jewish Palestine can have no

reactions on the political and economic position of any group of Jews outside Palestine. It means that a Jewish Palestine, in which the ideas and the qualities that are really characteristic of the Jew will find free expression in every department of life—in agriculture, commerce, industry, political and social organisation, learning, literature, art, and morality—that this Jewish Palestine will be of fundamental importance to the Jews outside Palestine in that it will revive their spiritual unity by providing them with a model of what Jewish life is—a model by reference to which they will be able to measure the Jewishness of their own lives—and with a living source of Jewish influence to quicken their Jewishness and give it definition and solid content.

It is probable that just as the revival of the Hebrew language is the most vital factor in the development of a distinctively Jewish type of life in Palestine itself, so the Hebrew language will play a decisive part in the re-establishment of spiritual contact between Palestine and the Diaspora and between different groups of Jews in the Diaspora. Reference has been made above to the importance of the language question in relation to the political problem of those Jews who live in large and compact masses. Among them it is not impossible that Hebrew may in course of time become the actual spoken language of every day. Hebrew schools could bring about that change in two or three generations, with the stimulus and the help that Palestine will give. In western countries, where the Jews are not and cannot be organised as national groups, the possibilities of Hebrew development are naturally more limited. But this is no reason why Hebrew should not become sufficiently familiar to the average Jew in western countries to be the normal language of the Synagogue—that is to say, not merely, as now, the language in which prayers

are recited (whether they are understood or not), but the language of the sermon, of Jewish study, and of communal business. Hebrew-speaking Rabbis and teachers from Palestine will introduce a more exacting standard of Hebrew knowledge than exists at present among assimilated Jews, and under their influence the prevalent way of regarding Hebrew as a dead language, of which the Jewish child needs a smattering in order to perform certain religious exercises, will give place to a realisation of the essential connection of Judaism with the original language of the Bible.

For the Synagogue, which will no doubt remain the normal form of Jewish organisation in western countries, this development will be fraught with incalculable good. The Synagogue will no longer be a thing exotic, tucked away into a corner of a life from which it is divorced by the strangeness of its language and tradition. It will no longer need to make desperate efforts to get into closer touch with that life by assimilating itself to the forms and the atmosphere of non-Jewish places of worship. When ability to understand the Bible and the Hebrew prayer-book is no longer the hall-mark of a 'scholar,' but a property of the ordinary Jew, the Synagogue will have an appeal dependent neither on mere tenacity of instinct nor on artificial attempts to make it 'attractive.' It will be able to develop, if development be necessary, on lines determined by the Jewish sense and knowledge of its congregants and by the example of development in Palestine. It will no longer be a purely 'religious' as opposed to a 'secular' institution; and its teaching will stand in an intelligible relation to all sides of the spiritual life of those who frequent it. For the same Jew who recites old Hebrew prayers in the Synagogue will read Hebrew books and papers produced in Palestine


in his own day. He may conduct his business correspondence with Palestine in Hebrew, and may meet now and again with a Hebrew-speaking Palestinian. As a child he will lisp Hebrew songs and dog-ear Hebrew picture-books; as a young man he may take a course of study at the Jerusalem University. Thus Hebraic influences will contribute to the moulding of his outlook as living forces, not as voices from a dead and unintelligible past. He will learn to understand himself as Jew, to realise what it means to be a Jew, and to find in the Synagogue, or in some of the activities connected with it, an expression of his personality which he could not do without.

Judaism under these conditions will obviously be more clearly definable and more exacting than it is now. It will become impossible for a man to be a Jew merely 'by birth.' A man will be either a Jew or a non-Jew, not both at once. For those in whom the Jewish instinct has become so weak that they do not find it worth while to re-assimilate themselves to Hebrew thought, the alternative will be to identify themselves completely with their non-Jewish surroundings. Those who choose to remain will have to live up to their professions. As a reward they will have a deeper spiritual unity, a greater homogeneity of outlook, and consequently will be better able to shoulder that corporate responsibility for the individual Jew which is imposed on all Jews by a dictum of the Rabbis as well as (too often in a less friendly spirit) by a critical world. Presenting Judaism to the eyes of the world in all its manifestations, whether better or worse, they will have a right to expect the world not to condemn a Jew as Jew except for some short-coming which is demonstrably a result of his Judaism. Thus one at any rate of the handles of anti-Semitism

will disappear ; and if anti-Semitism itself does not disappear, at least its moral sting will be less bitter, both because of the greater spiritual solidarity of the Jewish people, and because nobody will be a Jew without a conviction that it is a good thing to be a Jew, and those who have that conviction will be armed against the slings and arrows of the enemy.

Jewish communities thus strengthened and re-vivified will be the natural channels through which currency will be given to whatever a Jewish Palestine may be able to contribute to human progress. A knowledge of Hebrew is scarcely likely to become part of the ordinary equipment of the educated European or American ; and there will be work for the European and the American Jew to do in translating into his own vernacular the best fruits of Palestinian thought and scholarship. At the same time, Jewish students at the Universities will no doubt take up Semitic studies in larger numbers, and will be able to relate those studies to the real issues of the present, because for them Hebraism will be not an archaeological survival, but a living fountain of ideas. Most of all, perhaps, in the field of biblical research will their work be of value—a field in which the assimilated Jew of to-day scarcely appears. Modern critical study has of course contributed enormously to the elucidation of the Bible, but the critics are generally men very far removed by their mentality and training from that Jewish spirit which finds in the Bible its highest expression. The Jewish student of the future, familiar with Hebrew from his early years, and accustomed to the traditional Jewish method of approaching the Bible, but taught to regard honest inquiry as a tribute and not an affront to it, should have ideal qualifications for taking a worthy part in its scientific study.

We may picture, then, 'the Jewish people' becoming a reality—a spiritual reality—under the influence of a Jewish Palestine; freed from the dead-weight of the merely racial Jews; demanding and receiving a greater measure of willing service from those who remain staunch in their adherence; united in a community of the spirit which expresses itself in thought and conduct and literature as well as in worship; scattered throughout the world, yet conscious in all its parts of a bond which transcends geography and is independent of citizenship. Non-Jews sometimes imagine that Jewry is a sort of 'secret society,' the members of which are ready to take orders from some hidden authority. Nothing could be either more untrue in fact or more unlike what Jews desire. It would be contrary to the whole spirit and tradition of Judaism to have either in Palestine or elsewhere a central authority commanding the obedience of all Jews, whether in political or in spiritual matters. 'The Law shall go forth out of Zion'; but the 'Law' is *Torah*—teaching, spiritual influence—not the binding enactments of a sovereign. And so the 'spiritual centre' will strengthen the Jewish people not by imposing on it the fetters of an organisation, but by giving it the unity which comes of conscious and willing service to great ideals, and enabling it to face the world, whether friendly or hostile, with moral courage and dignity.







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